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NEGOTIATION  TABLE:  INTERNAL
CONFLICTS  AMONG  ISRAELIS
AND  AMONG  PALESTINIANS
Robert H. Mnookin,  Ehud Eiran,  and  Sreemati Mitter*
I.  INTRODUCTION
A profound  paradox  characterizes  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict:  While
the outline of a two-state solution  that would better  serve the  interests of most
Israelis  and most  Palestinians  is  reasonably  clear,  leaders  of both  parties  are
unable to  reach agreement  across  the negotiation  table this  seemingly  intracta-
ble, often violent, conflict persists.  Indeed, during the five years since the col-
lapse of the Oslo peace process, more than  1000 Israelis  and 3000 Palestinians
have  died  in  renewed  violence.  We  believe  the essential  explanation  for  this
paradox  relates  to  profound  internal  conflicts  among  Israeli  Jews  on  the  one
hand,  and among Palestinians on the other.  These  "behind the table"  conflicts
within each  community  stand as  barriers to progress  at  the negotiation  table.'
The general  terms of a two-state  deal  are well  known.  President  Clinton
outlined  them  to  the  parties  in  December  of  2000.2  This  outline  included
arrangements  to ensure  a secure  Israel, which  would remain  a democratic  Jew-
ish state.  A  Palestinian  state would be established,  that would comprise  Gaza
and essentially  all  of the West  Bank.  All Jewish  settlements  would  be evacu-
ated, with possible exceptions for those very near the "Green  Line"3 or adjacent
*  Robert  H.  Mnookin  is  the  Williston Professor  of  Law  at  Harvard  where  he  chairs  the
Program  on Negotiation  and directs  the Harvard Negotiation Research Project.  This article
derives from  a lecture he delivered at  the Saltman  Center at  the William  S.  Boyd  School  of
Law  at the  University of Nevada,  Las  Vegas  on  March  17,  2005.  Ehud  Eiran  is  a  Senior
Research  Fellow,  and  Sreemati  Mitter is a Research Associate  with the Harvard  Negotiation
Research  Project.  Those portions of this Article  dealing with the Jewish  settlements  in the
West Bank and Gaza  draw upon an  article by  Robert H. Mnookin  and Ehud  Eiran, Discord
'Behind  the  Table':  The Internal  Conflict  Among  Israeli Jews  Concerning  the  Future  of
Settlements  in the  West  Bank and Gaza,  I J. OF Disp. RESOL.  11  (2005).  The authors wish to
thank Jonathan  Greenberg,  Jawad  Issa, and Aviva  Meyer  for their useful  comments.
1  Interactions between "across  the table negotiations" and conflicts among each negotiator's
constituents  characterize  bargaining  in labor relations  and international  relations, and there is
an  academic  literature dealing with each.  For relevant citations  see Mnookin  & Eiran, supra
note  *, at  13  n.8.  See  also  Russell  Korobkin  & Jonathan  Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Road
Map:  A Negotiation  Theory  Perspective  on  the  Israeli-Palestinian  Conflict After  Yasser
Arafat,  30 YALE J.  INT'L L.  1 (2005).
2  See  DENNIS  Ross,  THE  MISSING  PEACE:  THE  INSIDE  STORY  OF  THE  FIGHT FOR  MIDDLE
EAST  PEACE 752-53  (2004).
3 The "Green  Line" was the  cease-fire  line,  established  in  1949, that became  a provisional
border  between Israel  and  the territory controlled by Jordan before the  1967  War.  See  Rob-NEVADA  LAW  JOURNAL
to  Jerusalem.  Those  settlements  might be  annexed  to  Israel  in exchange  for
land that is presently  part of Israel,  and other considerations.  Jerusalem would
become  a  condominium  of sorts, encompassing  the internationally  recognized
capitals of two states,  Israel and Palestine.  Arab east Jerusalem would become
the capital  of the new Palestinian  state, while the Jewish  portions of Jerusalem
would  be  Israeli.  The  Palestinian  claim  that  their  refugees  have  a  "right  of
return"  would be definitively resolved in  a way that guaranteed Jews remained
a substantial  majority  in Israel proper.
We argue  in  this paper  that this conspicuous  and  as  of yet  unachievable
deal, while serving  the interests  of most Israelis  and most Palestinians,  creates
profound conflicts  within  each community.  These conflicts  help explain  why
the Oslo Principles  were  so  vague,  why  there has  been  a  pattern  within  both
communities  of deferring  decisions  on these issues, and why, although there is
substantial evidence  that  moderates  on  both  sides might  be  able  to make  this
deal,  it has never been accomplished.4
Among Israeli  Jews, the internal  conflict concerns the  future of the settle-
ments.  A contiguous Palestinian  state in the West Bank portion5  would encom-
pass  many existing Jewish  settlements,  and as  a practical  matter displace  tens
of thousands  of Jewish  settlers.  It would also mark  the end of the  "settlement
project."  For  some  religiously  observant  Israelis,  this  project  was  meant  to
guarantee  the fulfillment  of  a  messianic  desire  to  include  within  the  Jewish
state the cradle of "Eretz  Yisrael,"6  or biblically  significant parts of the ancient
Jewish land.  The political  and social turmoil that Israel experienced  prior and
ert J.  Araujo, Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion-Legal  Consequences of the Con-
struction  of a  Wall  in the  Occupied Palestinian Territory:  Fences [Do Not]  Make  Good
Neighbors?, 22  B.U.  INT'L  L.J.  349,  365-66  (2004).
1  Many blame  the breakdown  at  Camp David on  Yasser Arafat,  see Ross supra note 2,  at
710, although  Prime  Minister Ehud Barak  and President  Clinton  are sometimes  said  to be
responsible  as  well.  Compare Hussein Agha  & Robert Malley,  Camp David:  The  Tragedy
of Errors, N.Y.  REV.  OF  BOOKS,  Aug.  9,  2001,  available at http://www.nybooks.com/arti-
cles/14380, with Dennis Ross, Gidi Grinstein,  Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, Camp David:
An Exchange, N.Y.  REV.  OF  BOOKS,  Sept. 20, 2001,  available at http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/14529.  See also Jeremy Pressman,  Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp
David and Taba?, 28  INr'L  SECURITY 5, (2003),  available at http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/
international-security/v028/28.2pressman.pdf.  In the  years since,  some  commentators  have
suggested that the Bush II administration  bears blame  for the lack of progress  towards  reso-
lution because it failed to design a strategy  to enable  the parties to accept the terms of a deal
that would appear  to serve  the interests  of both sides.  See  Gareth Evans  & Robert  Malley,
Roadblocks on the Path to Peace, N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct. 24,  2002,  at A35  (claiming President
Bush  lacked  a  sufficient  plan  for comprehensive  political  settlement  between  Israel  and
Palestinians);  Thomas  L. Friedman, A  Rude Awakening, N.Y.  TIMES,  Feb.  5,  2004,  at A31
(blaming  the  Bush  foreign  policy  team  for  failing  to  tailor the  peace  process  to  build  a
moderate center Palestinian bloc).  Other explanations  suggest the possible absence of a bar-
gaining zone between  the two parties,  or mutual  hard bargaining.  See  Korobkin  & Zasloff,
supra note  I.
5 It  is  widely  assumed  that  the Palestinian  state  will  have  two  non-contiguous  parts:  the
Gaza Strip and the West  Bank.
6 "Eretz  Yisrael,"  literally  "land  of Israel."  Politically,  the  term  means  "greater  Israel,"
those areas that were promised to the Jews in the Bible including areas that are not under the
sovereignty of the modem  state of Israel.  The territory that was held by the under British as
a  mandate  from  the  League of Nations  1920  control  (1917-1948)  was  called  "Palestine-
Eretz  Yisrael."
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during the  relocation  of some  8500  settlers  from  Gaza  (which  has  little relig-
ious significance  to Jews)  and the northern  West Bank in the summer of 2005
underlines  the  salience  and  importance  of the  internal  conflict concerning  the
future of the West  Bank settlements  spread over the biblical heartland,  where
over  250,000 Jewish  settlers  now  live.
Among  Palestinians, one of the more  pressing  internal  conflicts  concerns
the  "right  of return"  of Palestinian  refugees  and  their descendants  to what  is
now  Israel  in order to claim  and reoccupy  the land and property that had been
theirs  before  Israel  was  established.  During  what  Israelis  call  their  War  of
Independence  and  what  Palestinians  call  the  "disaster,"  about  750,000 Pales-
tinians became refugees.  Today, they  and their descendents  number  in the mil-
lions,  many  of whom remain  in refugee  camps  not only in Gaza and the West
Bank  but  also  in  Lebanon,  Syria,  and  Jordan.  Unlike  the  internal  conflict
among  Israeli  Jews  over  the  settlement  project,  which  is  conspicuously
revealed in  very public disputes at the center of Israeli  politics and Israeli  civil
society,  the  internal  Palestinian  conflict  over  the  scope  and meaning  of  this
right  is  not  so  conspicuous  and  has  not  been  a  matter  of  substantial  similar
public debate.  As we will show, in part because the Palestinian  national libera-
tion movement  has defined itself as a refugee  movement, at the  level of politi-
cal rhetoric,  there would appear  to be a nearly  unanimous  commitment among
Palestinian  leaders  to a  right  that  is  both  a  collective  right  of the  Palestinian
people and a "fundamental"  and "inalienable"  individual right of every refugee
to choose whether to return to what is now Israel. But beneath the surface, there
lurks  a  profound  internal  conflict  among  Palestinians  about  the  scope  and
meaning  of this  right of return.
Privately,  many  Palestinians  acknowledge  that it  is  unrealistic  to  expect
that  Israel  will  accept large  numbers of Palestinian  refugees.  Moreover,  some
polls suggest that many refugees would rather get compensation and citizenship
rights  in a  new  Palestinian  state  or  in  some  other country7  of their  choosing
than  live  in  Israel.  But  the  same  polls  indicate  a  substantial  minority  of the
refugees  and their descendants  would prefer to return  to their original  lands  in
what  is  now  Israel.  The disappointment  and  anger of these  Palestinians  over
any negotiated deal extinguishing  their right of return is widely seen as capable
of erupting  into violent opposition.
These  internal  "behind  the  table"  conflicts  interact  with,  and  create
problems  for, any  significant across  the table  negotiations  between  the Israeli
government  and  the  Palestinian  Authority.  Indeed,  these  interactions  best
explain  why it is difficult for Israeli and Palestinian leaders to make and imple-
ment  a comprehensive  deal.  On  the one hand,  if an  Israeli  leader  goes to the
negotiating  table insisting  on the broad territorial  claims  of the  national  relig-
ious settlers, or if a Palestinian negotiator presses for the expansive demands  of
refugees  who  insist  on return  to  Israel  "proper",  negotiations  across  the  table
are doomed.  On the other hand, a two-state  accord that might satisfy the inter-
ests  of  most  Israelis  and  most  Palestinians  risks  turmoil  and  even  violence
"behind  the table"  within each  community.
I  Korobkin  & Zasloff, supra note  1, at 55-56.
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Part II of this paper begins by describing conflicting Palestinian  and Israeli
perspectives concerning  the origins of the refugee problem,  its scope, and who
should bear moral,  legal, political or economic  responsibility for its resolution.
We  next review  the  history of Israeli  settlements  and  show how,  in  the  after-
math  of the  1967  Six  Day  War,  a  settlement  movement  led  by  determined
national religious settlers promoted and  vastly expanded Jewish  settlements  on
the West  Bank and Gaza.  Finally,  we  demonstrate  the centrality  and  intracta-
bility of the refugee and settlement  issues by  examining the recent  across-the-
table  negotiating  history  between  the  Israeli  government  and the  Palestinians.
Part III  marshals  the  evidence  to  demonstrate  the  existence of  profound
internal  conflicts  on these  issues.  With respect  to  the  internal Israeli  conflict
concerning  the  settlements,  the  evidence  is  conspicuous  and  overwhelming.
The  difficulties  faced  by  Prime  Minister  Sharon  in  removing  less  than  four
percent  of the settlers  serve  as  a vivid  reminder.  The  internal conflict  among
Palestinians  about the scope  and meaning  of the right of return is  more subtle
but  no less  difficult.  We trace  the changing  currents  of Palestinian thought  on
these  issues to  show  how,  since  the collapse  of the Oslo process, the internal
conflicts  have become  explicit and public.  After describing these two  internal
conflicts,  we  compare them.  In each case,  the  most  fervent  proponents  claim
their legitimacy  within each community  founded on a reading of history.  Both
employ a narrative based  on suffering  and past victimization,  and the claims of
each  implicate  their  core  identity.  As  we  will  show,  each  is  able  to  sound
themes  that  have  broad  resonance  even  among  their  compatriots  who  think
their  more extreme  claims are  unrealistic  and counterproductive.
The  conclusion  suggests  that  managing  internal  conflicts  like  these
demands  a combination  of empathy  and assertiveness  on the part of Israeli  and
Palestinian  leaders.  Empathy  is  required  because  a  stable  two-state  solution
will  require  that Israeli  settlers  be displaced  from  their homes  and Palestinian
refugees  give  up  all  hope  of returning  to  what  had  once  been  their  homes.
Ending  the  settlement  project and  forgoing the  right of return  would  involve
profound sacrifices  on the part of members of each of those groups,  giving up
hopes and dreams that have given meaning  to their lives.  Within each commu-
nity,  some  would  be  required  to  suffer  and  pay  a  price  for  the  sake  of  the
greater  good  of their people.  We  suggest that  ideological  as  well  as financial
compensation  will be  necessary.  Assertiveness  by the leadership  is  necessary
because compliance  will not be voluntarily  secured from some, no matter what
the  compensation.  After a  legitimating  process,  authorities  in both  Israel  and
the  new  Palestinian  state  will  need  to  impose  the  outcome  on  a  dissenting
minority.
II.  UNDERSTANDING  THE  REFUGEE  AND  SETTLEMENTS  ISSUES:
ESSENTIAL  BACKGROUND
In  this  section  we  provide  some  essential  background  on  the  two  core
issues, first  on the Palestinian  refugee  problem and  then  on  the  Israeli  settle-
ments.  We  explain  why  these  two  issues  are  central  to  any resolution  of the
Israeli-Palestinian  conflict and demonstrate how intractable they have remained
over the  years,  despite  intermittent attempts  to resolve  them.
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A.  The Palestinian  Refugees
Palestinians  and Israelis have  radically different  perspectives on  the refu-
gees  and contest  the  causes of their original  displacement,  the  reasons  behind
their continued  demand for return,  the legality  and justice of their claims, and
even  the basic facts about  their present  and  past numbers.
1.  The Conflicting Palestinian and Israeli Narratives
The traumatic  events of  1947-1949,  which  the  Palestinians  refer to  as al-
Nakba ("the  Disaster"), constitute the central narrative in the  formation of the
Palestinian  national  identity.8  According  to  one  Palestinian  perspective,  the
"refugee problem"  arose  during this period as a direct consequence of the vio-
lence  and terror that Zionist militias  deliberately visited upon  the Palestinians,
with a view to cleansing them from the  land allotted to Israel  through the U.N.
Partition  Plan.9  These  Palestinians  claim  that  waves  of  refugees  were  either
expelled  directly  by  those  militias  or  forced  to  flee  as  word  of impending
destruction spread from village to village.  A key component  of this narrative is
the massacre  at Deir Yassin  and the terror among ordinary  Palestinians  caused
by its news.' °  While many Palestinians  stayed and fought to retain  their lands,
eventually  vast  numbers  fled  when  forced  to choose  between  the defense  of
their lands  and  the fear  of death."  Another version  of this history  mutes the
claim  of ethnic  cleansing  on the  part  of Israelis  and acknowledges  that refu-
gees are often a natural  consequence of war but insist that international  human
rights law mandates that all refugees be allowed to return to their homes, if they
should  choose  to do  so, at  the cessation  of hostilities.'
The Israeli narrative, for its part, holds that the state of Israel had no direct
role in  the creation  of the refugee  crisis,  which  was  a consequence and not  a
cause of the  1948 war that had been declared unjustly upon the nascent state  of
Israel  by  the Arab  states.' 3  In  the Israeli narrative,  the culpability  of the Arab
states  for the creation of the refugee  problem is  two-fold:  (1) They  caused the
refugee  crisis by their violent rejection of the UN Partition Resolution  of 1947
that  envisaged  the creation of a  Jewish  and  an  Arab  state  in  Palestine (a  plan
the  Jews  accepted  peacefully);  and  (2)  the  Arab  states  actively  encouraged
Palestinians  to leave their homes during the war, and falsely gave  them reason
to believe  that  they  would be let back in  after the  war had been  won. ' 4
The essential component of this narrative  is that the  1948 war was unjustly
declared  upon the state of Israel by the Arab  states and that the Jewish militias
I  Rashid I. Khalidi,  Observations  on the Right of Return, 21  J.  OF  PALESTINE  STUD.  29, 30
(1992).
9  Joseph  Alpher  &  Khalil  Shikaki,  The  Palestinian Refugee  Problem and the  Right of
Return 3-4 (Weatherhead Center for Intemational  Affairs, Working Paper No. 98-07,  1998),
available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/papers/98-07.pdf.
'0  Adel  Yahya,  The Future of the Palestinian  Refugee Issue in Final Status Negotiations;
Palestinian Refugees:  Their Past, Present and Future 28-30, IPCRI  Final Status  Publica-
tions  Series  (1998).
''  Id. at  83.
12  Alpher & Shikaki, supra note  9, at  3-4.
13  SHIMON  PERES,  THE NEW  MIDDLE  EAST  186-87  (1993).
14  Alpher  &  Shikaki,  supra note  9,  at  5-7.
Winter 2005/2006]NEVADA  LAW  JOURNAL
that entered  into the war fought only in their own defense.' 5  The refugee prob-
lem  arose  not  because  of any  deliberate,  premeditated  actions  of the  Jewish
armed  forces that predated the  war, but rather as  a natural  consequence  of the
war,  as  refugees  are  a  natural  consequence  of any  war. 16  Although  within
Israel there is some scholarship by "revisionist" or "new" Israeli historians such
as Benny Morris  suggesting that  at least some  Arabs became  refugees because
of deliberate actions  of Jewish militias and the Israel Defense Forces during the
War  of  Independence,  a  majority  of  Israelis  reject  the  notion  that  they  are
broadly  responsible  for the  creation or maintenance  of the refugee problem.' 7
Palestinians  reject  the  Israeli  claim that the  Arab  states were  the aggres-
sors in the  war.  They  maintain that  the first act of aggression  was committed
against them by the British  who allowed immigration  of Zionist foreigners into
their  land;  allowed  mass  transfer  of  ownership  of that  land  to  the  Zionists
through  dubious  means;  and eventually,  the  violent partition  of that  land,  all
without the consent  of the people who  lived  on it.  The  second act was by  the
UN when it mandated  the partition of the land, again, without the consent of the
people  who lived  on it.  And the  third act was by the Zionist gangs  that used
violence (or  the threat of it)  to force Palestinians'  flight from their homes  and
lands.' 8  The  Zionist acquisitions  of Palestinian land  during  the British  Man-
date period, and the accompanying  injustices, were, in the Palestinian view, the
primary  cause of the  1948  war.t9
2.  The Question of Responsibility
The  Palestinians  consider  the  refugee  issue  to  be  a  matter  of  political
rights  (and  wrongs)  and  legal  remedy,  while  the  Israelis  consider  it  to  be  a
matter of  humanitarian  assistance  and,  thus,  economic  aid.  Moreover,  many
Israelis  believe  that the  Palestinian  leadership,  with  the  cynical  complicity  of
the leaders of the Arab host states, contrives to keep the refugees  mired in their
current  misery  to  keep  alive  artificially,  and  indeed  fan  the  flames  of, the
demand  for  return.2°  They  claim  that  the  refugee  problem  is  essentially  a
humanitarian one that  can  be  solved  by humanitarian  means  (e.g.,  improving
the living conditions of the refugees today,  helping them to find jobs and better
educate  themselves,  and aiding  their resettlement  into  the  countries  in which
they  currently  reside).2'
The Palestinians,  for their part (and,  interestingly, this includes  not just the
Palestinian leadership  but very many  refugees themselves), insist that the refu-
'5  See, e.g., AI  SHAVIT,  HALUKAT  HA'ARETZ  148  (2005)  (in  Hebrew).
16  PERES,  supra note  13,  at  181-94.
17  BENNY  MORRIS,  THE  BIRTH  OF  THE  PALESTINIAN  REFUGEE  PROBLEM,  1947-1949,  1-3
(1989).
18  Yahya, supra note  10,  at  52-62.
19  It is important to note  here that the primary  sources of Palestinian history are not scholars
but  the  refugees  themselves;  it  is an  oral  history,  a  survivors'  history,  that endures  in the
camps and cities and countries in which  the refugees have coalesced;  it is passed down from
generation  to generation  with  the  keys  of  the houses  lost  and  the  deeds  of the  properties
vanished;  it  is  codified  and  confirmed  by  word  of  mouth;  and  has  about it  an  anecdotal
authenticity  with  which dryly  factual  historical  accounts  cannot quite  contend.
20  PERES,  supra note  13,  at  187.
21  Alpher  & Shikaki,  supra note  9,  at 5-6.
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gee problem  is  essentially a political one  that can be  solved  only  by political
means  (i.e.,  by allowing  the  refugees  to choose  their method  of return).  The
humanitarian  aspects of the problem are, according  to them, important but sec-
ondary,  as  they  do  not  address  the  root causes  of  the  problem.22  They  also
vigorously  deny  the  charge  that  the  Arab  and  Palestinian  leaders  have  been
keeping  the  issue  alive  artificially,  asserting  instead  that  the  refugees  them-
selves have consistently rebuffed  any attempts on the part of leaders to "bribe"
them  into  accepting  a  solution  that  does  not  allow  them  the  freedom  to
choose.23
This  deep  disconnect  in perceptions  is  further  underscored  by  the  insis-
tence with which the Palestinians look to the rubric of international law for the
legitimacy  of their claim:  The Palestinian  perspective maintains  that the  right
of refugees to return  to their homes, should they  choose to  do so,  is enshrined
in an array of international  laws and conventions  such as the International  Cov-
enant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  (1966),24  the  Universal  Declaration  of
Human  Rights  (1948),25  and  the Fourth  Geneva Convention  (1950).26  Addi-
tionally, Palestinians  refer to international bodies and instruments that seek spe-
cifically  to protect  the rights  of  refugees.  Examples  of these  are  the  United
Nations  High  Commission  for  Refugees  ("UNHCR"),  which  has  recently
begun to favor voluntary  repatriation  as  an  optimal  solution  for refugees,  and
the  1951  Refugee  Convention,  which  defines  refugees  as  protected  persons
under  international  law  and  articulates  certain  basic  minimal  provisions  for
their protection.
Palestinians  also  point  to what  they  consider  to be  the  successful return
and/or  restitution  of refugees  at  the  cessation  of other  hostilities  around  the
world.  For example,  the right of return of Bosnian  refugees was  enshrined in
the Dayton Agreement of 1995 and seen as an important factor in resolving that
conflict.  The same holds  for the Arusha Peace and  Reconciliation  Agreement
of 2000,  the  Interim  Agreement  in Kosovo  in  1999,  the  Quadripartite  Agree-
ment in Georgia  in  1994,  and  many other peace  agreements  signed  in the last
quarter century,  which all provide for the  voluntary repatriation  and restitution
of property  of war-time  refugees.27
22  Id.
23  Yahya,  supra note  10, at  118-20.
24  G.A.  Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,  Supp No.  16,  at 52, U.N.  Doc. A/6316 (1966)
("No  one  shall  be arbitrarily  deprived  of the  right to enter  his own  country.").
25  G.A.  Res.  217A, U.N.  GAOR, 3d Sess.,  at  74,  U.N. Doc. A/810  (1948)  ("Everyone  has
the  right to leave  any country,  including his  own,  and  to return  to his country.").
26  Geneva  Convention Relative to the Protection  of Civilian Persons  in Time of War, Aug.
12,  1949, art. 49(1), 6 U.S.T. 3517,  3544, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 314 ("Individual or mass forcible
transfers,  as well  as deportation of protected persons from  occupied territory to the territory
of the  Occupying  Power  or  to  that  of another  country,  occupied  or  not,  are  prohibited,
regardless  of their  motive ....  Persons  thus  evacuated  shall  be  transferred  back  to  their
homes  as  soon  as  hostilities  in  the  area  in question  have  ceased.").  See  generally Yifat
Susskind, Background  Resource:  The Crisis of Palestinian Refugees  and the Right of Return
(July 2000),  http://www.madre.org/articles/me/rightofreturn.html.
27  Badil  Resource Center for Palestinian Residency  and  Refugee  Rights, Peace Agreements
and Refugees-Lessons  Learned  (December  2003),  http://www.badil.org/Publications/Bul-
letins/Bulletin-14.htm.  Some Palestinians  also point to the positive example set by the Land
Claims Court in South  Africa that sought to compensate or return land  to those dispossessed
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Palestinians  find their  most concrete  legal  backing  in their reading  of the
famous  U.N. General  Assembly Resolution  194  and it  is this resolution which
they quote  principally when  referring to their "right  to return."'28  In their read-
ing, of course,  they honor  what  they consider  to  be the  spirit and intention of
the Resolution, rather than its exact wording, which is, as we shall see below, to
what Israelis  refer.  The essential paragraph  from that  resolution resolves that:
[R]efugees  wishing to  return  to their homes and  live at  peace  with their neighbours
should be permitted  to do  so at the earliest  practicable  date, and  that  compensation
should  be paid  for the  property  of those  choosing  not to  return  and  for loss  of or
damage to property  which, under principles of international  law or in equity,  should
be made good  by the Governments  or authorities  responsible  ....  29
The  Israelis, for their part, also look to international  law for guidance  and
support on this matter, for a key component of the Israeli narrative is that Israel
is  a legitimate,  sovereign  state  that  was  re-established  as  a  homeland  for  the
Jewish nation  after years of striving, suffering and homelessness on the part of
the  Jewish  people.  The  legitimacy  of  this  re-established  state  derives  not
merely from  the international  approval  manifested  in the UN Partition  Resolu-
tion, but also from history,  including that Israel  is the historic  birthplace of the
Jewish people, the cradle in which  their "spiritual,  religious  and national  iden-
tity was formed,"  and that the  Holocaust proved beyond doubt the necessity  of
the re-establishment of a homeland  that would provide for the Jewish  people an
"equality of status among  the family of nations"  which  had been denied  them
for centuries.30
According to this perspective, Israel,  like all sovereign  states, has the right
to  self-determination  enshrined  in  international  law,  meaning,  among  other
things, the right to determine the character of the state and to decide  the rules of
its  citizenship.  Israel's  founders  intended  it to  be  a  Jewish  democracy,  and
Israel's right to declare itself as  such, and to pass legislation  to that effect, is a
basic exercise of its right to sovereignty  and self-determination, and not, excep-
tional.31  A  sovereign state's  right of self-defense  forms a  secondary  basis  for
Israel's  position  on  the refugee issue-no  sovereign  state  may  be  required  to
allow people into its territory who will cause harm (directly or indirectly) to the
safety and security of the state and its citizens.  An uncontrolled influx of refu-
gees into sovereign Israeli territory will encroach not only upon Israel's right to
define  the  state  as  a  homeland  for the  Jewish  people  but  also on  its  right  to
by racially discriminatory  laws during  the apartheid regime,  and,  invariably,  to  agreements
between  Germany  and  Israel  and  Jewish  organizations,  that  allowed  for the  restitution of
Jewish property and compensation, and that have  played a crucial role in the healing  process
between  Jews and  Germans  since the Holocaust.  Susskind,  supra note 26.
28  See,  e.g.,  Susan  Akram,  Reinterpreting  Palestinian  Refugee  Rights  Under  International
Law, and  a Framework  for  Durable  Solutions,  Badil  Resource  Center  for Palestinian  Resi-
dency and  Refugee  Rights  (February  2000),  http://www.badil.org/Publications/Briefs/Brief-
No-01  .htm.
29  UN  General  Assembly,  Resolution  194  (1948),  reprinted  in  THE  ISRAEL-ARAB  READER:
A  DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  EAST  CONFLICT  85  (Walter  Laqueur  & Barry
Rubin  eds.,  6th  rev.  ed.,  Penguin  Books  2001)  (1969)  [hereinafter  THE  ISRAEL-ARAB
READER].
30  State of Israel:  Proclamation  of  Independence  (1948),  reprinted in  THE  ISRAEL-ARAB
READER,  supra note 29,  at  81-83.
31  Alpher & Shikaki, supra note  9,  at  5-6,  11-12.
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defend those  people from the economic, political  and social dangers  of such  an
influx.32  To the extent that there is an option to return, then, Israel understands
that it is  controlled by the state of origin and not by the refugees  themselves.33
In addition, in Israel's view, international law grants to refugees the option
of returning  to their country  of origin only  if they  actually  have  a  country  of
origin to which they  may  return.  Since Israel  was  not their  country of origin,
the  Palestinian  refugees  cannot  possibly  claim a  right  to return  to  it.  Lastly,
Israel  is  careful  to  point  out  that  nowhere  in  international  law  is  a  refugee
granted  a "right to return."  Israel's  reading of U.N. Resolution  194  is,  in  this
sense,  carefully  literal.34
3.  Numbers Past and Present
In  addition  to  their  deep  disagreements  about  the  origins  of the  refugee
problem, and the justice/legality of the claim of return, Palestinians  and Israelis
also disagree  about the numbers involved, both in the past and at present.  Esti-
mates of the number of Palestinians  displaced during those turbulent war years
vary greatly, and no definitive statistics exist that satisfy  both sides.  According
to  the reputable  think tank International  Crisis Group, the estimate considered
reliable by most researchers  today is 750,000, produced  by the U.N. Economic
Survey Mission of  1949.35  This  estimate is approximately  the number  arrived
at independently  by Israeli  historian  Benny  Morris36  and tends to be the num-
ber  most  widely  used.  Statistics  published  in  1951  by  the  United  Nations
Relief  and Works Agency  (UNRWA),  however, suggest that the original num-
ber  might have  been much  higher  (around  860,000),  as  there existed  at  least
100,000 undocumented  or paperless  refugees who were not accounted for in the
1949  U.N.  Survey.37  On  the  other  hand, official  and private  Israeli  accounts
claim the  number was  closer to  500,000.38
Of the  original  750,000-odd  refugees,  the  1949  U.N.  Economic  Survey
Mission estimated  that approximately  280,000  went to  the area  now known  as
the  West  Bank;  200,000  to  the  Gaza  Strip;  100,000  to  Lebanon;  75,000  to
Syria;  70,000  to Jordan;  and smaller  numbers  to Iraq, Egypt,  and other coun-
tries.  By the time  the U.N.  had established  the*UNRWA  in  1950  as a  special
32  Shlomo  Gazit,  The  Palestinian  Refugee  Problem,  Final  Status Issue  Study  No.  2  8-14
(Jaffee  Center for  Strategic  Studies)  (1995).
33  See Ruth Lapidoth,  Do Palestinian Refugees  Have  the Right to Return  to Israel?,  Jan  15,
2001,  http://www .israel.  org / mfa /  peace %  20process /guide  %  20to %  20the %  20peace %  20
process/do %  20palestinian %  20refugees %  20have %  20a %  20right %  20to %  20return %  20to.
In addition  to claiming that it bears no responsibility for the refugee problem,  Israel has long
claimed that this resolution is "non-binding"  because it was  issued by the General  Assembly,
not  the Security  Counsel.
34  Id.
35  International Crisis Group,  Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemaking (Feb. 5,
2004),  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2511  &l=1.
36  Morris,  supra note  17.
17  See, e.g.,  United  Nations Relief and Works  Agency, Frequently  Asked  Questions, http://
www.un.org/unrwa/overview/qa.html  (last  visited  Jan.  28,  2006).
38  See,  e.g.,  Melissa  Radler, Justice for All,  JERUSALEM  POST,  February  16,  2001,  at  14
(indicating that  Israel  estimates  "half a million  Palestinians became  refugees"  in  1948).
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body  to administer  to the needs  of these scattered  and impoverished  refugees,
the  official numbers  looked  (and have  continued  to  look) as  follows:
TABLE  1
Number of Registered  Personsa
(As of 30  June  2004)
Field  1950  1970  1990  2000  2004
Jordan  506,200  506,038  929,097  1,570,192  1,758,274
Lebanon  127,600  175,958  302,049  376,472  396,890
Syria  82,194  158,717  280,731  383,199  417,346
West  Bankb  - 272,692  414,298  583,009  675,670
Gaza  198,227  311,814  496,339  824,622  938,531
Total  914,221  1,425,219  2,422,514  3,737,494  4,186,711
a.  Figures  are  based  on UNRWA  registration  records,  which  are  updated  continually.  However,  the
numbers  of registered  refugees  present  in the Agency's  area of operations  is almost certainly  less  than
the  population  recorded.
b.  Until  1967,  the  West Bank was  administered  as an  integral  part  in  the  Jordan  field.
The  most  recent  UNRWA  estimate  indicates  that  there  are  four  million
Palestinian  refugees  today.  However, this number  is also  in dispute, for some
Israelis claim that descendants  of those who lost their homes in  1948  and have
since  acquired  citizenship  rights in third countries  ought not be  considered  as
refugees  themselves.39  UNRWA,  however,  defines  as  a  refugee  "all  persons
whose normal  place  of residence  was Palestine  during the period  1 June  1946
to  15  May  1948  and who lost both home and means of livelihood as the result
of the  1948 conflict."  More  to the point, it considers  as refugees  all  descend-
ants of those who meet that definition and who choose  to call  themselves  refu-
gees.no  However,  despite  the  apparently  generous  sweep  of  this  definition,
several  thousand refugees  are evidently excluded, as UNRWA  counts only eli-
gible beneficiaries  and excludes  all Palestinians  who have  no residency  rights
in its areas of operation, all those who were never counted in the first place,  and
all those  who  have been removed over  the years from its rolls for various rea-
sons.  Therefore, the actual number might be much higher than the four million
estimated  here.  Palestinian  sources  suggest  that  it is  approximately  5.8  mil-
lion,4  while predictably,  Israeli  sources provide  a  much lower number,  some
as low as 2 million, and imply that UNRWA's  figures are grossly overstated.42
Notwithstanding  these disputes about numbers, it is clear that the majority
of people  who  define  themselves  as  Palestinians  in the world  today  are  refu-
gees.  Interestingly,  the majority of the  2  million  Palestinians  who live in  the
West  Bank  are  not  refugees  but  are  instead  descendants  of  the  original
39  International  Crisis Group,  supra note  35.
4o  See United  Nations  Relief and  Works Agency,  supra note  37.
41 International  Crisis Group, supra note  35.
42  ANTI  DEFAMATION  LEAGUE,  ADVOCATING  FOR  ISRAEL:  AN  ACTIVIST'S  GUIDE  (2002).
None  of these  estimates  include those  who  were  made refugees-either  by being  deported
from,  or by being  prevented  from  returning to  their homes-in  what became  the  Occupied
Territories  during  and  after the  1967 war.
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residents  of  these  areas.43  This  fact  is  significant,  because  the  majority  of
Palestinians  now  living  in the  West  Bank,  since  they  are  not refugees,  have
different interests  with respect  to the implementation  of the right of return from
the refugees  themselves.
To  summarize,  not  all Palestinians  are  refugees.  About  a million  remain
in  Israel  as Israeli  citizens  and over two  million  living in the  West Bank and
Gaza  are  indigenous  to  those  areas.  Of those who  were  originally  refugees,
many who fled to Jordan  and Syria  are now  citizens of those  countries, as  are
some  of those  who  went  to Egypt,  the  United  States,  and  various  European
countries  and received  asylum  and  sometimes  citizenship  on  a  case  by  case
basis.  In addition  to these differences  in political status, there are  great differ-
ences in economic, social, and political circumstances  stemming from the vary-
ing reception  accorded them in different  host countries.  Clearly,  the  worst off
are  those  who  live in refugee  camps.  Today,  roughly one-third  of Palestinian
refugees live  in fifty-nine  camps  recognized by UNRWA  (see Table  2 below),
most  in conditions  of wretched  poverty,  congestion,  rightlessness,  unemploy-
ment, and conflict.  Of these, it is generally considered that the twelve camps in
Lebanon, "home"  to approximately 200,000 refugees, are the harshest and most
untenable, and that of all the host  countries, the  state of Lebanon most greatly
circumscribes  the essential  rights and freedoms  of the refugees. 4  These  dis-
tinctions and proportions  matter because  they  create  differences  which  in turn
substantially affect the underlying interests of the various groups when it comes
to  the right of return.
TABLE  2
Distribution of Registered Population
(As of 30 June 2004)
Total  Registered  % Pop
Registered  Number  Camp  Pop Not  Not  in
Country  Population  of Camps  Population  in Camps  Camps
Jordan  1,758,274  10  304,035  1,454,239  83%
Lebanon  396,890  12  209,216  187,674  47%
Syria  417,346  10  122,055  295,291  71%
West  Bank  675,670  19  181,891  493,779  73%
Gaza  938,531  8  490,410  448,121  48%
Total  4,186,711  59  1,307,607  2,879,104  69%
Source:  UNRWA Public  Information  Office, UNRWA  Headquarters  (Gaza),  August 2004.
Against this background,  it is plain  that the resolution  of issues related  to
the  Palestinian  refugees  is  central  to  any  resolution  of  the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.  A large  proportion of all Palestinians see  themselves  as refugees,  and
43  While  not refugees,  these "native"  Palestinians, like  most Palestinian  refugees,  are pres-
ently  stateless,  and  share  with the  refugees  a desire  for  the  creation  of a Palestinian  state.
44  See Wadie  E. Said,  Facts, Rights, and Remedies: Implementing International  Law in the
Israel/Palestine  Conflict, 28  HASTINGS  INT'L &  COMP.  L. REV.  349, 352-54 (2005)  (describ-
ing restrictions including, inter  alia, a government  office that decides  whether or not to issue
travel  documents  to  Palestinian  refugees,  and the  limited availability  of work permits).
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the ethos of dispossession  lies  at the heart of the modem  Palestinian narrative.
For Israeli  Jews,  on  the  other  hand,  the  possible  return  of  large  numbers  of
Palestinian  refugees,  because  of  the  demographic  implications,  is  seen  as  an
existential  threat  to  the  continued  viability  of Israel  as  a  Jewish  democratic
state.
B.  The Jewish Settlements
1.  The Settlers and Settlements Today
About 250,0004" Israeli settlers  out of a total population  of some five mil-
lion Israeli  Jews live in about  120  settlements  in the West Bank.46 The settlers
comprise three reasonably distinct groups.  The first group, the religious nation-
alists, is deeply committed to a religiously based expansionist vision.  Although
they comprise only  about a quarter of the  settlers, they make up the vast major-
ity of the movement's  institutional  leadership.
The second group consists of many more settlers, perhaps half of the total,
who moved  to the settlements  to improve their quality of life.  They were  ini-
tially  motivated  primarily  by generous  government  subsidies  and the  opportu-
nity to acquire better housing  in a less  densely populated  area  with  more open
space from  which  they could still commute  to Tel  Aviv  or Jerusalem.
A  third  group,  about  a  quarter,  are  ultra-orthodox  Jews  (called  the
"Haredim")  who  had similar,  primarily  economic,  motivations.  The Haredim
have  traditionally  lived  in  segregated  communities  in  territorial  Israel  and
abstained  from  participating  in  Israeli  public  life.  Indeed,  some  have  never
recognized  the existence  of the State of Israel.  For these Haredim,  the  settle-
ments provide  a way to create new,  low-cost, segregated  communities.  Living
in the  West Bank, at  least initially, carried  no special  significance  for them.4 7
Over  time,  however,  some of  those  whose  original  motivation  was  primarily
economic have  become more ideologically  committed to the settlement project,
at  least  in  nationalistic  terms.  While  the  political  affiliations  of  these  three
groups  vary,  a  higher proportion of settlers  vote  for right-wing parties  than  is
true  for Israel as  whole.48
45  This number does  not include the  176,000  Jewish inhabitants of those portions of Jerusa-
lem previously  in the West  Bank that  were  annexed  to Israel  in  1968.  See Yehezkel  Lein,
Land Grab:  Israel's Settlement Policy in  the  West Bank,  BE'TZELEM,  May  2002,  http://
www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land  GrabEng.pdf;  see also Dror  Etkes,  Testimony
Before the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee,  Oct.  15,  2003  http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/EtkesTestimony
031015.pdf.  For 2005  figures  see  Uri  Yablonka,  13,000 New  Settlers in  the  West Bank,
MAARiV,  Aug.  26,  2005,  at  1, http://www.yesh-din.org/sys/spotlight/elist.phpid=67.
46  The  precise  number  of "settlements"  is not  so easily  determined.  In  addition  to recog-
nized settlements, there are others, sometimes called "outposts,"  that are not officially recog-
nized by  the Israeli  government.
"  Ultra-Orthodox  settlers  have  been  the  fastest-growing  group  of settlers  in  the  last few
years.  In  2002,  fifty  percent  of  new  settlers  were  from  this  group.  See  Nadav  Shragai,
Settler numbers are approaching  the 220,000 mark, HAARETZ,  April  10,  2004, http://www.
haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=  190545&contrasslD=2&subContrassID
= I  &sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y.
41  If one were creating a typology of settlements, rather than types of settlers, one might use
three  categories:  (1) "Political  Settlements"  created for  ideological  reasons  where  national
religious  settlers  live;  (2)  "Residential  Settlements,"  inhabited  by  either  "quality  of  life"
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2.  The  Growth of the Settlements:  A  Short History
Before  Israel's surprising  victory  in  the Six  Day  War in  1967, there  was
very  limited domestic  political  pressure  to  expand the  boundaries  of the  state.
In the years  following the establishment  of Israel  in  1948,  the right wing  party
Herut  voiced  the  rhetorical  aspiration  that  the  Jewish  state  should  someday
extend to the "two banks" of the Jordan River, but this notion was viewed by an
overwhelming  majority  of Israelis  as implausible  and foolish.  Some  left-lean-
ing  Labor  parties  such  as  Ahdut  Ha'Avoda  also  displayed  expansionist
approaches,  insisting that all the areas under the former  British Mandate  should
be controlled  by Israel.  Yet by  1948,  as  a practical matter these  streams aban-
doned this position.  Some of them, such as Yitzhak Tabenkin,  would join, after
1967,  those  forces  that  called  for  Israeli  territorial  expansion.' 9  In  another
expansionist  episode,  immediately  after  the  1956  war,  Prime  Minister  David
Ben-Gurion initially  staked out a claim for the Sinai and Gaza, but under inter-
national  pressure,  the Israeli  government  relinquished its occupation  and con-
trol within  a matter of weeks.  Despite these episodes,  the expansionist  visions
remained  a minority  voice in the pre-1967  Israel.
The impetus  to claim and settle the  West Bank  and Gaza  arose only after
Israel's surprising  victory  in the  Six  Day War, whose  outcome  elated  Israelis
and laid the  foundation for a fundamental  change  in territorial attitudes.  Israel
suddenly  found  itself occupying  a  vast,  unexpectedly  enlarged  territory  that
carried emotional  significance  for some  Israelis.  The  years that  followed  saw
the  emergence  of  various  political  and  religious  movements  that  called  for
expansion  into these  occupied  territories.
The first expansionist step involved Jerusalem.  Immediately  after the war,
Israel annexed East Jerusalem, and thereafter the  Israeli government  took steps
to encourage  Jews  to move  into  these  newly  annexed  neighborhoods.  There
was a broad consensus  among Israeli  Jews that an undivided Jerusalem should
be  the capital  of Israel.  By  1977,  less  than  a  decade  later,  50,000  Jews  had
moved into  the  newly  annexed parts of the city;  today  there are  over  175,000
Jews in  those  areas.  Among  Israeli Jews,  this annexation  and  settlement  has
never been controversial.  Today  there is a  widely shared belief that these  new
Jewish  neighborhoods  would remain  part of Israel in any  "two-state"  deal.5°
Settlement activities  can best be  understood  in four distinct  time periods.
The  first  period  was  between  1967  and  1977  when  the  Labor Party5'  was  in
settlers  or the Haredim;  and (3) "Security  Settlements" created  for purposes  of Israeli  secur-
ity.  These would  include the settlements in the Jordan Valley that were part of the Alon plan
(discussed  later)  and  those  on  the Golan  Heights.  For the  most part  the  settlers  living in
these settlements  are not religious  nationalists.
'9 ARYE  NAOR,  GREATER  ISRAEL  104-23  (2001)  (in  Hebrew).
50  While the  manner  in which  Jerusalem  would  be divided  was  a contentious  issue during
the 2000-2001  Taba negotiations, it appears that the Palestinians  were prepared to accept the
reality of Israeli control of Jewish neighborhoods  in East Jerusalem,  See Miguel Moratinos,
EU description of the  outcome of permanent status talks at Taba,  http://www.ariga.com/
treaties/taba.shtml  (last visited Jan.  28, 2006).
5"  Labor  is Israel's center-left political  party.  The party was  in power from  1933 (as  a pre-
state  political  institution) until  1977  and then  again  from  1992  to  1996  and  1999  to  2001.
Since the  1970s,  it has  supported  trading  land for peace  with regard  to  the West Bank  and
Gaza.
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power  and  there  was limited  settlement  activity.  During this  period,  the gov-
ernment  generally  resisted settlement,  and much  of the  activity  was  unautho-
rized.  The  second  period  began  in  1977  with  the  ascendancy  of the  Likud
Party52 and  extended  until  1992 when Labor regained  power.  After a cautious
start, the governments  during  this period  became  actively  involved in  promot-
ing the expansion of settlements.  The third  period runs  from  1992  until 2004.
During this period,  which  includes  the  Oslo  peace  process,  under  both  Labor
and  Likud  there  was  a  substantial  expansion  in  the  number  of  settlers  with
limited  creation  of  new  settlements.  The  fourth  period,  beginning  in  2005
reflects  both  contraction  and  consolidation.  Prime Minister  Sharon  relocated
over 8000  Israeli  settlers  from  Gaza  and the  northern  West  Bank  while at  the
same  time expanding  the  settlements  in other parts  of the  West  Bank.
a.  1967 - 1977 Settlement Activities
During  this  initial  period,  the  Israeli  government  essentially  viewed  the
territories  as  a bargaining  chip that would  some day be  traded for recognition
and  peace.53  Nonetheless,  some  limited  settlement  activities  were  authorized
based primarily  on national security  considerations.  Labor also authorized  the
"reestablishment"  of three settlements on sites populated  by Jews earlier  in the
twentieth  century,  prior to  Israel's  establishment.54  Some  within  the  govern-
ment opposed  on principle  even this  limited activity.
In the aftermath  of the Six Day War, a Ministerial  Committee on the  Set-
tlements  was  formed,  chaired  by  Yigal  Alon.  He  developed  what  became
known  as  the  "Alon  Plan"  which  involved  the  creation  of  a  string  of small
settlements  along  the valley  of the Jordan  River to provide  an  eastern  line  of
defense.55
Other settlements  were begun  contrary  to government policy,  often under
false  pretenses,  by  right-wing  national-religious  activists  who  claimed  to  be
living  in  temporary  "work  camps"  or  on  archaeological  excavations.56  The
most influential  movement  promoting  early settlement  in  the  West  Bank  was
Gush  Emunim ("Bloc  of the Faithful"),  a right-wing  national-religious  move-
ment  formed  in  1974.57
This  movement  reflected  a  fusion  of religious  and  Zionist58  ideologies,
and  was  based  on the theology  of two charismatic  rabbis,  Avram  Isaac  Kook
52  Likud is Israel's  center-right political  party.  It was  created  in  1973 as a union between  a
number of opposition parties,  the most important one being Herut, a nationalistic right-wing
party.  Likud rose to power in  1977 when it was able to effectively channel  the resentment of
many  sectors  of Israeli  society towards  the long-ruling  Labor  Party.  Since then  it has been
continually  in  power with the  exception  of 1992-1996  and  1999-2001.
53  Lein,  supra note 45.
14  See  generally id.
55  Id. at  12.
56  Id. at  13  (discussing  tactics  used  by  Gush Emunim).
57  Id.
58  Zionism  is  a  political  movement  established  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  which  was
aimed  at promoting the Jewish people as a nation  and establishing  a Jewish state.  The ideo-
logical  content  and  meaning  of  Zionism  has  been  contested  for  over  100  years.  See
SCHLOMO  AVINERI,  VARIETIES  OF  ZIONIST  THOUGHT  (1991)  (in  Hebrew).
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and  his  son  Tzvi  Yehuda  Kook.59  Gush  Emunim  was  comprised  largely  of
politically and religiously energetic  youths who belonged to the National Relig-
ious  Party  but  were  disappointed  by  their  party's  limited role  in  shaping  the
Israeli public sphere.60  This movement aspired  to incorporate  all of the territo-
ries  into  "Eretz  Yisrael"  as  an  expression  of its  dual  mission:  devotion  to  a
religious  mandate  ("the  Promised  Land")  that  is  a necessary  condition  to  the
coming of the messiah,  as well as a suggestion that the "new  frontier" is a way
to revive Zionism, a movement that was  in the process of decline in their eyes.
The settlement  project sought  to guarantee  that  all parts of "Eretz  Yisrael"  be
incorporated as an integral  part of the state of Israel.  The first set of principles
published by Gush Emunim in  1975  states that  "we  have to make  it unequivo-
cally clear to  [Israelis] and the nations of the world that the people of Israel  are
fully  committed  to  opposing  any  attempt  to  force  upon  them  a  withdrawal,
through political  or  military  means,  from  parts of Eretz-Yisrael.'
The  movement's  original  goals were wider  than  simply creating "facts  on
the ground"  to bring about Israeli territorial  expansion.  Its original list of prin-
ciples included expansion of national and religious education, unity of the Jew-
ish  people,  support  for  Jewish  immigration  to Israel,  political  and  economic
independence  from foreign  powers,  and an activist foreign policy.  Yet,  by the
late  1970's the movement essentially focused on a  single mission:  settling  the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  Gush Emunim set up a "settlement  department"
called Amana (Covenant).  By  the early  1980s  Gush Emunim disintegrated  as a
political movement,  while its  settlement  arm,  Amana, remained  active and has
since  played  a crucial  role in  the  expansion  of settlements.
From  1974-1976,  successive  Labor  governments  worked  to  restrain  the
settlement  activities  of  Gush  Emunim.  For  example,  at  the  same  site  near
Nablus  Gush Emunim, activists made  seven attempts  to establish a  settlement,
and  the  government  removed  them  each  time.62  But  on  the eighth  try  they
succeeded  when,  due to  an  internal  rift between  Yitzhak  Rabin  and  Shimon
Peres, a compromise was struck.  The settlers were allowed to reside at a neigh-
boring  military  base  which  they  subsequently  transformed  into  a  civilian
settlement.
63
By  1977,  when  the  Labor  government  left  power,  4500  Israelis  lived  in
thirty-six  settlements  (thirty-one  in the  West Bank and five in  the  Gaza Strip,)
that  had  been  established  either  on  the  government's  initiative  or  with  its
acquiescence.64
19  Lein,  supra  note  45,  at  13.  The father  (1864-1935)  was  a dominant religious  authority
who saw Zionism, even when led by non-religious  Jews, as a movement that serves religious
values.  He argued that a secular state is the beginning of Jewish redemption.  His son (1890-
1981),  also a rabbi,  carried  on his  work.
60 Gideon  Aran,  From  Religious  Zionism  to  a  Zionist  Religion:  The  Roots  of  Gush
Emunim  and its Culture  (1987)  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  Hebrew  University).
61  GERSHON  SHAFAT,  GUSH  EMUNIM  360  (1995).
62  See Lein, supra note 45,  at  13.
63  id.
64 Id. at  12.
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b.  The  1977 Watershed:  The Rise of Likud
In  1977,  the  Likud  Party  broke  the  Labor  Party's  long-term  political
monopoly  and formed  its first government.  Likud  was committed to  an expan-
sionist  ideology  that  suggested  Israel  should include  not only  the  West  Bank
but  also  most  of  Jordan.  However,  this  position  was  a  minority  one  until
1977.65  The  1977 elections  brought to power people who were  sympathetic  to
Gush  Emunim's dream  that the Jewish  state  should  include all of the Land  of
Israel.  While  many  in  Likud  shared  an  expansionist  vision,  Prime  Minister
Menachem  Begin's  government  was  initially  cautious.  Comparatively  few
Israelis  were  persuaded  by  Gush  Emunim's  religious  justification,  and  many
secular  Zionists,  including some  members  of Likud, were  concerned  that  the
conspicuous  expansion  of  settlements  would  damage  Israel's  international
standing.
Ariel  Sharon  championed  the  expansion  of  the  settlements.  In  the  first
Likud  government,  from  1977-1981,  Sharon  became  Minister  of  Agriculture
and used that post to design his own long-range  plan for expansion.66  Sharon
was  motivated  by a non-religious,  expansionist vision.  His initial goal  was to
erase  the  Green  Line  with  settlements.67  While  Gush  Emunim  and  similar
organizations  were  able  to attract nationally  and religiously  motivated  settlers,
Sharon  went to great lengths  to attract the  general public to the settlement  pro-
ject.68  By  1981  the  number  of West Bank  settlers  nearly  quadrupled  to over
16,000.69
Likud  won  again  in  1981  and  during  its  second  administration  (1981-
1984)  the settlement project greatly expanded and was further institutionalized.
Begin's successor  as prime  minister, Itzhak Shamir, was committed to  a vision
of greater  Israel  and  was  willing,  perhaps  even  more  than  Begin,  to expose
Israel  to  international  condemnation  to  expand  the  settlements.  Government
agencies  were  deeply  involved  in planning  and  implementing  the  creation and
expansion  of  settlements.  During  this  period,  mainstream  non-governmental
Zionist organizations such as the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organi-
zation  actively  participated. 70  This participation  meant  that  the  expansion  of
settlements  was transformed  from an essentially entrepreneurial  activity led by
a fringe group  into a mainstream  endeavor that provided  substantial  subsidies
to encourage Israelis to move to settlements.  Even more striking is the fact that
between  1984 and  1990, although Labor participated with Likud in two succes-
sive  national  unity  governments,  the expansionist  policies  persisted.  During
those years, the  number of West Bank settlers increased  from  35,000 to more
than 78,000.
7 1
65  YONATHAN  SHAPIRA,  CHOSEN  TO  COMMAND:  THE  ROAD  TO  POWER  OF  THE  HERUT
PARTY  (1989).
66  See  Lein,  supra note  45,  at  14.
67  Id.
68  Id.
69  Id. at  18  (Table 2,  citing Central Bureau  of  Statistics).
70  The  Jewish Agency  and the  World Zionist Organization  were  Zionist organizations  cre-
ated before  1948  that served  as  the institutional foundation for the  state of Israel.  Since  the
state  of  Israel  was  established,  as  quasi-governmental  organizations  they  have  remained
deeply  involved in facilitating  Jewish  immigration  and settlement  activities.
71  Lein, supra note 45,  at  18  (Table 2,  citing Central  Bureau of Statistics).
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During  this  period  the  Israeli  governments  actively  sought  to erase  the
distinction between Israel  proper and the occupied  territories.  For example, the
Ministry of the Interior began referring to the territories as "Judea and Samaria"
in  official  announcements  and  changed  the Hebrew  word  for  "settlement"  in
government publications  and  documents  from a  neutral  word to one evocative
of  Biblical  claims  of  redemption."2  Once  again  the  Labor  Party  was  com-
plicit.73  But Labor and Likud, Israel's two major parties during this period, had
different  long-term goals  regarding  the settlements.  Labor publicly  expressed
willingness  to  trade  land  for  peace,  thus  implicitly  anticipating  an  offer  to
remove settlements  as a bargaining chip in some future peace negotiations  with
an Arab  partner.  Likud, on the other  hand, while never prepared  to annex  the
territories,  became implicitly  committed  to a vision  of a  greater Israel.  Likud
sought  to  create  "facts  on  the  ground"  in the  territories  through  an  ambitious
government  sponsored  settlement  project  so that  politically,  no  future  Israeli
government would be able to withdraw from the West Bank  as part of an over-
all settlement  agreement.
c.  1992 - 2004: Settlement Expansion during Oslo and Beyond
In  1992 Labor came to power again, led by  Yitzhak Rabin who  promised
to reduce  significantly  the  amount  of governmental  resources  going to  settle-
ments.7"  In September  1993,  after  a few  months of secret  negotiations,  Israel
and  the  Palestinian  Liberation  Organization  ("PLO")  signed  a  declaration  of
principles  that  outlined  a process  over  a  period of years  that would  lead  to  a
two-state  resolution  of the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict.  Oslo  was premised  on
the  notion of land  for peace.75
Implicit in this agreement  was the notion  that Jewish  settlements would be
dismantled.  Moreover,  as  part  of the  Oslo  process,  in  1995  Israel  officially
committed not to "initiate or take any step that [would]  change the status of the
West Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip pending  the outcome  of the  permanent  status
negotiations. 76  The Labor government also promised to the United States  that
it would not establish new settlements or expand existing ones, except, if neces-
sary,  to  accommodate  the  "natural  growth"  of the  local  population.77  Ironi-
cally, during the  1990s, a decade dominated by the Oslo process, the number of
72  The  original  word,  "Yeshuvim,"  was  used  in the  early  phases  of Zionist  settlement  in
Palestine, and  did not have religious  overtones.  The new word, "Hitnahluyot,"  was used in
the Bible to describe the settlement process  by which the Israelites reclaimed their land after
being slaves  in Egypt.
73  Indeed,  as  early  as  1969  no official  Israeli  maps  had  the Green  Line  on them,  and the
terms "West  Bank" and  "occupied  territory"  were  not used  on  state  radio.
7' Lein,  supra  note 45,  at  15.
15 This  principle-that  first  appeared  in the  1967  UN  Security  Council  Resolution  242-
governed  the  1979  Israeli-Egyptian  peace  agreement,  underlined  the  Israeli-Syrian  peace
negotiations  from  1992  onwards,  and was  to serve  as the basis of the final  status  agreement
between  Israelis and Palestinians  in  the Oslo  process.
76  Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement  on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Chap. 5, Art.
31(7)  (1995),  available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interim.html.
77  Lein,  supra note  45,  at  11.
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West Bank settlers grew from 78,000 to nearly 200,000.78  Much of this expan-
sion occurred  under three Labor  governments.
During  the  Rabin  period,  the  government's  internal  guidelines  suggested
there would be no new settlements, only "natural growth."79  But the guidelines
made an exception for new settlement construction  in "the Greater Jerusalem80
area  and in the Jordan Valley."' 8  The Labor government also created semantic
loopholes  by expansively  interpreting  all of these  terms.  "Greater  Jerusalem"
was construed quite  liberally.82  "Natural  growth"  was  vague  enough to  allow
Israel  to  build  thousands  of new  housing  units  without  provoking  a  public
rebuke from the United States.83  A number of settlements were  constructed  as
"new  neighborhoods" of already-existing  ones. 8 4  Between  1993 and 2001,  the
number  of housing units in the Gaza Strip  and the West Bank (excluding East
Jerusalem)  rose fifty-four percent,  from 20,400 to 31,400.  The most significant
increase  took  place under Ehud Barak  in 2000.85
d.  2004 to the Present: Evacuation of Settlements from Gaza
and the Northern West Bank
The last fourteen  months  have marked  a new phase in the settlement  pro-
ject,  in  which  the  Israeli  government  evacuated  some  settlements  while
expanding  others.86  On  December  18,  2003  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Ariel
Sharon suggested, without being specific, that Israel should "unilaterally  disen-
gage"  from  some  occupied  areas that  were  presently  under  Israeli  control  but
were  heavily  populated  by  Palestinians  (the  "Herzliya  Speech"87).  Sharon
made  clear  that  this  would  require  the  relocation  of some  Israeli  settlements
that in his view would never "be included in the territory of the state of Israel in
the  framework of any possible  future permanent  agreement."88  Within weeks
Sharon more precisely defined the scope of his initiative to include the evacua-
tion of all  settlements 8 9  in Gaza  as  well  as four  small  settlements in the West
78  Id. at  13-14 (Table  2,  citing Central  Bureau  of Statistics).
71 Id. at  11.  A  policy of natural  growth would  mean that the only new construction  would
accommodate  young  settlers  choosing  to remain  in their  settlement but  who want  to  leave
their parents'  homes.
80  Greater Jerusalem  is  an area of 440 square kilometers that comprises the inner metropoli-
tan core  around Jerusalem  beyond the  Green  Line.
8'  Lein, supra  note 45,  at  11  (citing to the  Alon Plan).
82  See id.
83  Id. at  12.
84  id.
85  Id.
86  A similar approach  was undertaken by the second Begin  government  (1981-1983).  While
it relocated 7,000 Israelis from settlements in the Sinai,  it buttressed the settlement  project in
Gaza  and the West Bank
87  Ariel  Sharon,  Speech  at  the  Herzliya  Conference,  http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=373673&contrasslD=1  (last  updated  Dec.  20, 2003).
88  Id.  Sharon  also  re-affirmed  his  intention  to construct  a  fence  in the West  Bank that  he
claimed would diminish  the risk of Palestinian terrorism.  Id.  Some large settlements would
be on the "Israeli  side"  of the fence,  but many  smaller settlements  would  not.  Id.  Sharon
indicated  that the placement of the fence  would not determine the border  in any  final  status
agreement  that  might someday  be negotiated.  Id.
89  There  are either  seventeen  or  nineteen  settlements  in Gaza,  depending  on whether  two
small  adjacent  neighborhoods  are counted  as  a separate  settlement.
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Bank.  The Prime Minister  asked the Israeli  National  Security  Council to  initi-
ate  a governmental process to plan for relocation.  The Ministry of Justice was
assigned the task of drafting  legislation  to authorize  the evacuation and provide
for compensation  of those  settlers required  to move.
In the fall of 2004,  after an initial symbolic  vote rejecting  Sharon's state-
ment convening the legislative session, the Knesset approved  the plan in  princi-
ple.  Legislation  followed  in  February  2005  authorizing  the  relocation  and
stipulating  a  compensation  mechanism.  To  secure  a  majority  in  the  Knesset,
Sharon reconfigured  his coalition by inviting the Labor Party to a national unity
government.  The  political  avenues  open  to  Sharon's  opponents  were  finally
exhausted  when  the  Knesset approved  the  budget  in  the spring  of 2005,  thus
securing  the  survival of Sharon's government.
The plan was executed in August 2005  with a massive show of force.  The
Israeli military  and police deployed  some  50,000 soldiers  and law enforcement
officers  to  the carry  out the  mission  in Gaza  where  over 8000  Jewish  settlers
were forcibly  relocated, most of them to temporary housing in territorial Israel.
These actions  of the  Sharon government hardly  signaled  an abandonment
of  the settlement  project,  however.  Indeed,  during  2005  the  total  number  of
Jewish settlers increased, notwithstanding  this evacuation, because of the popu-
lation  growth of the remaining  West Bank  settlements.  During the  first eight
months of 2005,  the number of settlers in the West Bank grew  by five percent,
to  250,000.90  Moreover,  the  Israeli  government  also  took  steps  to  signal  its
increased  commitment  to  large  settlement  blocks  in  the  West  Bank.  Sharon
secured a commitment from United States President George Bush guaranteeing,
in  effect, U.S.  recognition  that  some settlements  will remain  in place even  in
the event of a future peace agreement with  the Palestinians.  On April  14, 2004
Bush wrote  to Prime  Minister  Sharon  a letter stating:
In  light of  new  realities  on  the  ground,91 including  already  existing  major  Israeli
populations  centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final  status negotia-
tions will be a full and complete return  to the armistice lines of 1949, and  all previ-
ous efforts to  negotiate  a two-state  solution have reached  the same conclusion.  It is
realistic  to expect that any final  status agreement  will only be  achieved on the basis
of mutually  agreed changes that  reflect these  realities.92
C.  The Intractability of Both Issues
As noted above, the conflict over the Palestinian refugees dates back to the
creation of Israel  in  1948,  while the  conflict over the Jewish  settlements  arose
in  the  aftermath  of the  1967  Six  Day  War.  For years,  each  side  asserted  its
positions,  and there  were no negotiations,  as neither side  recognized  the legiti-
macy of the other.  When direct negotiations between  the Israelis and the Pales-
tinians  finally  began  in  1991,  both  sides  agreed  to  defer  any  meaningful
discussion of the  substantive  issues to  a  later phase  of the Oslo  process.  The
90  Yablonka,  supra note 45.
91  Widely  understood  to mean  the settlement  blocks.
92  Bush  Letter  to  Sharon Supports  Israeli  Withdrawal  Plan,  Dep't of State Press Releases,
2004 WLNR  2465693  (April  14,  2004)  (emphasis added).
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first serious attempt to even discuss these issues took place only in the spring of
2000,  during  what  came  to be known  as  the "Swedish  channel. 93
During the  short  negotiation  history,  which  begins at  the first direct  talks
in  1991  and culminates  at the last official attempt  at bilateral  negotiation in the
winter of 2001  at Taba, the two issues proved intractable  as no agreement could
be  reached  on  either.  While the informal  record  suggests  that in  the Swedish
channel  and  at Taba, negotiators  at  the  table made  some progress  in  reducing
their  differences  on  these  two  issues,  the  internal  conflicts  within  each  side
remained  unaddressed  and  unresolved.  Neither issue could  be  resolved  satis-
factorily  despite  the efforts  of negotiators,  and by  the  end of talks  at Taba  in
February  2001,  the Oslo  process  had definitively  collapsed,  and was  followed
in  the  next three  years by intensifying  frustration  on both sides,  and escalating
violence.
1.  Israeli-Palestinian  Negotiations  from  1991 - 1999
The  first direct  attempts  at  negotiation  between  Israelis  and  Palestinians
began  at Madrid in October  1991  during multilateral  talks initiated by the U.S.
and  co-sponsored  by the  Soviet  Union.  These talks  were held in  the wake  of
the American  victory  in the Gulf War, the turbulence caused by the Palestinian
intifada, the  proliferation  and  growing  popularity  of militant  Islamic  groups
such as  Hamas  and Islamic Jihad,  and the growing  awareness  that Palestinians
needed  to be involved  in negotiations  for a lasting peace  to  ensue.  In contrast
to previous  peace  talks,  a Palestinian  delegation  was  allowed to participate  at
Madrid,  albeit  as  part  of  the  Jordanian  delegation.  The  Madrid  talks  also
involved representatives  from Syria, Lebanon  and Jordan.  While the PLO was
not allowed to officially attend, the Palestinian delegation,  led by Haydar  'Abd
al  Shafi,  was accepted  by the PLO  as  a suitable intermediary.94
Alongside the bi-lateral negotiations  that Israel held with its neighbouring
countries,  the Madrid process  also included  a number of multilateral  "working
groups"  to deal with regional issues.  One of these  was  a multilateral Refugee
Working  Group  ("RWG"),  chaired  by  Canada  and comprising delegates  from
thirty-nine  countries,  which was meant to directly  discuss the refugee  issue.95
The proceedings  of this group amply demonstrated  the wide gaps  between Pal-
estinian  and  Israeli  positions  on  the refugee  issue.  During  these  multilateral
talks,  the Palestinians  attempted to  focus  the discussion  on  international  legal
principles  concerning  the rights  of  refugees  to  return  and  compensation  and
wished  to discuss  long-term  political  solutions  to the problem.  They  claimed
that Israel  bore  full responsibility  for the creation  of the  refugee  problem and
argued that Article  11  of U.N. Resolution  194 required  Israel  to allow all refu-
gees who chose to  return  to do  so, provided they  were willing to  live in peace
with  their  neighbours.  The  Palestinians  also  demanded  compensation  from
9'  SHLOMO  BEN-AMI,  A  FRONT  WITHOUT  A  REARGUARD:  A  VOYAGE  TO  THE BOUNDARIES
OF THE  PEACE  PROCESS  45  (2004)  (in  Hebrew).
14  Glen Rangwala,  Negotiating the  Non-negotiable:  The  Right of Return and  the Evolving
Role  of Legal  Standards  12  (May  22-23,  2003),  http://www.badil.org/Campaign/Expert
Forun/Ghent/paper04.pdf.
9'  A User's  Guide to the Multilateral  Bodies of the Middle East Peace Process,  http://www.
usembassy-amman.org.jo/Enviro/MEPP2.html  (last  visited Jan.  28,  2006).
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Israel for all refugees who chose not to return; and, above all, they asserted that
every  refugee,  and  every  descendant of every  refugee,  had  a  legal  and  moral
right  to return  to his or her  original home.
On  the  other  hand,  the  Israeli  delegates  rejected  outright,  as  Israel  had
done since  1949,  any  possibility of a  significant return of Palestinian  refugees
to  Israel.  They  denied  any  responsibility  for  the  refugee  problem,  arguing
instead that it was entirely  the fault of the Arab states that had declared war on
Israel  in  1948.  They  claimed  that  the  only  compensation  Israel  would  pay
would be part of an  international package.96  More importantly,  however,  they
raised  a procedural  objection  to  the  workings  of the  RWG,  insisting  that  the
refugee  issue  could  never  be  solved  in  a  multilateral  framework.  They
demanded  instead  that the RWG  talks  be  restricted to technical  and humanita-
rian  concerns  (e.g., job  creation,  vocational  training,  public  health,  and  child
welfare  for the Palestinian  refugees  in their host countries)  as  well as  on poli-
cies  of adaptation  (i.e.,  better social  and  economic  integration  of the  refugee
communities  into their host  surroundings).97
While  the RWG  meetings  continued  to flounder  in irrelevance,  Israel  and
the  PLO  reached  a  breakthrough  agreement  on  mutual  recognition  which
culminated in the joint "Declaration of Principles"  at Oslo in 1993.  Inspired by
the  nascent  hope that permeated  the  region  at the time,  Yossi Beilin, then  the
Israeli  Deputy  Foreign  Minister,  announced  his  government's  willingness  to
double  the  number  of annual  licenses  granted  to Palestinian  refugees  through
the  family reunification  program  from  1000  to 2000.98
Meanwhile,  the historic mutual recognition between the PLO  and the state
of Israel  had led  to the  commencement  of bilateral  talks, which  meant, for the
first time, a direct negotiating channel between the two parties.  However, these
talks  were  carefully  circumscribed  to discuss only  "interim"  issues,  with talks
about  long-term  political  solutions  to  the  refugee  issue  relegated,  with  other
major issues such as borders and settlements, to the planned "final  status" talks
that  were  to be  concluded  by  the  end  of a  five-year  interim  period  in  May
1999.
As such, the three agreements that were arrived at between  the Israelis and
the Palestinians  over the course of the next few years  (The Declaration  of Prin-
ciples on  September  13,  1993,  the  Gaza-Jericho  Agreement  on  May  4,  1994,
and  the interim agreement  on  September 28,  1995)  contained  nothing of rele-
vance to the refugee issue.  Instead, buried in Article XII of the "Declaration of
Principles,"  now known as the "Oslo Accord"  under a subheading  titled "Liai-
son and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt,"  was  a sentence  that established  a
multi-lateral committee  that  would decide  "the  modalities of admission of per-
sons displaced from the  West Bank and Gaza  Strip."99  This  provision,  agreed




9 Jewish  Virtual  Library,  Declaration of Principles  On Interim  Self-Government  Arrange-
ments  Article  XII  (Sept.  13,  1993),  http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.
html.
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to by the  PLO leadership,  related to persons  "displaced"  from their West Bank
homes  as  a  result of the  1967  war, not refugees  of  1948.
The  Oslo  Accord  and  the  other  interim  agreements  signed  during  this
period  must be  considered nothing  short of pivotal in the  context of the  larger
history  of the Arab-Israeli  conflict.  But the accords placed  a higher priority on
taking  steps  towards  Palestinian autonomy  (and its promise  of eventual  state-
hood) in Gaza and the West Bank over a resolution of the refugee issue.  Those
Israelis who supported the Oslo process assumed that the creation of a Palestin-
ian  state,  to which refugees  could return, would be the solution  to  the refugee
problem.
Likewise,  no concrete  discussions ensued  at Madrid about the settlements.
What  discussion  there  was about  territorial  issues  was  limited  strictly  to  the
scope of autonomy in the  territories.1°°  Similarly,  there was  no discussion  in
the Declaration of Principles of settlements or borders, which were relegated to
"final status talks" that were meant to be held at the end of an interim period of
five years.  One  clause of "Oslo  2"  (Sept  28,  1995,  Ch.  2,  Art.  10,  section  2)
vaguely  implied  a  withdrawal  of Israeli  troops  from  the  West  Bank  over  a
period of time,  but the  scope of this  troop withdrawal  was ambiguous,  and  no
mention was  made of settlements  or settlers.
2.  Final  Status Negotiations-The Swedish Channel (Spring 2000)
Although final status talks were meant to begin in  1996, the peace process
entered  a crisis in  1995,  and the  ensuing  stalemate  was not broken  until Ehud
Barak led the Labor Party  back to power in  1999 on the strength of a campaign
promise to end the conflict and usher in peace.  Implied in this promise was  his
willingness to attempt to  solve permanently  the refugee issue,  and, to that end,
he demonstrated  a willingness on Israel's part to allow the refugees of the  1967
war (though not the  1948  refugees) to re-enter the territories now administered
by the  Palestinian  Authority  (previously,  Israel had  demanded  repatriation  of
all "displaced  persons"  to Egypt  or  Jordan).  While  Barak  remained  adamant
that there  would be  no return  of refugees  to  Israel,  and while  he  insisted that
Israel would  accept  no  responsibility for  the creation  of the refugee  problem,
many considered these  to be "opening positions"  at the negotiation table when
final status talks formally  began in September  1999.  Serious final-status  nego-
tiations finally  got underway  in the  spring of 2000, in secret  talks that came  to
be known  as the "Swedish  Channel"  or  "Stockholm Talks."
1o0  The  bilateral  component of the  discussions  at  Madrid  comprised  four  separate  sets  of
talks between  Israel and her Arab neighbors  (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and a Palestinian dele-
gation  represented through  Jordan).  According  to the Israeli  government,  "While  the talks
with the three Arab  states were  aimed at  achieving peace treaties,  the negotiations  between
Israel  and  the Palestinians  were based  on  a two-stage  formula:  5-year  interim  self-govern-
ment  arrangements,  to be  followed  by  negotiations  on  the  permanent  status  issues."  The
multilateral  talks  at  Madrid  were  construed  more  as  "confidence  building"  measures,  and
comprised  five separate forums  attended by delegations from countries in the region as well
as  representatives  of the  international  community.  The  multilateral  talks  focused  on  "key
issues  that concerned  the  entire  Middle  East-water,  environment,  arms  control,  refugees
and economic development."  (note:  no mention  of territories,  borders  or settlements).  See
Jewish  Virtual  Library,  The  Madrid  Framework,  http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/
jsource/Peace/madridl.html  (last  visited Jan.  28, 2006).
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By  this time public opinion polls indicated that Israeli Jews  and Palestini-
ans  held  diametrically  opposite  views  about  the  appropriate  resolution  to  the
conflict.  The vast majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (no polls
were conducted  at the time of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) wanted  a
full  right  to  return  to  Israel,  while  the  vast  majority  of Israelis  rejected  any
solution that would allow large numbers of Palestinians to be admitted to Israel
and  insisted  that it  was Israel's sole right to decide  who  should be  allowed to
return, if at  all.''
In  the  secret  negotiations  that  occurred  in  the  Swedish  Channel,  it
appeared  that  the representatives  at the  table made  some progress with  respect
to the refugee  issue.  There was little change in the Israeli  position.  The Israelis
proposed accepting up to 10,000 refugees  within a humanitarian  family reunifi-
cation scheme." 2  The Palestinians  proposed that an international  commission
ask all refugees  where  they wished to reside, with the questions framed in such
a way that the probable result would be that only a limited number would settle
in  Israel.  The parties  agreed to try to  create  what would  be a vaguely  worded
historical  recapitulation  on  the  right of return  that would somehow  be  consis-
tent with both people's historical narrative.'0 3  And  they also discussed the cre-
ation  of a  twenty  billion dollar fund  by  the  international  community  to  settle
refugee claims  and financially aid those countries that shouldered the burden of
accepting  and rehabilitating  them.'0 4
According to  some  Israeli sources,  the talks on refugees  were sufficiently
promising so  that the impression on the Israeli side was that the question of the
right  of return  could  be  "satisfactorily  resolved."'
0 5  According  to  the  same
sources,  however,  the  Palestinian  delegates,  while  unofficially  admitting  that
the  Swedish  Channel  had resulted  in agreement  in principle  that  the right  of
return  would never be fully implemented,  were unhappy  with the vague  word-
ing  of the  statement  that  was  meant  to  resolve  the contradictory  narratives.
They believed Israel  should assume moral and legal responsibility for the situa-
tion of the refugees  and issue  an apology,  demands  that had been  rejected  by
the  Israeli  delegates.  Most  fundamentally,  it was  not clear whether  President
Arafat was  aware of concrete proposals that were discussed, much less whether
he  had agreed to them.' 06
3.  Final Status Negotiations-Camp  David (2000)
While the  underlying reasons  are  not clear, during the Camp David  sum-
mit  in  July  2000, the  refugee  issue  did  not  receive  as  much  attention  as  did
101  Tovy, supra  note 96.
102  Uriya Shavit & Jalal Bana, Everything You  Wanted To Know About The Right Of Return
But Were  Too Afraid To Ask,  HA'ARETZ,  July 6, 2001,  available at http://www.mideastweb.
org/refugees3.htm.
113  Tovy, supra note 96.
o Shavit & Bana, supra note  102.
o ld. See also Ari Shavit, End of a Journey, HA'ARETZ,  available at http://www.haaretz
daily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=74353&contrasslD=3&subContrasslD=0&sb
SubContrasslD=0  (last visited Jan.  28,  2006).
106  GILIAD  SHER,  BE'MERHAK  NEGIA  141  (2001)  (in Hebrew).
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other divisive issues, such as Jerusalem,  security, and borders.
10 7  Indeed, some
participants  suggested there  was  something of a regression  between  the Swed-
ish Channel and Camp David  on the  refugee issue. 108  Whatever the  reason, it
is  clear  that  nothing  more  was  achieved  than  had  already  been  achieved  at
Stockholm.  Barak continued  to refuse the  notion that Israel  should accept  any
responsibility,  legal  or  moral,  for  the  refugee  problem,  and he  continued  to
oppose any recognition of the principle of the right of return.  However, he also
agreed  to  express  Israel's  regret  for  the  suffering  of  the refugees,  to  absorb
"tens of thousands"  under the family reunification  plan,  and to make financial
contributions  to an international  organization that would be established  for the
rehabilitation  of the  refugees  outside Israel.'0 9
Yasser  Arafat  and his delegates,  for their  part, continued  to insist on  the
moral and legal bases of the right of return but also agreed on practical grounds
that there could be no full return of refugees to Israel.  And, for the first time in
the negotiating history of the issue, Arafat's team referred to  a non-literal  inter-
pretation of U.N. Resolution  194,  which marked a  departure from the very lit-
eral interpretation on which they had traditionally grounded  their claim." 0  The
Palestinian  position  demanded  that  Israel  accept  the  principle  of  a  right  of
return  that would give individual Palestinians  a choice, but  it would be under-
stood  that  the  right would  be  somehow  implemented  so  that  only  a  limited
number  of  Palestinian  refugees  would  actually  return  to  Israel.  As  the  PLO
Negotiations  Affairs  Unit put  it:
[An  Israeli  recognition of the Palestinian  right of return does  not mean  that all  refu-
gees  will  exercise  that right.  What is needed  in  addition  to such  recognition  is  the
concept  of choice.  Many refugees may opt for (i) resettlement  in third countries, (ii)
resettlement  in a newly  independent  Palestine (though  they originate  from that part of
Palestine  which became  Israel)  or (iii) normalization  of their legal  status in the  host
country  where  they  currently  reside.  In  addition,  the right  of return  may  be imple-
mented  in  phases so  as to  address Israel's  demographic  concerns.
111
For Israel, no deal was possible unless it was  entirely clear that  the num-
bers would be limited and that Palestinians  would give up all future claims with
respect  to return.
While  both the Israelis and the Palestinians had traveled  some  ways from
the  days  when  they  clung  to a  fierce  denial  of all  return to  Israel  or  a  fierce
demand  for  full  return to Israel,  the  parties  were clearly  unable  to resolve  the
refugee  issue at Camp David.  The Palestinian delegation  had accepted  a non-
literal  interpretation of the right of return, although  the issue of Israel's accept-
ance  of moral responsibility  remained central  and non-negotiable for them;  the
Israelis had increased  the numbers  of refugees they  would allow  in under fam-
ily-reunification  schemes,  although  any  acceptance  of  responsibility  on  their
107  See  DENNIS  Ross, THE  MISSING  PEACE:  THE  INSIDE  STORY  OF  THE  FIGHT  FOR  MIDDLE
EAST  PEACE  674  (2004) ("there  was little  discussion  of refugees").
108  See  Shavit, supra note  105.
109  Tovy,  supra note  96.
l10  Rangwala,  supra note 94,  at  13-14.
'II  PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, Why  Did the Palestinians Reject the Camp David
Peace  Proposal?,  http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=nego-nego-camp-cmp-ncamp
davidlp  (last visited  Jan.  28, 2006).
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part,  and  any  uncontrolled  return  of large  numbers  of refugees,  remained  for
them  equally  non-negotiable.
By  all  accounts,  the  territorial/border/settlement  discussion  consumed
much time and attention  at Camp David, but again,  no agreement  emerged and
the  discussions  ended  in  acrimony.  The  Israelis  and  Americans  claimed  that
the final proposal offered by Barak  and Clinton to the Palestinians would  have
involved  Israeli  annexation  of nine to  ten  percent  of the  West  Bank, encom-
passing  many  current  settlement  blocs,  but leaving  the Palestinian  territory  in
one contiguous piece.  In addition,  a narrow strip comprising  fifteen percent  of
the  length of the  border along the  Jordan River valley would be kept by Israel
for security  purposes on  "long-term  lease"  for an  interim period.'2  In  return,
the  Israelis would  cede one  to three  percent of their territory in  the Negev  to
Palestine.'  13
The Palestinians  claimed that this proposal  aimed  to divide  the would-be
state of Palestine into four separate  and non-contiguous  cantons  surrounded by
Israel-the  Northern  West  Bank,  the  Central  West  Bank,  the  Southern  West
Bank,  and  Gaza.' 4  This  division,  they  charged,  would  prohibit  freedom  of
movement  of goods and persons within the Palestinian  state, and subject Pales-
tinian  nationals and  the Palestinian  economy  to  Israeli control, thereby  depriv-
ing  the state of any  semblance of sovereignty  and  independence.  Lastly,  they
objected to the fact that the final proposal sought to leave Israel in control of all
Palestinian  borders.  However,  they  also  stated that  they  were  not opposed  to
discussing  further  the solutions  that had been  proposed  by the Israelis  during
the  talks, but they  proposed  that such swaps should  "be  based on  a one-to-one
ratio, with land of equal value and in areas adjacent to the border with Palestine
and in the same vicinity as the lands to be annexed by Israel."'  5  They claimed
that the  Camp  David proposal  envisioned  a nine-to-one  land  swap  in  Israel's
favour, which  was not  only unfair but  also detrimental  to the principle  of fair
territorial  compromise for peace.
4.  The  Clinton Proposal (December 2000)
The Clinton  proposal was an  attempt, on the part of President  Clinton, to
bridge the  gaps that still existed  between  the  sides at the  end of Camp  David.
With  respect  to the refugee  issue,  President  Clinton  stated,  "I  sense  that
the differences  are more  relating  to formulations  and less  to what will happen
on a practical  level,"'  16 and this  sense led Clinton to believe that the gap on the
refugee  issue concerned  not the actual return  (he believed that the Palestinians
were ready  to "give it up")  but the handling of the history  of the issue, and the
question of the apology.  This led  in  turn to  a proposal that  was not materially
different  on the refugee  issue from  what had been  discussed  at  Camp  David,
112  Map  available  at http://www.mideastweb.org/lastmaps.htm  (last  visited Jan.  28, 2006).
113  Id.
1"4  PLO Negotiations  Affairs Unit, Camp  David Peace  Proposal of July, 2000:  Frequently
Asked  Questions,  http://www.ipcri.org/files/palresponsescampdavid.html  (last  visited  Jan.
28, 2006).
I  I  d.
116  Bill Clinton, The Clinton Plan (Dec.  23, 2000), reprinted  in THE  ISRAEL-ARAB  READER,
supra note  29,  at  563.
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but one that employed different  language.  Clinton said, for instance,  that  "we
need to adopt a formulation  on the right of return  that  will make clear there  is
no specific right of return  to Israel itself but that  does not negate  the aspiration
of the  Palestinian  people  to return to the  area."" 7  The Clinton  proposal  sug-
gested  individual  Palestinians  would  not  have  a  right to  choose  to  come  to
Israel,  but they  would have  a  right to "return"  to  a new  Palestinian homeland
which would become  a state.  The Clinton plan  also  specified  that "the  agree-
ment  will  make  clear  that the return  to  the  West  Bank, Gaza  Strip  and area
acquired  in  the  land  swap  would  be  right to  all  Palestinian  refugees,  while
rehabilitation  in host countries,  resettlement  in third countries,  and absorption
into Israel  will depend upon the policies of those countries."" 8  Lastly, the plan
mentioned the  need  to prioritize the refugee  population  in Lebanon.
While the Israelis  accepted the Clinton Plan within forty-eight hours of its
publication with  some reservations  (which  had to do with  security  clauses  and
the  sovereignty  to  be  assigned  to  the  Temple  Mount),  the  Palestinians
responded  on January  1,  2001,  with  a stern  document  titled  "The  Palestinian
Position Regarding  Clinton's Proposal"  which declared  the plan  objectionable
primarily  on  account of its ambiguity,  and which  stated:
The  United  States proposals  were couched  in general  terms that  in some  instances
lack clarity and  detail.  A permanent  status  agreement,  in our  view,  is not merely a
document  that declares  general  political  principles.  It is,  rather, a comprehensive
instrument that spells out the details, modalities,  and timetables of ending the Pales-
tinian-Israeli  conflict.  For such  an  agreement  to be  effective,  it  must be backed  by
clear, effective international  implementation  guarantees.  We  believe that a general,
vague agreement  at  this advanced stage of the peace process  will be  counter-produc-
tive....  The permanent  status agreement must be a truly final agreement  rather than
an agreement  to negotiate.
1 19
With respect  to  refugees,  the  official  Palestinian  position  on the  Clinton
proposal  was not much different from the negotiating position of the Palestini-
ans at Camp David.  They claimed the substitution of the word "home" with the
word "homeland"  was unacceptable  and not in keeping with international  law,
and they claimed Palestinian refugees must be given the option to choose where
to settle.  However they also claimed  they were "prepared to think flexibly  and
creatively  about the mechanisms  for implementing  the right of return, '" 2o  and
that they  were willing to accommodate  Israel's  demographic  and security con-
cerns.  In  the  Palestinian  view,  the  Clinton  proposal  did  less  than  what  had
already  been  agreed  to at the  Swedish  Channel  almost  a year  ago, and in  this
view  they  perhaps  did not differ  too much  from their Israeli  counterparts.' 2'
The  Palestinians  had  a series  of objections to the territorial  issue:
a)  The proposal was unaccompanied  by a map, which  made it difficult  to
see  how Palestinian  contiguity would or would not be affected  and which  set-
tlement  blocks  would be annexed  to  Israel;
117  Id. at  564.
I8 Id. (emphasis  added).
19  The Palestinian Negotiating Team, The Palestinian  Position Regarding Clinton's Propos-
als  (Jan.  1, 2001), http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/reacpal-en.
120  Id.
121  See,  e.g.,  id.
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b)  The proposal had not made clear what was the total of annexed  land for
purposes of the calculation  (i.e., it was unclear whether East Jerusalem and the
Dead  Sea area were considered  to be part of the West  Bank  when calculating
the three to four percent that would be annexed to Israel, or whether those were
in addition  to the other portions that would be swapped,  which would bring the
"percentage  annexed"  number  closer to the ten percent  range);
c)  The proposal did not contain  any provisions to ensure direct Palestinian
access to its international borders or even Palestinian control over movement  of
goods  and people within  the  new state of Palestine;
d)  The proposal  envisioned  that  an  additional  ten percent  of Palestinian
territory  would  be  placed  under  Israeli  control  under  what  they  called  "ill-
defined security  arrangements;"
e)  The  proposal  had  not  made  clear  which  areas  would  be  swapped  in
return  for  the  settlements  (the  Palestinians  desired  that  annexed  land  be
swapped  with  land of  equal  size and  value,  and  not, for  example,  with  arid
desert regions  in the Negev).
122
Despite  these substantial  objections,  the Palestinians  agreed to reconvene
talks  with the Israelis at the end of the month and to take as their starting point
the  Clinton proposal.
5.  Taba (January  2001)
Israeli  and Palestinian  negotiators  met for  a final  time  officially  in  what
was  described  as  a  "last-ditch  effort"  to  secure  an  overall  permanent-status
agreement before  the prime-ministerial  elections  in Israel  which  were  sched-
uled  for February  2001  and were widely believed to hold  slim chances of suc-
cess  for Ehud Barak's  by-then-very  beleaguered  government.
The talks  at  Taba  ended  inconclusively,  with  no agreement  between  the
parties on any  of the issues discussed. These  talks were probably doomed from
the outset because Prime Minister Barak's government had fallen, elections had
already been  scheduled  for February  2001,  and the second  intifada was raging.
Unlike  Camp  David,  neither  Barak  nor Arafat  was  present,  and it  is  unclear
whether either leader  in fact authorized the unrecorded  proposals that were dis-
cussed by the negotiators at the table.
123  Moreover,  even if the Palestinians  had
accepted  the Israeli  proposals,  which they did not, it appeared  at  the time  that
Barak  would have faced  significant difficulties  ratifying and implementing  an
agreement.
There is no official record  of the negotiations  at Taba,  but an  EU Special
Representative  later created  a  report,  never  officially  made  public  but in  fact
later released ("EU  non-paper"),  suggesting  that concessions  appeared  to have
been offered  by both  sides.
124
122  The Palestinian Negotiating Team,  supra note  119.
123  See  SHLOMo  BEN-AMI,  HAZIT  LELO  OREF  432-55  (2004) (in  Hebrew).
124  While  the  discussions  at Taba have  never been  officially  made public,  this  report pre-
pared  by Ambassador  Moratinos,  the EU Special  Representative  to the Middle  East Process
at the time, has been acknowledged  by Israelis and  Palestinians who were  present at the talks
as being  a "relatively  fair  description of the outcome  of the  negotiations  on the  permanent
status  issues at  Taba."
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a.  Refugees
With  respect  to  refugees,  four  key issues  were identified  and  discussed:
(1) the actual implementation  of return;  (2)  what should be  said acknowledging
a right of return and the question of historical responsibility for the suffering  of
the  refugees;  (3)  mechanisms  of compensation;  and  (4)  the  need  for closure.
i.  Implementation
There  was  an  acknowledgement  on  Israel's  part  that  the  refugee  issue
would  not only  have to be  resolved  in accordance with  U.N. Resolution  194,
but that such resolution was essential to "creating a lasting and morally scrupu-
lous  peace."' 25  This  translated  into  an  agreement  on  Israel's  part  that  some
refugees would have to be given the right to return  to Israel,  although the total
number allowed in would continue to be strictly capped and controlled by Israel
(no number was agreed upon during the talks, but sources suggest that the num-
bers discussed  were higher than  before),  and  a three-track fifteen-year absorp-
tion process  would regulate this return.126  Also, Israel  agreed that a somewhat
larger  (though, again,  unspecified)  number of refugees  would be  allowed  into
territory currently  belonging  to Israel,  but that would eventually be  "swapped"
over  to the  newly-established  Palestinian  state  in  exchange for settlements  in
the West Bank.1 27  These "swapped  territories"  would essentially comprise the
predominantly  "Arab  areas"  of Israel,  which  would presumably  include  such
towns  as  Umm  al Fahm.
For  their  part,  the  Palestinian  negotiators  suggested,  as  they  had  at  the
Swedish  Channel,  that Israel  would have  the right to  cap  the  number of refu-
gees  allowed  to  return  to  Israel,  to  regulate  the  manner  of  that  return,  and,
moreover,  any  return into Israel  "proper" would only be  symbolic.  Moreover,
the  Palestinian  negotiators  were  also  willing  to  concede  that  a  return  to
"swapped  territory"  and to "an eventual Palestinian  state" would also constitute
return, and that rehabilitation  in existing host countries, or relocation  to willing
third  countries,  so long  as  they  occurred  voluntarily  on  the  part  of refugees,
would  also  be  acceptable  components  of a just and  lasting  solution  in  accor-
dance  with  Resolution  194.  Significant gaps remained  between  the sides  as to
the actual number of refugees returning to "Israel  proper,"  the priority given, or
not given, to the refugees  in Lebanon, and to the importance  and feasibility  of
unrestricted  choice.
ii.  Acknowledgment
Much heated  discussion apparently  ensued during the  talks in Taba about
the  extent  to  which  Israel  would  accept  any responsibility  for  its role  in  the
creation of the refugee problem,  and while the European Union non-paper indi-
cates that  "much  progress" was made  on the  issue of a joint narrative,  it is not
125  EU Description  of the Outcome  of Permanent Status Talks  at  Taba,  Ha'aretz  at http://
www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=130196&contrasslD=2&subCon-
trasslD=5&sbSubContrasslD=0&listSrc=Y  (last  visited  Jan.  28, 2006).
126  Id.
127  Id.
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clear  what  was  exactly  agreed  to  in  the  end.128  Some  sources  indicate  that
Israel was willing to express "its  sorrow for the tragedy of the Palestinian refu-
gees,  their suffering and their losses"  without acknowledging  any direct respon-
sibility for  that tragedy;  other  sources  dispute even  that admission.'
29
iii.  Compensation
There  seemed to  have been  a  consensus  across  the  table  at  Taba  on the
need  for the establishment  of an "International  Commission"  and an "Interna-
tional  Fund"  to deal  with  the difficult  issue of compensation.  Both sides  also
apparently  agreed  that  all claims of compensation  for property losses  below  a
certain  amount  would be  subject  to "fast-track"  procedures.  The  question of
how  much, if at all, Israel would contribute  to this International  Fund was hotly
debated,  but it  appears  that the Israelis  agreed to be responsible  at least  for a
certain lump sum amount.  There was disagreement on how appropriated  assets
would be compensated,  with the Israelis preferring  a "macro-economic  survey
to evaluate  the  assets  in  order to  reach  a  fair  value"' 3 °  and  the Palestinians
preferring  a sum calculated based on the "records of the UNCCP, the Custodian
for Absentee  Property  and other relevant data  with a multiplier  to reach  a fair
value,"'
13 1 but it would be churlish, given the magnanimity  of the discussion, to
consider these  disagreements  as gaps.
iv.  Closure
In  what  must  be  considered  a  significant  concession  on  the  part  of  the
Palestinians,  both  parties  agreed  that  the  implementation  of  an  agreement
would constitute  a "complete and final implementation  of U.N. Resolution  194
and therefore  end  all  claims"'
1
3
1 to the right to return.  Moreover,  both parties
agreed that UNRWA would  be disbanded at the end of the process,  and that all
refugee  documents  and claims  would be  terminated.  In the end, there  would
effectively be  no more Palestinian  refugees in the  region.
Despite these four  areas of progress, there  remained two  open  issues:  1)
the Israelis'  refusal  to provide  any  restitution  of property  rights  for property
appropriated  from  Palestinians  by  the  state of Israel;  and  2)  the Palestinians'
refusal to include  any  discussion, under the  bilateral framework,  of compensa-
tion to former Jewish  refugees  from Arab  countries.  Although the Israelis did
recognize  that this  was not a  Palestinian  responsibility,  it seems the  disagree-
ment was  more  on whether  the  issue  should be brought  up  in  the context  of
refugee  rights.
b.  Boundaries and Settlements
The talks at Taba were marked by serious efforts by both sides to narrow
the wide  gaps  that remained  at the  end  of the Camp  David talks  concerning
128  Id.
129  Eldar Akiva, How  to Solve the Palestinian  Refugee Problem, HA'ARETZ,  May 29, 2001.
130  Moratinos,  supra note  50.
131  id.
132  The Taba Proposals and  the Refugee Problem,  MIDEAST  WEB,  Jan.  27,  2001,  http://
www.mideastweb.org/taba.htm.
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boundaries.  The  discussions  about  territory  were  accompanied,  for  the  first
time, by  an open exchange  of proposed maps of the West Bank,  which served
to  make the  discussions  about borders  and land  swaps  far more concrete  than
they  had  been  in  the  past, and  thus  more  productive.  While  the  talks  began
loosely  with the Clinton parameters,  the major  discussions and  disagreements
centered on  five points. 33
i.  Annexation of settlement blocs
The Palestinian side argued that the settlement blocs proposed by the Clin-
ton plan would cause significant harm to Palestinian interests and rights, partic-
ularly to the Palestinians residing  in those  areas that Israel  would annex, while
the Israeli  side  maintained  that Israel was entitled  to the  blocs  outlined in  the
Clinton  plan.  Also  in  keeping  with  the  Clinton  proposal,  the  Israeli  maps
aimed to place in settlement blocs approximately  eighty percent of the  settlers,
which would amount to a six percent annexation of the West Bank, which  was
the  outer  limit  of  the  Clinton  proposal.  The  Palestinians  presented  maps
allowing for three percent  annexation and insisted that Palestinian villages  and
towns  could not be annexed  to Israel.  They  also claimed the  "no man's  land"
(Latrun  area)  as part of the West Bank, which  the Israelis  disputed.
ii.  Contiguity
The Israeli  side maintained  that Israel  was entitled  to contiguity between
and  among  settlements,  while  the  Palestinians  claimed  that  contiguity  of the
West Bank  was more important,  essential  to the free  movement  of goods  and
services  within  Palestine  and  more importantly,  to preserving the  sovereignty
and  independence  of the new  Palestinian state.
iii.  Further  growth of settlements
The  Israeli  maps  included  plans  for future  development  of Israeli  settle-
ments  in  the  West  Bank,  to  which  the  Palestinians  greatly  objected.  They
insisted instead  that  all settlement  growth  must  occur inside  Israel.
iv.  Land swaps
Both sides remained committed to the idea of land swaps, but they clashed
on what exactly those swapped lands would look like.  The Palestinians  wished
to be  given  full  sovereign  control  over  all  lands  swapped  to  the  Palestinian
state, while the  Israelis  wished to control the  "safe  passage/corridor"  that was
to  be  included  as  part  of the  swap  (the  Palestinians  said,  in  response,  that if
Israel  were  to  exert  control  over  this  land,  it  could  not  be  counted  as
"swapped").  The Palestinians  also  stressed that Palestinian  villages and towns
could  not be  annexed  to  Israel  and  insisted that  any  swapped  land should  be
equitable in size and value, in areas adjacent to the border with Palestine, and in
the same  vicinity  as  the lands annexed  by Israel.
133  See EU Description of the Outcome of Permanent  Status Talks at Taba, supra note  125
(providing the following  account).
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v.  Leased land
The Israelis requested  an additional  two percent of West  Bank land under
a  lease  arrangement,  while the  Palestinians  claimed  that such  an  arrangement
could  only  be  discussed  after  the establishment  of a  Palestinian  state  and  the
transfer of land to Palestinian  sovereignty.
On January  27, 2001,  the parties  ended  the Taba talks without agreement.
The  negotiators  issued  an  extremely  upbeat joint  statement  indicating  that  in
discussing President Clinton's proposals there had been "substantial progress in
the  understanding  of the  other  side's  positions  and  in  some  of  them the  two
sides  grew  closer."' 34  The  statement  further  suggested  that  "in  light  of the
significant  progress  in narrowing  differences  between  the  sides,"  talks  should
be resumed following the Israeli elections  because "it will be possible to bridge
the differences remaining ....  135  The events of the next four years suggested
that this statement was overly optimistic.  While we are of the view that moder-
ates on both  sides could "bridge the differences"  and reach agreement,  a careful
analysis  of the  two  internal  conflicts  demonstrates  the profound  challenge  to
sell the  deal  within each  community.
III.  UNDERSTANDING  THE  INTERNAL  CONFLICTS
A.  The Internal Palestinian Conflict Over the Scope and Meaning of
the Right of Return
As  we  have  shown,  the idea  of return  has  been central  to the Palestinian
national narrative for over fifty years.  The demand to return to their homes was
the first response of the Palestinians  to their "nakba"  or disaster of  1948,  and
therefore  preceded  every  other  political  notion  including  that of independent
Palestinian  statehood.  Although  Palestinian  political  thought  underwent  a
profound  change  with  the  PLO's  acceptance  of the  two-state framework  and
the public acknowledgment  of the right of Israel to exist alongside  an indepen-
dent Palestinian  state, the concept of the right of return has  remained until this
day  a  salient Palestinian  political demand.  There is  clearly  a tension  between
goals of an independent Palestinian  state and the return  of Palestinian refugees
to Israel,  one that sometimes goes unacknowledged  and can be  resolved in dif-
fering  ways.
Some  Palestinian  "moderates"  have  publicly  acknowledged  that  they
would sacrifice the a right to return to what is now Israel in order to secure an
independent  Palestinian  state  with  the  context  of  a  two  state  solution.  The
internal  conflict  over  the  right of return  pits  these  latter  "moderates"  against
four  major groups of Palestinians:  (1) the intellectuals  and politicians  who  are
proponents  of the  "bi-national  one state"  solution,  and  who  believe  that Jews
and  Arabs  should  be  free  to  live  wherever they  want  in the land between  the
Mediterranean  Sea  and  the  Jordan  River;  (2)  the  majority  of the  Palestinian
Fatah leadership who continue to demand both statehood and return as a negoti-
ating stance and who believe  that any talk  of limiting return should only occur
once other major concessions  have  been offered  by the Israeli  negotiators;  (3)
134  The  Taba Proposals  and the Refugee Problem, supra note  132.
135  Id.
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some  Palestinian  refugees  and their  leaders  in  the  Diaspora  who  appear  to  be
unwilling  to give  up the idea of a broad  and individually  based  right of return
even if it means postponing the establishment of a Palestinian  state in the West
Bank  and  Gaza;  and (4) those Palestinians,  including the leadership  of Hamas
and  Islamic  Jihad,  who  remain  opposed  to the  very idea  of a Jewish  state  of
Israel  and who believe "return"  will take place after the destruction of the state
of Israel.
In this section, we first explore the evolution of Palestinian ideas about the
right of return  from the early days in  1948 to the present.  Then we examine the
dimensions of the internal conflict among Palestinians on this issue by describ-
ing the arguments of certain Palestinian intellectuals,  such as Dr Sari Nusseibeh
and  Dr  Khalil  Shikaki,  and  by  taking  note  of the  violent  disagreement  such
arguments  have  engendered.  Last, we  offer  some  speculative  evidence  about
the deep, if hidden,  differences  in opinion and preference  that have existed for
some time among Palestinian refugees themselves  about the meaning  and scope
of the right  of return.
1.  The Evolution of Palestinian Thought about the Right of Return
Palestinian  refugees  claimed a right to return to their homes and property
from  the  very  outset.  Self-appointed  committees  comprising  refugees  such  as
the  "Congress  of Refugees  of Ramallah"  and "The  Jaffa  and  District Inhabi-
tants  Committee,"  appeared  before  the U.N.  Mandated  Palestine  Conciliation
Committee  at Lausanne  in  1949, which the U.N. had launched in  the hopes of
arriving  at a "lasting and just peace"  in accordance  with U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolution  194.136  The Palestinians pleaded  for the implementation  of this
resolution;  however,  they  were not officially  present during  the talks,  and the
representatives  of the defeated Arab states  (Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon)
were  considered  the sole  official  arbiters  of the  "Palestine  problem."
For  almost two  decades  after the  conference  at Lausanne,  little progress
was  made on the refugee  issue.  The Palestinian  leadership  had virtually disap-
peared  from  the  scene,  and  the Palestinian  people,  suffering  from  the severe
traumas  of dispossession  and  dispersion,  were  politically  inactive  and  practi-
cally invisible during this time.'37  The  Arab states, in what can best be termed
a policy of avoidance  and deferral, continued during these years to demand full
repatriation  of the refugees  to Israel while  doing little to make  such demand  a
reality.  Meanwhile, the camps where  the refugees  were housed became  fester-
ing centers of resentment, violence, and lawlessness.  The worsening conditions
in  the  camps  exerted, especially  on  the governments  of Jordan, Lebanon,  and
Egypt, significant political,  social,  and economic pressures,  which in turn led to
an even  greater  intransigence  on the part of these  states and an implacable  and
self-interested  insistence  that all  refugees  be  returned  to  their original  homes
and  properties.
136  United Nations  Conciliation  Commission  for Palestine,  Fourth Progress Report (Sept.
22,  1949),  http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/60fd15ff5b22ca0d85256101007a9d2e?
OpenDocument.
137  Sari  Hanafi, Opening the Debate on the Right of Return, MIDDLE EAST REP.  222  (2002),
available at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer222/222_hanafi.html.
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The humiliation of the Arab defeat in the Six Day War had a profound and
complex  impact  on Palestinian  political  and national  identity,  and, in  turn,  on
Palestinian  thinking  on the refugee issue.  The  defeat  hastened the final  break
between  the elite  leaders  of the  Arab  countries  and the  young, impoverished,
and frustrated  Palestinian  refugees  who  had  grown  up  in refugee  camps  and
who felt deeply  abandoned  and  disillusioned  by the  leaders  of these  states.
a.  The Rise of the PLO
The PLO was formed in Jordan in 1964 by the League of Arab States upon
the  urging  of  an  influential  group  of Palestinian  refugees.' 38  Soon  after the
defeat of the Arab armies  in the Six Day War and the resultant disillusionment
of young Palestinians  with the Arab leaders  who had  thus far  sought to speak
for  their  interests,  the  PLO  emerged  as  the  most important  organization  for
Palestinian  nationalism  and political  activism.  By  1968,  the PLO  was domi-
nated  by  the  Fatah  party,  which  had  been  founded  in  Kuwait  in  1957  by  a
young refugee 139 named  Yasser Arafat. 40  Within  a few  years of its creation,
the PLO  became  the  most  significant  representative  body  of the  Palestinian
people  and was the first  such  organization  that was exclusively  Palestinian  in
focus.  From its  earliest days,  the PLO  was  dominated by  Palestinian refugees
from various parts of the Diaspora and functioned as a typical  organization-in-
exile.
The PLO enjoyed a sudden surge in popularity among camp residents after
the war, and young guerrillas such as Arafat,  who emerged  as most prominent
among  the  first generation  of purely  Palestinian  leaders,  began  to  urge  their
people away  from dependence  on the  rest of the Arab  world.  A  new demand
for Palestinian  statehood  gradually  began to take root  in the  Palestinian  mind
and political  discourse in place of what had thus far been  solely a pan-Arabist
focus  on  a general  objective  of destroying  the  state of Israel  and restore  it to
Arab hands.
While  the  discourse  of return  was  embedded  throughout  the  1960s  and
early  1970s  in  the  larger  desire  to  "liberate  all  of  Palestine"  through  armed
struggle, by  1974,  during the  12th  Session of the Palestinian National  Council
("PNC")  in Cairo,  a  first mention  was  made of a  "right  of return"  (haqq al
awda) that was  to be "at the forefront  of Palestinian rights."  But that right was
expressed separately from the goal of the liberation of Palestine.'4  As scholar
Rashid Khalidi  has  since pointed  out, the language  used during  this  session  is
noteworthy because  it contained the beginnings  of the idea of the possibility of
a Palestinian entity in only part of Palestine with the first mention of "any part
of Palestine  which is liberated." ' 142  It was also  the first time the PLO publicly
accepted  U.N.  Resolutions  181  and  194,  both  of  which  had  been  opposed
138  Rashid  Hamid,  What is the PLO?, 4  J.  OF  PALESTINE  STUDIES  90  (1975).
139  Although some accounts  suggest that Arafat's family  left Palestine prior to the 1948  war.
140  Palestinian National Authority, FATEH (Palestine), http://www.pna.gov.ps/Govemmentl
gov/fateh.asp  (last visited Jan.  28,  2006).
141  Khalidi,  supra note  8, at  34.
142  Id.  Khalidi cites the "Provisional  Political Program" adopted by the PNC in 1974 during
its  12th  Session, which  included  a  sentence  that suggested  that the  PLO  was, for the  first
time in  its history,  advocating  a Palestinian  state  in only  part of Palestine.
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before  because  they  required  peaceful  recognition  of  Israel.  While  it  would
take  several more years  for the PLO  to say this explicitly,  the beginnings  of a
concept  of nationhood  on part  of historical  Palestine,  and  the  first realization
that return  would not take place through the "liberation"  of all of Palestine, but
rather by making demands on the international community, can  be traced  to this
session.
The tumultuous  events between  1971  and  1982 led the Palestinian  leader-
ship to believe, by the end of that decade,  that  the cause of independent  Pales-
tinian  statehood  was  more  feasible,  and  internationally  considered  more
legitimate, than that of the return of all Palestinian refugees to Israel.' 43  Events
that hastened  the growing  precedence of statehood over return in the minds of
these leaders  included:  (1) President  Nixon's  assurance to Israel  in  1971  that
the  United  States  would  never  insist  on  any  implementation  of the  claimed
Palestinian  right of return;  (2)  the  1973  war and the subsequent  weakening  of
support for this idea on the part of the Soviet Union, which was  at the time the
Palestinians'  strongest  ally;  (3)  the  "land-for-peace'  formula  that  established
peace  between  Egypt and  Israel in  1978 through  the Camp David accords  and
made  no  mention  of the  right  of return but  instead  mentioned  the  legitimate
rights  of  self-determination  of the  Palestinian  people;  and  (4)  the  Israeli
invasion  of Lebanon  and the subsequent  splintering of the PLO  in  1982.
By  1988,  at  the  19th  Session  of the PNC  in  Algiers,  the PLO had  suffi-
ciently resolved  the tension between the desire to liberate  "all of Palestine"  and
the desire  to achieve  immediate statehood on  "any  part of Palestine"  to openly
accept,  for  the  first time  in  its history,  a  two-state  solution  and,  with  that,  a
recognition of the  state  of Israel.  As far as the  right of return  was concerned,
both documents released  by the PNC  at the time-the Declaration  of Indepen-
dence  and  the Political Resolution-grounded  that right crucially  "within the
context of" UN  resolutions  and rendered  it less of a  priority  than  the  aim  of
independent  statehood.  Significantly,  PLO  chairman  Arafat  used  language
almost  identical  to  U.N.  Resolution  194  when  he  appeared  before  the  U.N.
General Assembly in Geneva  in December  1988 and called for the "repatriation
of the Palestinian  refugees or the payment of compensation  for the property of
those choosing not to return.., in accordance with the  pertinent U.N. resolu-
tions." 145  This desire  on  the  part  of the  Palestinian  leadership  to ground  the
right of return in what Arafat called "international legitimacy"  is significant for
two reasons:
i.  The  embrace  of the  language  of U.N.  Resolution  194 meant  that the
Palestinian leadership  accepted  the  implicit limits on return to only those  who
were  willing "to  live  at peace  with  their neighbours;"  and
ii.  The Palestinians  no longer  made  any mention  of the specific  destina-
tion  of those  returning,  thereby  leaving  open  the  possibility  of return  not to
original homes and properties  now in Israel,  but, potentially,  to  a new state  of
Palestine.
143  Rangwala,  supra note  94.
'44  Camp  David Summit Meeting:  Frameworks for Peace (Sept.  17,  1978), reprinted  in THE
ISRAEL-ARAB  READER,  supra note  29, at  222.
145  Khalidi, supra note  8, at 35  (emphasis added).
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Thus,  a crucial shift  had occurred  in Palestinian  political thought.  While
the  right  of return  was  never  relinquished  as  a key  demand  of the  Palestinian
people,  the desire  to destroy  the  state of Israel  to  liberate  all  of Palestine  had
now  become  secondary  to the  desire  to  establish  an  independent  Palestinian
state on any  part of historic Palestine.  Consequently,  the desire  to allow refu-
gees  to  return  to  historic  Palestine  was  also  subordinated  to  this  desire  for
immediate  Palestinian  statehood.  Self-determination  had become,  during  this
era,  the  cri-de-couer for  the Palestinians,  and  it remains  till this day  the  pre-
eminent  political demand  of the  Palestinians.
b.  The  Composition of the PLO
While  the  PLO  may  speak  with  one  political  voice,  it  is  composed  of
many  individual  groups.  The  Fatah  party  has  always  dominated,  but  many
other  parties  and  groups  with  widely  differing  political  philosophies  are  also
members.  These  groups  include  the Popular Front for the Liberation  of Pales-
tine ("PFLP") (two  factions); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine ("DFLP") (two factions);  the Palestine Liberation  Front ("PLF");  Al  Saiqa
Organization;  the  Arab  Liberation  Front  ("ALF");  the Palestinian  Democratic
Union (Fida);  and the  Palestinian  People's Party  ("PPP").
Despite the differing political philosophies of these groups (which concern
primarily  attitudes towards  Israel, Oslo, the role of religion in the state, and the
role of armed  struggle in the national  liberation effort), most of their members
are refugees  whose main demand for decades,  despite differences  of opinion  as
to  means  and  methods,  was  to  return  to  their  homes  and  lands  in  erstwhile
Palestine.  As we  have discussed  in the  previous section,  it was only recently,
since  1988,  that  the  demand  for  separate  statehood  was  added  to  the  PLO's
manifesto,  and  even  more  recently  that  the  latter  demand  for  statehood  has
taken precedence  over the former  demand  for return.
While there has recently emerged  a tension between  those pragmatic poli-
ticians who believe the right of return must be settled through a process of give-
and-take with the  Israelis during  negotiations  and those  who continue to assert
that return  is  a non-negotiable  moral  right  of all Palestinians,  there  is  no clear
official difference  among the various  PLO political  parties  on  this issue.  The
PLO's charter, which  every PLO  member body has  ratified,  states in Article  3
that "[t]he Palestinian  Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland  and
have the  right to determine  their destiny  after achieving  the  liberation  of their
country  in  accordance  with  their  wishes  and entirely  of their  own  accord  and
will."
Although the PLO was not recognized as the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people by the Arab states until 1974,  it served since  its incep-
tion as the main umbrella under which many Palestinian organizations (political
and  militant groups,  trade  unions,  professional  associations,  as  well  as promi-
nent  national  figures)  met  to  discuss  and  implement  national  Palestinian
goals.146  The PLO continues to play the same umbrella role today,  although it
has  lost some  of  its  salience  to  the  Palestinian  National  Authority  ("PNA",
sometimes  abbreviated  as  "PA"),  which  was  created  by  the Oslo Process  and
146  Hamid, supra  note  138.
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now  has  sole authority  to administer the Palestinian  Territories.  However,  the
PLO  remains  the  official  representative  of  all  Palestinians  in  the  Diaspora,
whereas the PNA's role is carefully  circumscribed  in its charter to the Palestini-
ans  residing in  the  Palestinian  Territories.
c.  The PLO and the PNA
It is not hard to imagine that there is a natural tension between  the aims of
the  officials-in-exile of the  PLO,  who  continue to live  outside the Palestinian
Territories and whose prime concern is return to their original  1948 homes, and
the officials of the PNA, who live in the West Bank and Gaza and whose prime
concerns  center  around  the  establishment  of a  viable  Palestinian  state.  This
divergence in aims is recent, and can possibly only be traced back to July 1994,
the date  of the first re-entry  of Palestinian  leaders, led by a triumphant  Arafat,
into the Palestinian Territories,  through the Gaza-Jericho  agreement  signed ear-
lier  that year  by  Israel  and  the  PLO  in  Cairo.  The  agreement  restricted  the
administrative  reach  of  the  Palestinian  Authority  to  the  areas  of  Gaza  and
Jericho. 147
However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  most  PNA  officials  are  given  to
reminding their Palestinian  audiences  of their own refugee  status, that many of
them visit refugee camps  in and outside the Territories, and that many of them
are  either original  1948  refugees  themselves,  or were  born  and brought  up in
refugee  camps  as  descendants  of refugees.  The  current  President,  Mahmoud
Abbas, is himself a refugee  from Safed, located in the northern  Gaililee region
in what is now Israel, and while he has enunciated in public a nuanced interpre-
tation  of the  right of  return,  he  is  always  quick  to  point  to  his  own  refugee
status  in  all discussions  of the issue.
148
d.  Political  Parties  and Groups Outside the PLO
Outside  the umbrella  of the  PLO and PNA, the most significant  Palestin-
ian  groups  are  the  militant  Islamist  groups,  Hamas  and  Islamic  Jihad.  These
two groups  are violently anti-Fatah  and do not recognize the authority  of either
the PNA or the Oslo process, and their charters  officially  call for the  destruc-
tion  of the state of Israel through jihad (holy war).  Consequently,  the official
charters  of  these  groups  contain  no  mention  of  the  phrase  "right  of return."
Unlike  the groups  housed within  the PLO,  they  continue to be  focused  on the
destruction of the state of Israel,  and reject (at least officially)  any prospect of a
negotiated  settlement. 149
2.  Evidence of Conflict
Needless so  say, Hamas  and Islamic Jihad  support a right of return with a
very broad scope.  Indeed, they articulate a desire not simply for the refugees  to
147  Permanent  Observer  Mission  of Palestine  to  the  United  Nations,  Palestinian  National
Authority,  http://www.palestine-un.org/pna/intro.html  (last visited Jan.  28,  2006).
148  Akiva  Eldar, Abu Mazen and Nabil Sha 'at to Palestinian  Refugees:  You Aren't Going
Back  to  Israel, HA'ARETZ,  Sept.  5,  2002,  available at http://www.chicagopeacenow.org/
ppw-03.html.
149  See,  e.g.,  Hamas  Charter,  http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/charter.html
(last  visited Jan.  28,  2006).
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return to what is now Israel,  but they also wish to have the refugees return to an
Islamic Palestinian state that would include not simply the West Bank and Gaza
but  all of Israel.  Indeed,  the presence  and importance  of these groups  under-
lines  the severity  of the  internal  conflict.  While this internal  conflict  is  obvi-
ous,  we wish  to examine below  a more subtle  dimension of the conflict.  Since
the PLO stated in  1988  its willingness  to accept a two-state  solution, there  has
also arisen  a conflict between  those Palestinians who have realized the impossi-
bility  of  demanding  statehood  and Palestinian  return  at  the  same  time,  and
those who have continued to believe  that both demands  could  exist simultane-
ously.  This section examines this dimension of the conflict by noting, in partic-
ular,  the effects  of the writings  of  Palestinian  intellectual  and  academic,  Dr.
Sari Nusseibeh,  and the polling data collected by another Palestinian academic,
Dr.  Khalil  Shikaki.
Shortly  after the details of the  unofficial  talks at Taba in early 2001  were
revealed,  Dr. Nusseibeh,  who  was  then  serving  as the Palestinian  Authority's
diplomatic  representative  in  Jerusalem,  wrote  a  series  of  articles  about  the
impossibility  of reconciling  the idea  of a  full Palestinian  right  of return  with
that of a peaceful,  mutually acceptable,  two-state solution.  The articles  essen-
tially made explicit  what had already been implicitly, privately  agreed-upon  by
the negotiators  at Taba.150  These  articles culminated  in the publication, in July
2002,  of a joint initiative  between  Dr. Nusseibeh  and Ami  Ayalon,  the former
head  of  Shin  Bet  (Israel's  internal  security  service)  called  the  Nusseibeh-
Ayalon  Plan,  which  they  called  the  "People's Voice  Campaign,"  and  through
which  they  circulated  a petition  that  declared,  that  "Palestinian  refugees  will
return  only to the State of Palestine  ...  [or]  remain in their present country  of
residence  or immigrate  to third party  countries."' 5 1
While the Ayalon-Nusseibeh petition did receive  some  signatures of sup-
port  from  Israelis  and  Palestinians  (according  to  the  initiative's  website,
approximately  160,000  Palestinians  and  250,000  Israelis  signed  the petition),
due  to  its dismissal  of  the  right  of return,  it  was  met  with  a  deafening  and
emotionally-charged  chorus  of disapproval,  especially  on the Palestinian  side.
Dr. Nusseibeh  was vigorously  criticized  by his fellow  intellectuals  and politi-
cians, and  above  all by  Palestinian refugees  and their  advocates,  who  swiftly
organized  an  impassioned  and  remarkably  personal  campaign  to  dismiss  not
only  his  ideas  but  also  his  character  and  credibility.  A  typical  response  was
expressed in the evocatively titled  piece, "Please, don't Speak on  Our Behalf,"
written  by Fawaz  Turki,  a son  of  1948 refugees,  who  said:
Nusseibeh,  after all,  is a child  of privilege.  Not only did he  not experience  the hun-
ger, the cold and the destitution that were the  lot of Palestinians expelled from home
and  homeland  in  1948,  but he  did not know that  behind  the blackened walls  of that
encapsulated  world  we  call  a "refugee  camp,"  a whole  generation  of  Palestinians
grew up to whom  the notion of Palestine had immediacy  and concreteness  ....  No
outsiders,  and  certainly Nusseibeh in this context  is an  absolute outsider, should
insinuate  themselves  into  this  smoldering  debate  with  unsolicited,  not  to  mention
provocative  and  inflammatory,  observations.  Sure,  we  libertarians  who  value  free
150  Hanafi,  supra  note  137.
15 Ami  Ayalon  & Sari  Nusseibeh,  Statement  of  Principles,  July  27,  2002,  http://www.
mifkad.org.il/en/principles.asp.
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speech  will not hold it against Nusseibeh for saying what's on his mind-as a private
citizen.  As an official,  however, he should be  more thoughtful and circumspect.  He
should  know  better.
152
Early  responses  were  viciously  personal  in  their  criticism  of  Dr.  Nus-
seibeh.  Some  like  Turki  accused  Dr, Nusseibeh  of being  an  "outsider"  who
knew nothing, some claimed that he was an Israeli and American stooge, others
claimed  that he was entitled  to his views  as a private  citizen but could not air
them  so long as he  remained  a public official,  and the rest charged,  as did  the
self-described  "70  year  old  Palestinian  who  [has]  spent  his  life  as  a  . . .
[r]efugee  struggling  for  survival  since  1948,"  that  "I  am  sure  that  you  are
reflecting  an implicit official position. '"53  The PLO's  Department  of Refugee
Affairs issued, for its part, in prompt response to such suspicions,  a statement in
October  2002  that reiterated  the  PLO's  official  stance  on  the  right  of return,
while  also making  sure  to point out that the "Palestinian  National Authority  is
the  party  authorized  to design  the  solution  to  the  Palestinian-Israeli  conflict
...  ,, 14  Meanwhile,  various  refugee  groups  and  organizations  coalesced  to
issue solemn statements  that asked, in  one typical instance,  "[c]an  the words of
one  man  revoke  the  legal  and  moral  rights  of  millions  of  Palestinian  refu-
gees?,""55  while fellow politicians,  such as Husam  Khader, a Palestinian legis-
lator from the Balata Refugee camp, declared that Dr. Nusseibeh was no longer
"in  our camp,"  and academics,  such as Dr. Salman Abu  Sitta, who  deemed Dr.
Nusseibeh irresponsible  for misrepresenting  the  refugees'  demands, scrambled
to refute  and  deny any  validity  to Nusseibeh's  logic.
156
However, Dr. Nusseibeh was also,  somewhat unexpectedly, defended by a
few  groups  and political factions,  such  as the Fatah youth organization,  which
published  a  communiqu6  sent  to  all  other  Fatah  factions  in  his  support;1 57
scholars such as Muhi  'Abd  al-Hadi  and Jan  de Jong of PASSIA  (the Palestin-
ian Academic  Society for the Study  of International Affairs),  who  proposed,  in
a special bulletin,  an extension of the Palestinian territories to include the Gali-
lee  and  some  areas  of  the  Begev  to  absorb  portions  of  refugee  populations
without altering the demographic  balance of Israel; and by certain high and low
ranking  insiders  within  the  political establishment  of Fatah.' 58  For example,
Abd  al-Karim  Shamasna,  a  grass-roots  Fatah  leader  in  the  West  Bank,
responded  to  Nusseibeh's ideas  by saying  that the Palestinians  in Haifa, Jaffa
and Acre  (inside Israel's  1948  borders)  are  part  of the  Palestinian  family but
152  Fawaz Turki,  Please,  Don't Speak on Our Behalf, AL-AWDA  NEWS,  http://www.shaml.
org/ground/Nusseibeh/reactions/Please.htm  (last  visited Jan.  25,  2006)  (emphasis added).
"I  Nizar Sakhnini, An Open Letter to Prof. Sari Nusseibeh:  Surrender of Palestinian Rights
is  NOT the Proper Way for a Peaceful  Co-existence  (Dec.  30, 2001), http://www.shaml.org/
ground/Nusseibeh/reactions/an-openjletter.htm  (emphasis  added).
151  Palestine  Liberation  Organization,  Statement  issued  by  the  Department  of  Refugee
Affairs,  (Oct.  9,  2002),  http:/lwww.badil.org/Publications/Press/2002/press275-02.htm.
151  AI-Awda  Coalition,  Palestinian  Refugees  Have  Every  Right  to  Return,  http://www.
shaml.org/ground[Nusseibeh/reactionslPalestinian%20Refugees.htm  (last  visited  Jan.  25,
2006).
156  See,  e.g.,  Hanafi, supra note  137  (describing  Sitta's  "spirited  responses"  to Nusseibeh
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that "the price" of gaining an independent  state has to be "giving  up the dream"
of ever returning there.'5 9  Similarly, Yasser Abdu  Rabbo, the Palestinian Min-
ister  of Information,  said,  in  an  interview  with  the  Israeli  newspaper  Yediot
Ahronot  in November 2002, that "Palestinians  will not insist on the implemen-
tation  of the  right of return  for the refugees."'
' 60
Although  what  support  there  existed  on  the  Palestinian  "street"  for  Dr.
Nusseibeh generally  appeared in oblique  and muted terms and was thus far less
vociferous  than  the  outcry  against him,  Dr. Nusseibeh  did  succeed,  as  noted
above, in garnering  at least 160,000 Palestinian signatures  in favor of his "initi-
ative."  The  more  notable achievement,  however,  of his articles and  speeches,
was the provoking,  for the first time in Palestinian political thought, of a debate
(albeit still very  one-sided) about  the practicality of the right of return, which
in  turn  prompted  some Palestinian  intellectuals  to think  more concretely  than
they had before about the contradiction,  as Dr. Nusseibeh called it, between the
practical imperative  for  a two-state  solution  and  the moral imperative  for  a
right of return.
While there was to be neither a dramatic revolution in Palestinian political
thought on this matter  (as there had been,  for example, in  1988  when the PLO
accepted for the  first time  in public  the concept  of a two-state  solution), nor a
definitive  break between  Palestinians  (as there  had been in the  Israeli  side  on
the issue of the settlements), Dr. Nusseibeh's  writings prompted  a new division
of Palestinians  into  "pragmatic"  and "absolutist"  camps  and  a  fresh political
subtlety that led even an activist as committed to the cause  of Palestinian rights
as  Azmi  Bishara to write,  in  an  article  that practically  mirrored  the  logic  and
language  of Nusseibeh's  piece,  that:
It is impossible  to  apply  the right of return  to the  two-state  framework!  There  is a
structural  contradiction  between  the  two-state  solution  and  the  right  of  return  for
Palestinian  refugees,  which  would  change  the  demographic  nature  of  the  Jewish
state,  with the permission  of the Jewish state  itself.  The  Palestinian  national libera-
tion movement should decide whether  the establishment of the Palestinian  state with-
out the  right of return constitutes  an  acceptable historical compromise  (as long as the
state has  sovereignty over the  Haram al  Sharif and as  long  as  the agreement allows
refugees  to return  to  inside  the  state's borders).  If such  a historical  compromise  is
impossible from  both the Palestinian  and Israeli  points o view,  we have before  us a
long  struggle  ....  161
Until 2003  this  debate remained very  much confined  to the  rarified realm
of intellectual discourse and was conducted, as such discourses are, through the
pages  of newspapers  and journals.  To  the extent  that  average  refugees  them-
selves  participated,  it  was  to  express  disapproval  and  disagreement  with  the
ideas  of  Dr.  Nusseibeh  and  his  supporters  with  one  voice,  through  refugee
"I  Isabel  Kershner,  Palestinian  Affairs:  Palestinian  Peace  Now,  HASHD  People's  Cam-
paign  for Peace And  Democracy  (August 9,  2004), http://www.hashd.org/english/eliazabith/
Jerusalem%20Report.htm.
'60 SHAML  Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre,  The Palestinian Return  Centre Con-
demns  Statement by Yasir Abdu Rabbo and Calls  for his Removal  from Office, http://www.
shaml.org/ground/Nusseibeh/reactions/yasirabed.htm  (last  visited  Jan.  25,  2006)  (quoting
statement  of Yasir Abdu Rabbo).
161  Azmi  Bishara,  Liberating the  Homeland, Liberating Human Beings, WIJHAT  NAZAR,
Dec.  23,  2001  (in  Arabic).
Winter  2005/2006]NEVADA  LAW JOURNAL
advocacy groups such as BADIL and al-Awda Coalition.  It was not until 2003,
when Dr. Khalil  Shikaki  published,  to loud and public  notice,  the results  of a
poll of  some 4500  refugees  (in  the  West  Bank,  Gaza,  Jordan,  and Lebanon)
conducted  between January  and June 2003,  that these "average  refugees"  were
themselves  revealed  to  not  be  entirely  in  agreement  with  each  other.  The
results of this  poll (summarized  in Table  3 below)  implied  inter alia that  not-
withstanding their constant  unanimity on the subject of return, only ten  percent
of the  refugees  polled wished to physically  return  to Israel if given the option,
more than fifty percent wished to  return to a Palestinian  state and receive com-
pensation  in  lieu  of return  to Israel  proper, and there existed  great disparities
among the refugees  in West Bank and Gaza,  Jordan,  and Lebanon,  on each of
the  questions  asked.
TABLE  3
Results  of PSR Refugees'  Polls  on  Refugees'  Preferences  and
Behavior  in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent
Refugee  Agreement
WBGS  Jordan  Lebanon
Total (% of
tot.  popn  in
the areas)*
Return  to Israel  and become  (or not
I  become)  an  Israeli  Citizen.  12  5  23  10
Stay  in the  Palestinian  State that will
be  established  in the West Bank  and
Gaza  and  receive  fair compensation  for
the property  taken over by Israel  and
2  for  other losses  and  suffering.  38  27  19  31
Receive  Palestinian  citizenship  and
return  to  designated areas  inside  Israel
that  would  be  swapped  later on with
Palestinian  Areas as  part  of a territorial
exchange  and  receive any  deserved
3  compensation.  37  10  21  23
Receive  fair compensation  for  the
property,  losses  and suffering  and stay
in  host country receiving  its citizenship
4  or Palestinian citizenship.  0  33  11  17
Receive  fair compensation  for the
property,  losses and suffering  and
immigrate  to  a European country  or  the
US,  Australia or Canada  and obtain
citizenship  of that country  or
5  Palestinian citizenship  1  2  9  2
5  Refuse  all options  9  16  17  13
6  No opinion  2  8  0  5
Nource:  ralestinian Center  for  roicy and  Survey  Kesearcn, *Based on  4506 refugees.
June  2UU.
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While  this  poll was  criticized  by  some  statisticians  for  its methodology,
selection  biases, sampling errors,  leading  questions that allegedly  led to biased
answers,  and  a host  of other faults,  it  was  nonetheless  hailed  by  many  others
(not  least Shikaki  himself)  as proof that:
[R]efugees-without  help  from  their  own  leaders-have  internalized  the  dramatic
shift and  have acted on  it, favoring  their  national  identity  over land  and legacy....
Needless to say,  what facilitated the decision for the majority of the Palestinian refu-
gees in seeking to  live in a Palestinian state is  the fact that their national identity  can
still be embodied in a part of the historic homeland;  they can have the best of the two
worlds:  to be  on the  land,  and  with  the people,  of Palestine.
162
While the merit of such a large claim on Shikaki's part is necessarily dubi-
ous,
163  the  reaction  to  the  poll was  itself  noteworthy.  A  flurry  of  articles
appeared in international  and regional newspapers and journals alternately criti-
cizing  and supporting  the results and interpreting  them  at length.  The expatri-
ate Palestinian  community, meanwhile, joined forces with West Bank and Gaza
based refugee organizations  to organize  a spirited public  campaign  to point out
the pitfalls inherent in such polls,"6  while almost all PA-sanctioned  media out-
lets in  the Palestinian  territories  remained  significantly silent  on the matter.' 65
However,  things came to a head  a few  weeks after the poll was published,
when  Shikaki's office  in Ramallah  was ransacked by  what he described  as an
"organized  mob"  which  didn't  appear  to him  to  be  a  spontaneous  gathering.
According  to one journalist's  account,  this  mob:
[A]rrived  in  orderly  manner  by bus  and  offered the  gathered  journalists  their  own
press release.  Calling [itself]  the Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Refugees'
Rights, and using  the stationary of the PLO refugee  affairs department ....  [the mob]
accused  Shikaki of "selling himself to the U.S.  dollar" and  "deviating  from the con-
sensus  of  the  Palestinian  people."  The  statement  warned  "anyone  who  considers
harming  the  national rights  that their fate  will  be  similar to  that of Shikaki."
166
Newspaper  reports  go on  to  describe  how,  as  Palestinian  police officers
stood  by, the  mob ransacked Shikaki's office and then  made its way down the
street  to  the  Muqata  compound  where,  allegedly,  Arafat  welcomed  them,
although  the New  York  Times story  noted  that it  was  unclear  whether  Arafat
knew  what  the mob had just done. 1 6 7 Despite the possible, and alleged,  "offi-
cial"  sanction of this act of violence  against Shikaki,  the fury of this mob indi-
cated  that Shikaki's poll had brought into the fray ordinary  Palestinians, and  in
162  Khalil Shikaki,  The Right of Return, WALL  ST.  J.,  July  30, 2003,  at  A12.
163  Notwithstanding  the  many  statistical  objections  to  the  poll  mentioned  above,  at  least
thirteen  percent  of all refugees  polled "refused  all  options,"  which  Shikaki  and  others  who
trumpeted  the  significance  of the poll  have tended to  ignore.
'6  BADIL,  for example,  released a bulletin  which  stated that:
Opinion  polls do  not determine refugee  rights,  [instead,  they]  reflect public  sensitivity resulting
from the Israeli-international  effort at  undermining refugee  rights, are strongly  influenced by  the
specific  polling  context, (and)  are  bad indicators of actual  future refugee  choices, because  refu-
gees  do not have  the  factual  information  required  for educated choices,  and they  do  not have a
guarantee  that their choices  will  be  recognized.
http://www.badil.org/Publications/Press/1999/press73-99.htm.
165  Eric  Umansky,  Why  a Mob Attacked  the Most Rational Man  in  the Middle East, 42
COLUM.  JOURNALISM  REV.  30,  31  (2004).
166  Id.
167  James  Bennet, Palestinian  Mob Attacks Pollster, N.Y. TIMES,  July  14,  2003, at  Al.
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so doing, had opened up to the Palestinian  "masses"  what had  previously been
a  debate  among  intellectuals.  The  arguments  that  had once  been  confined  to
the  pages of newspapers  and journals  had now been  taken  to the street.
3.  Differences Among Refugees  in Circumstances and Interests
While  Palestinian  political  leaders  and  refugee  activists  have  largely
ignored  or even attempted  to silence  public expression  of differences  concern-
ing the right of return, both anecdotal interviews and common sense support the
notion  that there is an  internal conflict  among Palestinian refugees  themselves
because  of profound differences  in their interests  and circumstances.  The fol-
lowing  section  of this  paper examines  some  of the more  conspicuous  dimen-
sions of these  differences.
a.  The Generational  Differences
It  stands  to  reason  that  there  is  a  conflict  between  those  refugees  who
place  a  greater  weight  on their  personal  and economic  interests  and  those for
whom the memory of past injustice outweighs  all concern  for present or future
living conditions.  The  former  are  often  middle-aged  or young  refugees,  who
wish  for a  better life  for themselves  and  their children,  are  bitter  about camp
conditions  and the political stalemate that keeps  them there, and resent the dis-
crimination  they  face  in  their  host  countries  because  of  their  refugee  status.
The latter are often  older refugees,  who have either lived through the expulsion
from the homeland themselves  or know  someone  who has,  and  for whom the
status of refugee  is itself a badge of honor that attests  to  the suffering  of their
people.  As  one  young  refugee  put it,  "the  condition  of being  a refugee  has
become  a psychological  trap for the older generations,  for whom the individual
loss"  (the  loss  of a  home, of a  way of life, of a parent or a sibling  or a  loved
one)  "has  been confused  with  the collective  loss"  (the loss of a homeland  for
the Palestinian people), and together these losses have constituted a psychology
of loss from  which  there is no  escape.' 68  These  older generations  long  most
visibly  for return;  the middle-aged  and  younger refugees  talk of their right to
return but do not seem to  long for it  in quite the same  way.
b.  Geographical  Differences
There  is much evidence  to  support  the conjecture  that there  is  a  negative
correlation  between  the  treatment  of,  and  discrimination  against,  refugees  in
their  host countries,  and the  intensity  of their  desire  to  return.  This  evidence
became  apparent  to  us  during  discussions  with  refugees  on  the  situation  in
Syria, during which our interviewees explained to us  that while the Palestinian
refugees  in  Syria  are certainly  not  treated  well  by  the  government,  they  are
treated  as  badly  as  any  other  Syrian,  and  feel  no  special  discrimination  on
account of their  status  as refugees  and  Palestinians.  Their desire  to  return to
Palestine is consequently muted when compared to that of their counterparts  in
Lebanon,  who  are discriminated  against by the  state of Lebanon  and deprived
of all  manner  of  essential  rights  including  the  freedom  to  move  out  of  the
168  Interview by Sreemati  Mitter with Anees Anani,  San Rock Hotel, Amman,  Jordan (Jan.
17,  2005).
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camps,  the freedom  to work in  most professions,  the  freedom  to marry  Leba-
nese citizens  and  so on.
This point  is of special  significance  when  it  comes  to understanding  the
intensity of the  demand  for the  right of return  in  the  camps  in Gaza  and  the
West Bank.  Unlike their counterparts  in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, these refu-
gees are already  living in "Palestine."  They hold on to the right of return much
more  adamantly,  as  the  fact  of  being  a  refugee  is  "an  existential  issue  for
them."' 69  It impinges on every  aspect of their lives,  and they live in the camps
as refugees,  often within short distance of their original homes and lands,  with-
out  any  political  or  social  rights  to  speak  of, "whereas,  [in  Jordan],  we  are
treated more or less as citizens, we don't live in camps,  and [for us] it is more a
political  issue."
170
This  negative  relationship  is  greatly  complicated  by  the  fact  that  many
refugees  who  continue  to live  in  camps,  at least  in  the  West Bank, do  so  by
choice,  to hold onto  their refugee status, which they consider  sacred.  It is also
complicated  by the fact that many refugees who  live  in relative  affluence and
freedom in Western  Europe and the United  States, and who enjoy full rights as
citizens  in  those  countries,  are  often  the  most  strident  when  it  comes  to
demanding  the  right of  return.  But  these  complications  do  not  disprove  the
general  validity  of  the principle  that  the  better  one is  treated  politically  and
socially by the host country,  the more  one is  disposed to think of the right of
return  as a political  issue as opposed  to an  existential  issue, and  the less  des-
perately one  wishes  for an  actual  physical  return.
c.  Class Differences
Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  a gap also  exists between  those refugees  who are
affluent, especially  second and third generation refugees,  and feel less urgently
the need to return,  and those who are poor and continue to live in the camps,  in
circumstances  of dreary  impoverishment.
d.  Tribal/Clan  Affiliations
Many  Palestinian refugees have  maintained over the years the historic tri-
bal or geographical/village  affiliations  of their families from the pre- 1948 days
in Mandate  Palestine.  Most  refugees in Jordan  and Lebanon  have  resettled in
camps that are arranged  along clan and tribal lines,  and it is not unusual to  find
an  entire  village  from  erstwhile  Mandatory  Palestine  recreated,  almost  in  its
entirety, in Lebanon.  There  seems to  be, moreover, a general negative  correla-
tion between  the condition  of living among one's  own tribe  and/or  clan in  the
host country and the desire  to return  to what is now Israel.  In other words, the
greater the  degree  of replication  in the host country  of the  societal  structures
that  were  once  in  place  at  home  and  the  more  comfortable  and familiar  the
current  surroundings,  the less  likely the refugee  is to demand  a return  to what
he knows will be an entirely alien  social situation in  a country he knows  noth-
ing  about.  This  correlation  is important because  it  is especially  true of older
169  Interview  with  Jalal  al-Husseini,  Institut Francais  du Proche-Orient,  in Amman, Jordan
(Jan.  18,  2005).
170  Id.
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generation  "original  1948  refugees"  who  actually  have  memories  of living  in
Mandate Palestine.  While this group is most likely to hold onto its demand for
return,  when  pressed,  most "original"  refugees  tend  to  say  that  they  will  not
actually  return  because  all their friends and  family  members live around them,
and they had  no one to return to.  The advanced age  and physical debilitation  of
most  of these  "original  1948  refugees"  also  greatly  reduces,  to  our  mind,  the
credibility  of their  desire to return.
In  sum, there  are  profound  differences  among  Palestinians:  between  the
refugees  who  continue  to live  in  the camps  and  those  who  have  been  assimi-
lated for years into the cities; between  those who have  been incarcerated  in the
woeful  camps  of Lebanon and  those who  live  in relative  prosperity  and free-
dom  in  Syria  and  Jordan;  between  those  who  have  been  granted  asylum  in
affluent  Western  countries and  those  who  went to live  in the  Gulf states  and
were persecuted and expelled after the Gulf War, in punishment for the  support
of Saddam  Hussein  by  the PLO;  and  finally  between  the  actual  survivors  of
1948  who continue to live  with their  memories  and long to return  to Palestine
as they  knew it, and their grandchildren  who live with  their ambitions for  edu-
cation, employment  and wealth, have never  set foot in Palestine, and have more
complex,  hyphenated  notions  of personal identity.
B.  The Internal Israeli Conflict over Jewish Settlements 171
1.  The Nature of the Conflict
The core internal conflict over the future of the Jewish settlements  has two
dimensions.  First,  the  settlements  pose  a  concrete  political  question:  What
should  Israel  do  with the  occupied  territories?  The conflict over  this question
profoundly  affects  Israel's internal  politics.  The second  dimension goes  to the
nature  of Israel  and the meaning  of a Jewish state.  It implicates  the  core iden-
tity  of some  but not  all  the protagonists.  This  dimension  raises  the  following
sorts of questions:  What role should religion play  in public  life?  In a democ-
racy,  can  the  "sacred"  override  state  sovereignty?  By  what  process  should
decisions  over these  issues be  made?
In  a brilliant essay  written two  decades  ago, Amos  Oz  suggested  that the
internal  conflict  among  Israelis  over  the  settlement  project  implicated  these
sorts  of issues.  He  wrote,  in  words  that ring  true to us  today:
Hundreds of thousands  of Israelis are convinced,  intellectually  and emotionally,  that
if Israel keeps hold of the occupied  territories it will cease to exist-nothing less than
that.  Hundreds of thousands  of other Israelis  are convinced  that if Israel pulls out,  it
will cease to exist-nothing less than that ....  Both sides are armed with precedents
and expert  opinions,  indications  that appear to them  infallible.  Both sides  sense an
imminent  catastrophe.  Both sides share  a sense  of emergency.1
72
a.  The  West Bank, Gaza and Israel's Future Borders
The settlement project goes to the question at the heart of the most signifi-
cant internal  Israeli  political  conflict of the  last three  decades:  what should be
17  See Mnookin  & Eiran,  supra note  * (providing a detailed  discussion  of this conflict).
172  AMos  Oz,  ISRAEL,  PALESTINE,  AND  PEACE:  ESSAYS:  WHOSE  HOLY  LAND?  DIVIDED
ISRAEL  IN  PALESTINE  78-82  (1995).
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the permanent status of the occupied territories of West Bank?  Although Israel
has controlled  the West Bank since  1967,  its final  status has  not been  decided
and  the region  has  never  legally been made  a part  of Israel  proper.  Deciding
how  to  answer  this  question  has  created  an  internal  fault-line  between  the
Israeli  right  and  left  since  the  1970s.  The  right  has  traditionally  supported
retaining  the  territories  for  a  combination  of  national  security,  cultural  and
religious  reasons.  In  their view  Israel  needs  to expand  eastwards  to create  a
more  defensible  border  as  well  as protect  the  country's  water  supplies.  The
West Bank is also viewed  as the historical cradle  of Jewish  civilization and  an
essential  part  of the Promised  Land.  Despite  these  views,  however,  the  right
never annexed  the territories  when it  was  in  power.
Left-wing  Israelis believe  that Israel should aim to relinquish control  over
these  areas  for  strategic,  demographic,  and  moral  reasons.  Strategically,  the
left has argued that the occupied territories  should ultimately  be traded in return
for  peace  with  the Palestinians  and  Israel's  Arab  neighbors.173  The  left  has
also emphasized the adverse long-term demographic  consequences  of annexing
the  occupied  territories:  Israel  could  not  remain  a democracy  with  a  Jewish
majority.  The left has further  argued  that Israel's continuing domination  over
Palestinian  areas  is  both  immoral  and  would,  in  the  long  run,  corrupt  and
coarsen Israel  itself.
Since the late  1970s,  on the  Israeli left,  Peace  Now has  led the efforts  to
halt  the expansion  of  settlements.' 7 4  Dror Etkes,  a  Peace  Now  staffer,  indi-
cated  in  2003:
Peace  Now  has  always  thought  that  settlements  in the occupied  territories  threaten
our  existence  as  a Jewish,  democratic  state,  weaken  the security  of Israel,  drain  our
economic  resources,  undermine  our  society's  moral  fiber,  and  serve  to  perpetuate
Israeli  rule  over another  people  in  a way  that  prevents  Israel  from  reaching  peace
with the Palestinians.  The settlements today  pose an existential  threat to the future of
Israel.  Let me be very clear:  it is in Israel's own best interests to separate  itself from
settlements  and  the  occupied  territories  that  the  settlers  would  have  us  bind  to the
state. 175
The settlement  project was designed  to affect the outcome  of this territo-
rial  conflict through  the  creation  of "facts  on  the ground."  The  vision  of the
national religious settlers was to create a thick network of Jewish settlements  in
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  to  prevent the  possibility  of an  Israeli  withdrawal
from these areas.  Once there were a sufficiently large number of settlers, it was
assumed that it would become impossible  for any Israeli government to require
massive  numbers of ordinary  Israelis  to relocate.76
A partial  and limited answer to  the question  of Israel's  future borders  was
made  clear  in 2005  when the  Sharon  government  "unilaterally"  uprooted over
"I  Initially, most  Israelis thought  the West  Bank  would be  returned  to Jordan.
174  See  Peace  Now,  About  Us,  http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=43  (last
visited  Nov.  19,  2005)  (Claiming  to  be  Israel's  largest  non-governmental  movement,
founded  in  1978  and currently  running a "Settlement  Watch"  project  to  both  monitor and
protest  the building of settlements  in the West  Bank  and  East Jerusalem).
175  Dror Etkes, Testimony Before  the Near Eastern and  South Asian  Affairs  Subcommittee
of the Senate  Foreign Relations Committee (Oct.  15,  2003) available at http://foreign.senate.
gov/testimony/2003/EtkesTestimony031015.pdf.
176  Meir Harnoi,  The  Settlers, TEL-Aviv:  MAARiV  225  (1994)  (in  Hebrew).
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fierce  internal  opposition  all  the  Jewish  settlements  in  Gaza  and  withdrew
Israeli  troops from  that area.  Yet, the  internal  conflict  about  the future of the
West  Bank  settlements,  home  of  the  vast  majority  of  settlers,  is  far  from
resolved.  If an  Israeli  government  attempts  to  define  its  borders  in  the  West
Bank,  whether  through further  unilateral  actions 77, or by a  negotiated  agree-
ment with the Palestinians,  large numbers of Jewish settlers  will be required  to
relocate,  and  many  can  be  expected  to resist.  It remains  to  be  seen  how  the
events  of summer  2005  in. Gaza  will  affect  the  "next  political  round"  in  this
internal  conflict.  Indeed,  the  violent  clash  between  Jewish  settlers  and  the
Israeli police  at the West Bank outpost of Amona  in  early February  2006  sug-
gest the  possibility that future  relocation of West  Bank  settlements may  prove
to  be  a far greater  challenge  than relocating  settlers from Gaza.178
b.  The  Settlements and the Nature of the Jewish State
The conflict over the  settlements  implicates  more than the concrete inter-
nal  debate  about  territorial  expansion.  It  raises  profound  issues  about  the
nature  of the Jewish  state and  the personal  identities  of some  of the  protago-
nists.  One  such issue relates to Israel's national identity as a democratic Jewish
state.  Since  Israel's birth  in  1948  there has  been  an  inherent  but manageable
tension between the nation's universalistic,  democratic norms and its particular-
istic  affiliation  with Judaism  and Zionism.  In its fifty-year  history, Israel  has
accommodated  this tension  by  encouraging  the  development  of both  a demo-
cratic culture  and  one where Jewish holidays  and  symbols had  a preferred  sta-
tus.  In  addition,  there  were  special  immigration  rules  such  as  the  "Law  of
Return"  that gave  every  Jew  the  right to  immigrate  to  Israel  and  become  an
Israeli citizen. 179  Because  Jews represent about eighty percent  of Israel's total
population,  they are a dominant  majority  in the  state. 1 8°  Although twenty  per-
cent of Israel  citizens  are  Palestinians,  the "Jewishness"  of the  public  sphere
and  national culture has been maintained while  according  its Arab citizens full
right  to participate in Israeli  political  life.
If the settlement project leads to the annexation of the occupied territories,
Israel will  be faced with  hard choices.  What  will be  the status of the millions
of  Palestinians  residing  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza?  Resolving  this  issue
implicates  the tension  between  maintaining  Israel  as  a Jewish  state  and  as  a
democratic  state.  To  maintain  a  Jewish  electoral  majority,  even  in the  short
run,  Palestinians  in the  occupied  territories  cannot be  given full  voting rights.
This  would obviously  undermine  Israel's  democratic  character.  But if Pales-
tinians  in the  West Bank  and Gaza become  equal  members in  the Israeli  body
177  See Greg  Myre, Olmert Wants to Define Borders,  Ally Says, N.Y.  TIMES,  March 6, 2006,
at A5.
178  Efrat  Porsher  and  Tal  Yemin  Wolwowitz,  Amona  Relocation Ends:  160  injured,
MAARIV,  Feb.1,  2006 (Hebrew),  available at http://www.nrg.co.illonline/I/ART1/0421164.
html  (Viewed  last on  March  6, 2006)
179  In its present form, the Law of Return has  a very expansive definition of who counted as
a Jew.
180  See  CIA  WORLD  FACTBOOK  273  (2005),  available at  http://www.cia.gov/cia/publica-
tions/factbook/geos/is.html.
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politic,  Israel would soon  lose its Jewish majority' 8  and as  a result its  Jewish
national  identity would be jeopardized.
The conflict over the settlements  also implicates  contentious issues about
the  role of religion in  the public  life.  The  national religious  settlers base their
determination  to  annex  the  occupied  territories  on  a  religious  claim  that  the
land  is sacred, and that their project involves a religious calling to populate  the
"Promised  Land"  and  redeem  God's  promise  to  the  Jewish  people.  Many
national  religious settlers broadly  call for the  infusion and imposition  of tradi-
tional  religious norms, as  opposed to Jewish cultural  norms, throughout  Israeli
public  life.  One  settler suggested  recently  that Israel  should  develop  a  "third
temple  culture"  that fuses religion  with all aspect  of the modem  state. 182  For
Israeli  Jews  with  a  secular,  non-religious  orientation,  such  notions  are  pro-
foundly repugnant.
For  some  protagonists,  the  internal  conflict  over  the  settlements  poses
profound issues of personal identity.  For the  first generation  of national relig-
ious  settlers,  the  project  gave  their  life  meaning  by  defining  their  role  in  the
chain of Jewish  history  and representing  their unique generational  contribution
to Judaism and Zionism.  For such settlers, dismantling  their settlements would
be a direct challenge  to their personal identities.  Some scholars have suggested
that a collapse of the settlement  project might push some  settlers  to relinquish
their  religious fervor or even  turn  suicidal.
183
As  evident  from  the  Amos  Oz  quote  above,'84  this  conflict  also  poses
issues of identity for liberal  Israelis, whether secular or religious, who are com-
mitted  to Israel's  democratic  nature.  One observant  Israeli  academic  summed
up his  concerns  quite  vividly:
If the map of the settlements will  establish the border of the sovereignty of the State
of Israel,  this will bring  about a situation for the next  generation  in which  a Jewish
minority  will  oppress  and  will go on  oppressing  an  Arab  majority  with  everything
that entails  in daily  life.  For  me  this  would  mean  that Israel  is  a  state  that  wasn't
worth  establishing;  a  state  that  is a disgrace  for  the  Jewish  people  and  for  the
Bible. 1
85
Finally,  the  conflict over the  settlements  poses process  issues  relating  to
political  legitimacy.  By what process  should decisions  about the future of the
settlements be  made?  Religious nationalists  base the legitimacy of their claims
in part  on the  sacred.  Some  suggest  this gives  them  the right to disregard,  in
effect, the secular political process.  Some  have suggested  that even if the vast
majority of Israeli  Jews  agree  to abandon the  territories,  it  will be  an  illegiti-
181  Arnon  Soffer, Demographics  in the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute,  Address at the Washing-
ton  Institute  Special  Policy  Forum  (Mar.  22,  2002)  (summary  at  http://www.washington
institute.org/templateC05.php?CID=206  1).
182  MoTI  KARPEL,  THE  EMUNIC  REVOLUTION:  THE  DECLINE  OF  ZIONISM  AND  THE  RISE  OF
THE  EMUNIC  ALTERNATIVE  73  (2003).
183  Gideon  Aran, Anthropological-Historical  Notes on the  Hard Core  Israeli  Settlers in the
Territories  Towards Possible  Evacuation,  Presentation  at  Harvard Law  School  Conference:
Past, Present,  and Future of the Israeli Settlements  in the West Bank and Gaza Settlements:
The Internal  Israeli  Conflict  (Oct.  14-15,  2004).
184  See  infra Part  II.A.
185  Interview  with Moshe  Halbertal,  Professor,  Hebrew  University of Jerusalem,  (Apr.  14,
2004).
Winter  2005/2006]NEVADA  LAW  JOURNAL
mate act because of the sacred nature of the land of Israel and the obligations of
Jews  to occupy  it. 186  The  left, on  the  other hand,  believes  that  the  state  has
complete  sovereignty to make  these kinds  of decisions through  ordinary politi-
cal  processes.  Their  commitment  reflects  a  belief  in  both  democratic  and
rational decision-making.
Most  see  Zionism  as  a  national,  secular movement.  They  reject  using
religious  rituals or beliefs as the basis for government policy.  They believe that
modern  secular,  not  ancient  religious, norms  should  determine the  fate of the
Jewish  people.  A  leading  Israeli  philosopher  summed  this  up  when  he  sug-
gested that  the  current  debate  about Prime Minister  Sharon's proposal  is  "not
typically cast by the settler movement in terms of whether it  is right or wrong
as a matter of policy or wise politics, but instead is cast in terms of jurisdiction:
whether Israel as a state has the sovereign  power to decide  it?  Is there a legiti-
mate process that can adjudicate the conflict?"  In his view, the settlers suggest
that  "elected  government  officials  lack the jurisdiction  to  decide  these  issues
and that relocation of settlers poses issues of religious law beyond the capacity
of the  state  to decide."
' 187
2.  Settlers' Efficacy and the Internal Debate
Less than five percent of the Jewish  population  of Israel resides in settle-
ments,  and  the  ideologically  committed  national  religious  settlers  are  only
about  a  quarter  of those  settlers.  Nevertheless,  the  history  of the  last  thirty-
seven years  has demonstrated  that this  small group has  wielded disproportion-
ate influence on domestic politics and Israel's international relations.  The num-
ber of settlers has  expanded  almost  continuously  under both  Labor  and Likud
governments.
The settlers played  a crucial role in brining down Israeli governments  that
tending  towards  settlement  relocation.  Within  Israel  it  has  been  politically
risky for a political figure even to talk about evacuation of settlements.  Taking
concrete  steps  towards  this  end  contributed  to  the  downfall  of  the  Rabin,
Netanyahu,  and Barak  governments  and now  threatens  Sharon's.  What  is  the
origin  and  nature  of this  influence?  Why  have  settlers  in  general,  and  the
national  religious  contingent in  particular,  succeeded  in  making  the  future  of
the  settlements  into  the third rail of Israeli  politics?  And  more  broadly,  what
factors,  unrelated to actions of the settlers, contributed to the successful  expan-
sion of the  settlements.
The  national  religious  settlers draw  on  three  sources  for their  dispropor-
tionate influence:  (1)  their ability to sound themes that have religious and ideo-
logical  resonance  with broad appeal  within Israel;  (2)  the institutional  structure
of the governmental  entities representing the settlers and the peculiar influence
minority parties  can play within  Israeli politics;  and (3)  the fear created within
Israel by the settlers'  willingness  to use hard-bargaining  tactics, including  civil
186  See  Elyakim  Haetzni,  Mishal Am,  NFC, (Sept.  24,  2004), http://www.nfc.co.iI/archive/
003-D-7425-00.html?tag=8-l0-01  (in  Hebrew).
187  Moshe Halbertal,  National Religious  Ideology's Challenge  to Israel's Sovereignty,  Pres-
entation  at Harvard Law  School Conference:  Past, Present, and  Future of the Israeli  Settle-
ments  in  the West Bank  and Gaza  Settlements:  The  Internal  Israeli  Conflict  (Oct.  14-15,
2004).
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disobedience  and the  threat of violent  protest.  There are also four other factors
unrelated  to actions of the settlers that contributed  to the expansion.  These are:
(1)  considerations  relating  to  national  security;  (2)  the  lack  of clarity  about
whether  there was  an Arab  entity with whom to negotiate  that was prepared  to
accept  responsibility  for  the West  Bank;  (3)  a  desire  to  create  incentives  for
possible  future  negotiations  with  Arab  or Palestinian  representatives;  and  (4)
the economic  benefits  to Israel's economy of retaining the  occupied territories.
a.  The Settlers Can Sound Themes Having Broad Resonance
within Israel
Ideologically  committed  settlers have had surprising  influence because  of
their  ability  to  sound  themes  and  create  images  that  have  deep  resonance
among  a  much  broader  group  of Israeli  Jews  who  may  be  less  religious  or
nationalist than  the settlers.  Some of these themes are biblical, and connect the
West  Bank  to  the  ancient  homeland  of  the  Jewish  people;  others  are  more
explicitly  religious,  and  suggest  redemption  through  the  settlement  of  the
ancient  homeland.  Many of these  themes  echo  sentiments  voiced  by  secular
Jews  who laid  the foundation  for the  modem  state.  These  themes  include the
rebirth  of  the  Jewish  people  through  a  pioneering  spirit,  the  importance  of
strong  solidarity  within  communities  consisting  of mutually  supportive  mem-
bers, the primacy of non-materialistic  values, the need to value  a "serving elite"
willing  to  devote  their  lives  to  the  creation  and  survival  of  Israel,  and  the
importance  of  "creating  facts  on  the  ground"  through  new  communities  that
would eventually  shape the territorial  borders of the Jewish  state.  The broader
resonance  of  these  themes  creates  sympathy  and  support  among  many  non-
settlers.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  they  create  ambivalence  and  even  reluc-
tance  to  voice  their  opposition  among  those  who  intellectually  object  to  the
settlement project.  Danny Rubinstein,  an Israeli author,  observed, "the  slogans
of  Gush  Emunim  ...penetrated  the  hearts  of  those  who  were  distant  from
Judaism  and  the  National  Religious  Party."' 88
The combination of the pioneer appeal, the notions of a serving  elite,  and
the model of communitarian  life  all resonate  for many Israelis  as an extrapola-
tion of traditional Zionism.  Zionism is a settler ideology.  From the  1920s until
at least the  1950s,  many thought that the essence of Zionism required the crea-
tion  of  settlements  that  would  reclaim  the  land  and  create  a  new  identity  for
Jews connected  to  the land.  Even today,  some Israelis believe  that settlements
are  a crucial  manifestation  of Zionism.
The national religious  settlers see themselves  as reviving Zionism and res-
cuing  it  from  the  hands  of an  aging  and  debased  group  of Labor  Zionists 89
who were in decline.  Traditional Zionism was a secular movement  with social-
ist overtones,  led by  many who wished to rebel against traditional Judaism.  It
was primarily political and was focused on establishing  a Jewish  state.  Obser-
vant  Jews had never been  at the core  of the  movement  and felt marginalized.
188  DANNY  RUBINSTEIN,  ON  THE  LORD'S  SIDE:  GUSH  EMUNIM  162  (1982)  (in  Hebrew).
9 Labor  Zionists traditionally  believed  that  a Jewish  state  can  be created  and maintained
through the efforts of the Jewish  working class on kibbutzim and in  the cities.  See  AVINERI,
supra  note  58.
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After  1967,  religious nationalists  saw the settlement  project as a means  to cre-
ate a central role in Zionism for themselves  through the fusion of religion  with
old  notions  of  territorial  expansion  through  settlement  and  national  security.
From the caboose  of the Zionist train,  national religious Israelis  moved  to the
front  car  and  in  the eyes  of  some  seized  control  of the  locomotive.1 90  One
leader of the settlement  movement, Hanan  Porat, declared that Labor Zionism
"had concluded  its  mission"  and now  its  leaders should  move  aside and "stop
disrupting"  the  task of reviving  Zionism  through  new settlements. 19'
b.  Institutional Sources of Settler Influence
i)  The Israeli Political System-Coalitional  Politics
The settlers  enjoy significant  influence  in the Israeli  political  system as a
result  of some  institutional  features  of  the  system.  These  features  are  com-
pounded by the internal  structure  of the settlement movement, which  gives  the
most ideologically  committed settlers disproportionate  influence among the set-
tlers as  a  whole.
The Israeli  political system allows small, determined, and cohesive minor-
ity groups to exert disproportionate  power.  This power has  allowed small par-
ties  that  were  sympathetic  to  the  settlement  movement  (mostly  the  National
Religious Party) to  affect political  outcomes  well beyond  their small  numbers.
Moreover,  settlers  are  substantially  overrepresented  in  the  Knesset.  By
2003, nine percent of the members of the Knesset  (11  of  120) were  settlers,
192
even though  settlers  comprised  only  three  percent of the  electorate.
ii)  Regional, Local, and the Yesha  Councils
Other  structural  features  of the  Israeli  government  and  settlement  move-
ment  itself contribute  to  the disproportionate  influence  of ideologically  com-
mitted settlers.  Those settlers who become elected officials, mostly at the local
government level,  are often willing to commit municipal and regional resources
under their control  to the settlement  movement.
In both  Israel and the occupied territories, many  significant  governmental
functions,  including  planning  and  zoning,  the provision  of roads,  sewers  and
water, and many social and educational  services are administered by local  gov-
ernment entities, not the central  government.  Regional and local  councils have
command over  significant material  and human resources that  can be translated
into political  power.  One  source of patronage  is their control of the local pay-
roll.  Indeed,  for  Jews,  government  is  the  largest  employer  in  the  territories.
Local  and regional  councils have used their budgetary  control to finance  cam-
paigns against settler relocation during  the Oslo process and to fight the Sharon
initiative.  Resources  are  also  used  directly  for  political  mobilization.  For
example, during the 2004 mass demonstrations  in Israel against Prime Minister
Sharon's relocation  plan,  settler regional  and local  councils  used  their control
over the educational  and busing  systems  to transport  thousands of schoolchil-
190  A  metaphor  widely  attributed  to  Amos  Oz.
191  RUBINSTEIN,  supra note  188,  at  162.
192  The  Price of the  Settlements,  HA'ARErZ  (Special  Rosh  Hashanah  Journal),  Sept.  26,
2003,  at 43.
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dren  and  local  government  employees  to  protest  against  the  government's
policies.
Along with this municipal  government  structure, the  geographic  distribu-
tion  of settler  groups  accounts  for  the  disproportionate  influence  of the  most
ideologically  committed  settlers.  Most national  religious settlers reside  in, and
make  up  a  majority  of,  smaller  settlements  with  a  local  or  regional  council
government.  Most non-ideological settlers reside in larger communities  with a
"city"  form  of  local  government.  This  residence  structure  has  two  conse-
quences.  First,  national  religious  settlers  are  able  to  control  most  local  and
regional councils.  Second,  such settlers  are able to control the Yesha Council,
an institution  composed of settler leaders.  Although  the Yesha Council has  no
official governmental  status, it has long claimed to speak for  those who  live in
the settlements.'
93
The  settlers  further  benefit from  continuity in  their leadership.  Some  of
their  leaders,  such  as  Pinchs Vallerstein,  the head of the Regional  Council of
Mate Binyamin,  and Ze'ev Hever (Zambish), the head of the settlement arm of
Gush Emunim, have been leading the settlers for almost three decades.  Most of
the bureaucrats  they  deal with,  do  not keep  their positions for that long.  This
gives  the  settlers  a  significant  advantage  when  they interact  with  those  who
oppose  them,  who  are  countered  easily  by  the  experienced  settlers.  It  also
allows  them  to  use  the  state's  resources  more  effectively  when  they  interact
with  bureaucrats that  support their project  by virtue  of their experience.
c.  The Settlers' Effective  Use of Hard Bargaining  Tactics
The  settlers  have  successfully  played  on the fear  among  Israelis  at  large
that  any  attempt  to  evacuate  settlers  would  result  in  a  violent  confrontation,
could  create a painful and costly internal  rift among  Israeli Jews,  and may  cre-
ate a  crisis that would damage the principle  of democratic,  majority  rule.  The
leaders  of  the  settlement  movement,  while  typically  reluctant  to  explicitly
endorse  the  use  of violent  tactics,  nevertheless  have  always  been  willing  to
exploit  fears  of  settler  violence  in  the  face  of  evacuation. 194  For  example,
while  leaders  suggest that most  national religious  settlers  are  law-abiding  and
would  never resort  to violence,  they simultaneously  suggest  that some extreme
elements  within  their  ranks  are  difficult  to  constrain. 95  The  existence  of
extreme elements prepared to use violence is  doubted by few  Israelis, given the
plot of the Jewish  underground  to blow  up  the Temple  Mount  and the Rabin
assassination. 196
193  Mnookin & Eiran,  supra note  *, at 21-22.
194  Interview  with Moshe  Halbertal,  supra  note  185.
195  This suggestion  interestingly reflects a similar argument made by leaders of the Palestin-
ian  authority  who  suggest  they  lack  the  capacity  to  control  Hamas,  Islamic  Jihad,  and
extreme elements  with the PLO.
196  NOEMI  GAL-OR,  THE  JEWISH  UNDERGROUND:  OUR  TERRORISM  39-48  (1990).  Some
contemporary  analysts  have  suggested  that the youth  who  have established  new hilltop out-
posts  cannot  be  controlled  by  the settler  leadership.  Shlomo  Kaniel,  The  Hilltop  Settlers:
Biblical  Sabras, Presentation  at  Harvard  Law School Conference:  Past, Present,  and Future
of the Israeli  Settlements  in  the West Bank and Gaza Settlements:  The  Internal  Israeli Con-
flict (Oct.  14, 2004).
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Israelis  are especially  sensitive  to the risk of internal  conflict  because  of
the  "lessons"  of history.  Even  secular  Jews  are  taught  the  Talmudic  story  in
school, indicating  that Jewish  independence  was lost to the Romans during the
Second  Temple  era (circa 70 AD) because of violent rifts and "internal  hatred"
among  the  Jews.
19 7
Religion aside, Jewish culture has traditionally  stressed a tribal notion that
Jews  throughout  the  world  share  a  responsibility  for  each  other's well-being
and  survival.  This cultural  theme  makes  repugnant  the  prospect  of a  violent
confrontation  among  Jews.  This  notion  may  help  to  explain  the  extreme
trauma created  by  Rabin's  assassination.
For  Israelis,  the  "nightmare  scenario"  of  an  internal  rift  would  involve
widespread insubordination  within the military.  Today settlers  and other relig-
ious nationalists  are  understood  to be  vastly overrepresented  in junior officer
corps  and  combat  units.' 98  Press  reports  have  suggested  that  many  of these
soldiers  might  disobey  orders  to evacuate  settlements.  As  a result,  the Israeli
military  was  careful  to  choose units  that  had  absolute  loyalty  to the  state,  in
carrying  out  the  settlement  relocations  in  the  summer  of 2005.  Conscription
units  that  were  suspected  as  being  hesitant  regarding  the  relocation  mission
were not mobilized to directly support it.19 9  Nearly all Israeli Jews believe  the
strength and cohesion of the military is essential for Israel's survival.  No insti-
tution within Israel enjoys higher prestige than  the armed forces.200  This pres-
tige is hardly surprising  given Israel's fundamental  reliance on its military over
a fifty-six year period  that  has  seen  six wars  and intermittent terrorist attacks.
The role of settlers and religious nationalists in the military adds to the credibil-
ity of the  implicit  threat of  disunity  in the  ranks.  Indeed,  in the  past  some
rabbis  have  issued  edicts  saying  that  soldiers  should  ignore  certain  military
orders  relating  to  the  cession  of  army  bases  in  the  West  Bank  to  the
Palestinians.2° 1
197  Romans destroyed  the  Second Temple  in 70  AD.  In  132  AD the  Jews  unsuccessfully
rebelled  again  against  the  Romans.  The  Romans  then  expelled most of the Jews  from  the
Holy Land  and  the  second Diaspora began.  See  YEHOSHFAT  HARKABI,  THE  BAR  KOKHBA
SYNDROME:  RISK  AND  REALISM  IN  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS,  (1983);  Talmud,  Yoma,  9B
(The Second Temple was destroyed because during that time "sinat Hinam" [baseless  hatred]
characterized  the  relationship  among  Jewish  groups.  The  Talmud  concludes  that  "this
teaches  us  that  baseless  hatred  [among  Jews]  is  deemed  as  grave  as  the  sins  of  idolatry,
immorality  and bloodshed  combined.").
198  In  1998, former  Director of Military  Intelligence, General  (Res.)  Shlomo Gazit, warned
that the large  numbers  of religious and settler soldiers  is "dangerously  politicizing  the mili-
tary." Tzahi Fanton,  The Motherland of Antisemitism, NFC (Apr.  19,  2004), http://www.nfc.
co.il/archive/003-D-5650-0O.html?tag--4-57-59  (in Hebrew).
"I  Yishai  Holander  &  Kave  Shafran,  Golani  will  not  Relocate  Settlers,  MSN  NEWS
(Hebrew  Edition),  16  June  2005,  http://business.msn.co.illnews/statepoliticalmilitary/mili-
tary/200506/20050616072745.htm?inter= 1.
200  See  YARON EZRAHI,  RUBBER  BULLETS:  POWER AND  CONSCIENCE  IN  MODERN  ISRAEL 38
(1998)  (service  in the  military  is "the  most defining  component  of Israeli  identity").
201  Joel  Greenberg, Hand Over Israeli Bases? No Way,  Rabbis Tell Troops, N.Y.  TIMES,
July  13,  1995,  at  A3.
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d.  Other Factors Contributing  to Settler Power and Settlement
Expansion
Other factors,  unrelated  to  the  actions of the  settlers  themselves,  contrib-
uted to the  remarkable  expansion  of the  settlements.
i.  National Security Arguments
Borders: Over the years many believed that settlements  in  the West Bank
enhanced  Israel's  security.  As  noted  above,  among  Israelis,  the  old  "Green
Line"  border  between  Israel  and  the  West Bank  was  deemed  impossible  to
defend  from  an  eastern  military  attack.  Israeli  Foreign Minister  Abba  Eban,
who had a reputation as a "dove,"  labeled it "the Auschwitz  Border" because  it
risked  extermination  of Israel,  as  the  neck  of Israel  was  less  than  ten  miles
wide.  Many believed that by "creating facts  on the ground,"  settlements might
enhance Israel's  long-term  security  by ultimately  guaranteeing  that any  future
eastern  border would be  east of the Green  Line. 02
Whatever  the final  borders, many Israelis believe that maintaining control
over  portions  of the  West Bank  is essential  until there  is a  stable  Palestinian
government  insuring  there  would be  no cross-border  terrorist  attacks  and  the
West Bank aquifer  would not be  contaminated.2°3  Even  among  some  former
leaders of the Labor Party, such as Yigal Alon,  settlements  were a vital method
of insuring interim control.20 4  Settlements could house military units and could
create a continuing presence in a strategic location.  However,  the effectiveness
of civilian  settlements in asserting military control  is  disputed.  Many  analysts
argue  that  civilian  presence  in  the  territory  compromises  military  control
because  civilian settlers  need  extra military  protection  and divert  scarce  mili-
tary resources.
The  Settlements as a Bargaining Chip:  After  Israel took  control  of  the
territories,  it  was  widely  assumed  that  Israel  would  someday  trade  land  for
peace in  a future negotiated  deal with its neighboring  Arab  states or the  Pales-
tinians.  However,  with the exception  of Egypt, between  1967 and  1991,  there
were  no  formal  negotiations  between  Israel  and  its Arab  neighbors.  Shortly
after the Six Day War, the Israeli cabinet suggested that it was prepared to trade
land for peace  with  its Arab  neighbors.  At  an  Arab  League  summit  at Khar-
toum  in  September  of  1967,  the  response  was  "three  no's":  no  peace  with
Israel,  no recognition  of Israel,  and no negotiation  with  Israel. °5
Within Israel,  many who  had no interest in permanently  remaining  in the
territories either  supported or acquiesced  in the creation  of settlements  for two
reasons.  On  the  one hand,  the  threat of ongoing  settlement  expansion  might
202  Another area where settlements are thought to contribute to Israeli  security was  the Gush
Etzion  area, south of Jerusalem. In hostile hands, control of this area would  facilitate attacks
on  Jerusalem.
203  Some security  analysts suggest that Israel should control  at  least part  of the West  Bank
because  the  West  Bank  aquifer,  if  contaminated,  would  compromise  Israel's  main  water
supply.
204  Yigal Allon, Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders, FOREIGN  AFFAIRS,  Oct.  1976,  at
38-53.
205  Jewish  Virtual  Library,  The  Khartoum  Resolutions  (Sept.  1, 1967),  http://www.jewish
virtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/three-noes.html.
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create  a  "fading  opportunity"  that  might induce  the Arabs to come  to the  bar-
gaining  table.  On  the  other  hand,  some  believed  that  at  the  bargaining  table
itself the settlements  could serve as a "bargaining  chip" that could be traded for
an  Arab  concession.  There  is  an  obvious  tension  between  these  arguments.
The  opportunity  is  "fading"  only  to the extent  that settlement  expansion  was
seen as irreversible.  Moreover,  the use of the settlements  as  a bargaining chip
in  negotiation  requires  the  Israeli  government  to have  the  capacity  to  require
evacuation  of  the  settlers.  The  experience  of  the  last  twenty  years  suggests
neither  argument has panned  out.  On  the one hand,  the constant expansion  of
settlements  appears  to  have  undermined  and  inhibited  negotiations  with  the
Palestinians.  On  the other, the existence of the settlements  has  in fact made it
very  difficult  for  any  Israeli  leader  to  create  and  sustain  sufficient  domestic
support  to abandon them.  The settlers have not been passive pieces on a strate-
gic chessboard.  They  have played an active  role as spoilers,  resisting all inter-
nal  political  efforts  to reach  an Israeli-Palestinian  deal.
ii.  The Ambiguous Status of the Territories
The settlers benefited from the unclear status of the West Bank and Gaza,
as well as the ongoing inability to determine their future status.  Israel occupied
both  areas  in  1967,  but  never  annexed  them,  and  legally ruled  them  under  a
temporary  military  legal  system.  But  even prior to  Israeli  occupation,  sover-
eignty over  these regions  was  not internationally  agreed  upon.
The issue  goes back to the early  days of the  state  of Israel.  Since  1948,
with  the  end of the  British  Mandate,  no  state  acquired  internationally  recog-
nized sovereignty over these areas.  Though under the  1947 U.N. Partition Plan
Gaza and the West Bank were supposed  to be part of a future  Palestinian  state,
by  the  end  of the  1948-1949  war,  they  were  occupied  by  Egypt and  Jordan
respectively.  Egypt held Gaza under military rule between  the years  1949-1967
but never  annexed it.  Jordan  annexed the West Bank in  1950, but the interna-
tional  community  did not recognize  the annexation.206  Though it was  widely
assumed in  Israel that the territories would be handed to  an Arab party at some
point, for at least  twenty-five years, it was not clear whom this  party would be.
Until 1987 Jordan claimed that the West Bank was part of the Hashemite King-
dom.  Following  the  1993  Oslo  accord it was  assumed that a Palestinian state
would have  sovereignty  of the region,  but  the collapse  of the  Oslo  process in
2000 once  again  created uncertainty.
The  Palestinians,  the  local  residents  of these  areas,  did  not  articulate  a
clear  and  effective  demand  for  self-determination  until  the  1970s,  and  even
then  the  demand  was deemed  unrealistic  by  many,  as  it  included  an  undist-
inguishable claim for both the territories  and the state of Israel.  These circum-
stances  created  a  political  vacuum  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza that  made  it
easier  for settlers to both  pursue their project and create  "facts  on the  ground"
without substantial  internal  opposition.
206  Two  countries,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Pakistan,  were  alone  in  recognizing  this
annexation.
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iii.  Absence of a Deal
The  settlers  greatly  benefited  from  the  absence  of  a  final  status  deal
between  Israelis  and  Palestinians.  At  no  time  was  the  Israeli  public  faced
directly with a choice between  the settlements  in the West Bank and Gaza and a
peace  agreement  with  the  Palestinians,  and they  did not  have  to evaluate  the
trade-offs  between  the  two.  For  the  first  twenty-five  years  of the  settlement
project,  neither Israelis  nor Palestinians  accepted  the legitimacy  of the  other's
right  of  self-determination,  let  alone  a  negotiated  deal.  Though  both  sides
negotiated and signed a set of agreements in the  1993-2000 Oslo peace process
period, it was only in 2000 in the Camp David and Taba negotiations that Israel
and the  PLO got closer  to discussing  a comprehensive  final deal which  would
have crystallized the choice between land and peace.  Even then, as we  discuss
above, a deal  was not reached  and the  public was not asked to make  a choice
between peace  and  the settlement project.
Although  the  Israeli  public  was  not  asked  to  choose  between  the  settle-
ments and peace  during the Oslo  peace  process, Israel's  short history provides
one vivid  example  of majority  support  for  halting  or uprooting  a  settlement
project when a concrete  peace plan was on the table.  In  1982,  the Israeli  Knes-
set  authorized  the  relocation  of  6000  Israeli  settlers  in  Sinai  as  part  of  an
Israeli-Egyptian  peace  agreement.  Yet  the  public  has  never  had  to  make  a
direct choice  between  settlements  and peace in the West Bank  and  Gaza,  and
they  did  not have  a strong  incentive  to halt  the  settlement project. 2°7
Many Israelis,  as  well  as Palestinians,  warned that the continuation  of the
settlement  project would create  enormous  difficulties  for a future peace agree-
ment.  But lacking  a final  status  agreement,  their warnings  were  ignored.
3.  The  Parties  to the  Conflict:  An Assessment
The  history of the internal  conflict  over the  settlements  can be  seen  as a
political contest  for the hearts and minds of a reluctant and ambivalent  majority
where  the  protagonists  are  two  warring  minorities.  One  minority,  led  by  the
national religious  settlers,  has  shaped events to a much greater  degree than  the
second  minority,  the  peace  movement  led  by  Peace  Now.  The  settlers  have
effectively  mobilized  government  resources  in  their  service,  especially  when
Likud was in power.  Peace Now  was much less effective in mobilizing Labor
governments  to block settlement expansion.  Indeed, the settlement  movement
has succeeded  in creating  "facts  on the ground" that profoundly  complicate the
implementation  of a  two  state  solution.  One  hundred  and  twenty  settlement
communities,  home  to  over  250,000  Jews,  now  pepper  the  West  Bank  and
Gaza. °8  We  have  suggested  that  national  religious  settlers,  a  small,  deter-
207  Moreover,  public  opinion  data  provide  inconclusive  evidence  of the  Israeli  public's
appetite for other land-for-peace  deals.  Polling data show that withdrawing  from the Golan
Heights  in  exchange  for  peace  with  Syria  has  not  mustered  the  support  of a  majority  of
Israelis.  See  Ephraim  Yaar  & Tamar  Hermann,  Steinmetz  Center  for  Peace  Research
Report,  Dec.  1999,  http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/peaceindexl1999/files/dec99e.pdf
("[T]he Jewish public at this time lacks a majority in favor of full withdrawal from the Golan
in return  for a full  peace  agreement  with  Syria.").
208  This  paper was  written  prior to  the implementation  of Prime  Minister Sharon's  plan  to
relocate  all  Jewish  settlements  in Gaza.
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mined  and  well-organized  minority  have  successfully  invoked  themes,  both
cultural  and  religious,  having  broad  resonance  within  Israel.  We  have  also
pointed  to institutional  features of the Israeli political  system that  have  ampli-
fied  their power.
The  number  of  Jewish  settlers  in  the  occupied  territories  has  increased
steadily  since  the  1967  war,  irrespective  of whether  Labor  or  Likud  led  the
Israeli  government.  As noted, even in 2005.  notwithstanding  the evacuation  of
of the  Gaza settlements,  the  total  number of settlers  grew.
From  1967  until 2004,  Israel's two  major  political parties  responded dif-
ferently to  the conflicts  between  national religious settlers and the peace  move-
ment.  As a general proposition, Labor-led governments  employed a strategy of
avoiding  direct  confrontation  with  the settlement  movement.  These  govern-
ments  demonstrated little understanding  or sympathy for the perspective  of the
national  religious  settlers,  but they  were  unwilling  to  firmly  halt  expansion.
Conflict avoidance  characterized their response.  When Likud-led  governments
were in power, their posture  was one of accommodation  of the settlers.  Likud
demonstrated  an empathetic  understanding  for the  settlers'  goals  and actively
supported  settlement  expansion.  While  territorial  expansion  was  consistent
with  Likud's  traditional  ideology,  Likud  governments  were  never  assertive
enough  to  implement  the  settlers'  grand  vision  and  annex  the  territories  to
Israel  proper.
The internal  conflict has  also been one that keeps changing.  In the thirty-
seven  years of internal  debate,  many players,  such  as  political leaders,  parties,
and  public  intellectuals,  shifted  their  positions.  Most  of  them  have  turned
against the settlement project.  Shimon Peres, as Rabin's Minister of Defense in
the  1970s, was the champion of the early  Gush Emunim settlements in Samaria,
but  by the  1990s  had become  one of their greatest opponents.  Prime  Minister
Sharon,  the champion  of the  settlers  from  the  mid  1970s  to  the  early  2000s,
now  directly  confronts  the  movement  with  a  specific  proposal  to evacuate  all
the settlements  in Gaza as well  as four small ones in the West Bank.  Similarly,
the  Likud party, once  the leading supporter of a vision  of a Greater Israel  that
implied keeping all the settlements and even expanding  them, is now torn inter-
nally  over  the  future  of the  settlement  project.
4.  The Internal Debate and Debate around Sharon's Disengagement
Plan
Because  of the  settlers'  political  efficacy,  Sharon  faced  fierce  political
resistance  to  his initiative  to relocate  settlers  from  Gaza  and the West  Bank.
The  leadership  of  the  settlement  movement  mobilized  their  entire  settlement
constituency,  not just those  8000  that might be  required to  move.  To all  the
settlers, the leadership indicated that  Sharon's initiative was a dangerous prece-
dent  and  that it  would  be  a precursor  for  much  more  substantial  steps.  The
leadership  effectively recruited  tens of thousands  of settlers for demonstrations
and door-to-door grass-roots campaigning.  They further created dissent among
the  Likud Members  of Knesset  and encouraged  the withdrawal  of two parties
from  Sharon's original coalition  government.
By  the  spring  of 2005,  once  the  settlers  lost the  formal  political  battle,
their resistance had moved  to the streets.  The  settlers believed that their backs
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were "to the wall" and they needed to demonstrate their willingness  to use hard
bargaining  tactics.  During  the  spring and  the  summer of 2005,  settler  leaders
called  for  massive  civil  disobedience  to make  the  government  "fill  the jails"
with  protesters.2°9  On numerous occasions major highways  in territorial Israel
were blocked  by Israelis opposing  the relocation of the  settlers,
210  and in  July
2005  the  settlers  organized  a  mass  march  from  territorial  Israel  to the  Gaza
Strip.  The police  were  able to block  the march,  but the  settlers committed  to
continue  this  type  of resistance.2 1
As noted  above, these efforts  were not enough  to  block  the implementa-
tion of  the  Sharon  plan.  Yet,  although  this  battle  over  the  Gaza  relocation
ended  with complete relocation of settlers, the conflict  at large is far from over.
In our view, this limited  Israeli withdrawal  will not be the last and will not lay
to rest  the debate  over the  settlements.  Israelis  will debate  *  the  future, per-
haps  even  the  near future,  the  nature  of their state and  its boundaries.  When
they  do, the  conflict over  the settlements  is  bound to  appear yet again  at  the
core of this  inevitable  rift.
C.  Third Track Initiatives
The recent  "third track"  initiatives  and the strong reactions they provoked
in  both  Israeli  and Palestinian  communities  provide  further  concrete  evidence
of the internal conflicts we analyze.  The Ayalon-Nusseibeh  "People's Plan"  of
2002  and the "Geneva Accord' 2 12 strongly suggest that moderates  on each  side
might  be  able  to  navigate  successfully  through  the  stormy  waters  created  by
clashing  narratives,  existential  fears  and collective  memories  and  reach  agree-
ment on the terms of a two-state solution  that would well  serve the interests  of
most  Israelis  and  Palestinians.  On the other hand, the angry  reactions  to each
initiative  within  the  two  respective  communities  underline  the  internal
conflicts.
The  two  initiatives  adopted  essentially  identical  principles  to resolve  the
territorial/border  issue,  and  both  contemplated  that  after  establishment  of
agreed borders,  no Jewish  settlers  would  remain  in the new  Palestinian  state.
Both took as the starting point the June 4,  1967  "green line,"  and both contem-
plated possible modifications  based on  agreed-upon  territorial  exchanges on  a
209  Letter  from  Pinchas  Vallerstein,  to  the  Settlers  of Mate  Binyamin  Regional  Council,
(Dec.  20,  2004), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3021080,00.html  (in  Hebrew).
21o  Aril Bender, Blocking Roads is a Form of Rebellion, Maariv-NRG  (July  5,  2005), http://
www.nrg.co.il/online/l/ART/954/475.html  (in Hebrew).
211  Yoad Kedari,  Eliran Hayat, &  Uri Glickman, Thousands in Demonstration  Against Relo-
cation, Maariv-NRG  (July  18,  2005),  http://www.nrg.co.il/online/l/ART/959/786.html  (in
Hebrew).
212  The  Geneva Accord  was  the  result of extended  secret  negotiations  between  a group  of
Israelis and Palestinians  over a three year period, hosted and sponsored  by the Swiss  govern-
ment.  The  Palestinian  delegation  was  headed  by  former  Palestinian  Information Minister
Yasser  Abed  Rabbo  and  the  Israeli  delegation  by  former  Israeli  Justice  Minister  Yossi
Beilin.  The discussions culminated eventually in the publication  of a Draft Permanent Status
Agreement which was  made public  in October 2003.  Foundation for Middle East Peace, The
Geneva  Accord  (Oct. 2003),  http://www.fmep.org/documents/GenevaAccord.htm.
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one-to-one  basis.213  Both also provided  for a  "safe  corridor"  linking the West
Bank  and  Gaza.  Far  more detailed  and  lengthy  than  the  similarly  motivated
People's  Plan,  the Geneva  Accord  resembled  in appearance  and  tone  an inter-
national  treaty  and went further than the  Plan by identifying, through a map, a
possible  land  swap.
The two initiatives  differ in their treatment  of the refugee  issue, although
both  would  require  relinquishment  of  any  notion that  individual  Palestinians
would  have  an  unfettered  right  to  return  to  Israel.  The  People's  Initiative
unambiguously  extinguishes any  claim that Palestinian refugees have a right to
return  to Israel.  It  states "Palestinian  refugees  will return  only to  the  State of
Palestine,"  and "[tihe  international community  will offer to compensate  toward
bettering  the lot of those refugees  willing to remain in their present country of
residence,  or who wish to immigrate to third-party countries.' , 2  4  The Geneva
Accord  also provides  for refugee compensation  through  an  international  fund,
but  it is one to which Israel  would contribute  amounts  of its own choosing.21 5
Unlike the People's  Plan, the Geneva Accord would permit a limited number of
refugees  to choose  Israel  as  their  permanent  place  of residence.216  Although
the Geneva Accord suggests this number "shall be at the sovereign discretion  of
Israel,"  it also appears  to constrain  that discretion  by providing that Israel will
submit to an International Commission the total  number of Palestinian refugees
that Israel will accept, and that  as a basis for that number Israel "will consider
the  average  of the total  numbers  submitted  by  the different  third countries  to
the International  Commission.
217
The  official  and  unofficial  reactions  among  Israelis  and  Palestinians  to
these two initiatives confirm  our basic thesis that internal conflicts within each
community  are potential barriers  to  a negotiated resolution.  While the Ayalon-
Nuseeibeh  plan  was  endorsed  by  some  250,000  Israelis  and  some  160,000
Palestinians,  it  was  also  met  by  a  deafening  chorus  of  disapproval  on  both
sides.21 8  The Geneva Accord was widely condemned within Israel.  The Likud
government  rejected  it  outright  while  the  Labor  Party  remained  silent. 21 9
Meanwhile,  prominent Israeli  moderates  such  as Gilad Sher publicly criticized
the Accord  for not being  sufficiently  clear on the  right of Israel  to  limit refu-
gees'  choice of Israel  as their permanent  place of residence  and for not clearly
stating  that  the  accord  would  entail  the  end  of all  claims  of Palestinians  to
213  For the text of the Geneva  Accord,  see id.  For the text of the People's Plan,  see http://
www.mifkad.org.il/en/about.asp.
214  The Ayalon-Nusseibeh  Plan: The "People's Choice"  (July  27, 2002),  http://www.jewish
virtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/peoplesvoiceplan.html;  Ayalon  & Nusseibeh,  supra note
151.
215  Geneva Accord,  supra note  212.
216  The  Geneva  Accord  avoids  any  use.of the term  "right of return,"  instead  referring  to a
"choice  of permanent  place of residence."  Id.
217  Id. (emphasis added).
218  See supra Part IH.A.2.  See, e.g.,  Khaled A.  Toameh, PLO Slams Nusseibeh for 'Stab-
bing Arafat in  the Heart',  JERUSALEM  POST,  Oct.  15,  2002,  at  2  (Nusseibeh  was  "strongly
criticized"  by  Palestinians).
219  See, e.g.,  Matt Rees,  A  Different Road Map,  TIME,  Dec.  15,  2003, at  38  (calling Prime
Minister  Sharon  "apoplectic  in  his condemnation  of the  plan").
[Vol.  6:299BARRIERS  TO  PROGRESS
return  to  Israel.22°  On  the  Palestinian  side,  acceptance  was  only  slightly  less
lukewarm.
221  Arafat sent representatives  and a message of support to  the sign-
ing  ceremony,  but  avoided  actually  endorsing  it,  while  Hamas  and  Islamic
Jihad  were  quick to condemn  it.
222
D.  Comparison of the Two Internal Conflicts
The  internal  conflicts  share  two  basic  features:  (1)  the  possession  or
repossession  of land  lies at the  heart of the claims  of the  settlers and the refu-
gees;  and  (2)  the  implementation of these claims,  on either side,  would imply
the end of the two-state  solution.  The two  internal conflicts  share  some  other
features  as  well,  which  we analyze below.
1.  Narrative, Ideology, Identity, History
National  religious settlers and Palestinian refugees have sincerely  and fer-
vently held  beliefs involving historical  claims  to land  voiced  by a people  who
have  a narrative  of suffering,  victimization  and loss.  Palestinians  believe that
dispossession  and their refugee  status form the core of the Palestinian national
identity.  National  religious  settlers  believe  that by  reclaiming  "Eretz  Israel"
their  settlement  activities  represent  the essence  of Zionism, their  sacred  duty,
and their personal contribution to the historic struggle of the Jewish people.  In
their eyes, the settlement  project is  the response  to two thousand years of Jew-
ish  victimization,  culminating  in  the  Holocaust.  Each  claim  is  inextricably
linked with each  group's reading  of its national history,  ideology, and  individ-
ual and collective identity, and both groups  subscribe to a particular version of
the national narrative  that grounds  the very essence of national and individual
identity  on that  claim.
True  believers  within  each  group  are  contemptuous  of compromise,  not
out  of narrow  self-interest, but  because  they  see  their duty  as  vindication  of
their  people's  rights.  As  we  have  shown,  the  themes  sounded  by  the  true
believers  have  some  real  resonance  among  many  who  are  sympathetic  to  the
broad claims but would prefer compromise  and peace  within the framework  of
a two state solution.  Others within each community oppose the broad claims as
endangering  what they  believe  should  be  the essence  of the  national  project.
There are Israeli Jews who see the settlement project as jeopardizing the contin-
ued existence  of a  democratic  Jewish  state.  Some  Palestinians  see  a  broad
220  The  Geneva Accord  provides that "the parties  recognize"  that  UN Resolutions  194 and
242,  and  the  Arab  Peace  Initiative  concerning  the  rights  of  the  Palestinian  refugees
"represent  the basis for  resolving the  refugee  issue"  and  further provided  that implementa-
tion of the agreement would  mean the "permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian
refugee  problem"  and  that the  only  claims  that  could  be  raised  in  the  future  were  those
related to the implementation  of this agreement.  Geneva Accord,  supra note 212;  Interview
with Gilead  Sher, Apr.  19,  2004.  See also Gilead Sher, Geneva is Not So  Good for Israel,
HA'ARETZ,  November  30,  2003,  at B2.
221  Peter Goodspeed,  Geneva Accord Leaves Both Houses Divided, NAT'L  POST,  Dec.  4,
2003,  available at  http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-paestine/2003/1204
bothhouses.htm;  Palestine Centre  for Policy and Survey  Result, Poll  No 10, Geneva  Accord
(Dec.  2003).
222  Tony  Karon,  Geneva Accord:  Political Theatre, but  Worth  Watching,  TIME,  Dec.  4,
2003, http://www.time.com/time/columnist/karon/article/0,9565,555902,00.html.
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assertion  of a  right of return  as  undermining the  establishment  of an indepen-
dent  Palestinian  state.  These  differences  result  in  profound  conflicts  within
each  community.
2.  Leadership Challenges
Each internal conflict poses  great  challenges  to  any leader who wishes  to
negotiate  a  two  state  solution.  A  Palestinian  leader  must largely  sacrifice  the
rights of refugees to return  to what is now Israel.  An Israeli leader will need to
dispossess  tens of thousands of Jews now living in the West Bank.  Both lead-
ers  will, of course, claim that the  sacrifice is  necessary  for the  greater good  of
their people.  But  for  many  within each  community  the prospective  loss will
outweigh the claimed  benefits.
Prime  Minister  Sharon's  uphill  struggle  to  implement  the  evacuation  of
the 9,000 settlers of Gaza amply demonstrates how difficult the task of evacuat-
ing settlements  is and renders  almost  unimaginable,  in terms of political diffi-
culty,  the  task of  evacuating  settlements  from  the  West Bank,  which,  as  we
have  noted  above,  are  far more  populous  and numerous,  and  often  of greater
religious, political and economic  significance, than are the settlements  in Gaza.
On  the Palestinian  side,  we  have  described  how  difficult  it  is  for  any  public
figure  to  contemplate  openly  the  unfeasibility  of  any  return  of  refugees  to
Israel,  and how, for every  voice  that points out the incompatibility  of the right
of return  with  any two-state solution,  there are  several more voices, louder and
shriller,  that  warn  against  the  bartering  away  of  the  "sacred"  rights  of  the
refugees.
3.  Avoidance and Deferral
Within both  the Israeli  and  Palestinian  societies, there has  been  a historic
tendency  to avoid  and  defer  any  concrete  solutions, especially  at  the  political
level,  to  the "settlement  problem"  and  the  "problem  of the  claim  of return."
While the  reasons  for this  tendency  to avoid  and defer are  clear enough  (and
discussed in sections  III and IV), it  has resulted in  a hardening of positions  on
both  sides  and a "status  quo"  mentality that has been immeasurably  dangerous
to the  prospects  for peace.  Deferral  further compounded  the  problem on each
side.  The  number  of refugees  has  grown  from  750,000 in  1948  to  more than
four  million in 2004  as the children  of refugees are  also awarded  the status  of
refugees. 223  The  number  of  settlers  has  in  turn  grown  from  a  few  dozen  in
1968  to 231,000  in 2004.  In  turn,  the  growth  in numbers  created  secondary
effects  that also added  to the  complexities of the  situation.  A growth  in  num-
bers has  awarded these groups  further power within their respective  communi-
ties.  Both  groups  enjoy  a  high  birth  rate  and  are  now  greater  not  only  in
numbers  but  also  in  proportion.  Larger  numbers  also  mean  that  many  more
resources  will  be  needed to resolve  the problem.
Deferral  and avoidance  occurred  also in other realms.  On the Palestinian
side, refugees  have  been offered no incentives  by politicians  to discuss  openly
their understanding of the meaning and scope of the return.  Rather, their indi-
vidual preferences have been silenced, and they  have often been  encouraged  to
23  See  United  Nations Relief  and Works  Agency, supra note  37.
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keep demanding the right to  return and  to keep believing  in the possibility of a
future  implementation  of this  right.  On  the  Israeli  side,  although  there  was
much public discussion over  the future of the territories and the settlements,  no
clear decision  was taken.  Even under the Oslo process,  which was intended to
lead to a two-state  solution,  not a  single  settlement  was relocated.
Bargaining  chips:  Both  Palestinian  and  Israeli  leaders  have  tended  to
think  of these  two  issues  as  bargaining  chips  during  negotiations  that  could
eventually be given  up in return for other concessions.  Israeli  (Labor)  leaders
allowed  the  settlements  to expand  because  they  felt  that  this  would  increase
their leverage at the negotiating  table.  Similarly, some Palestinian  leaders con-
tinue to cling publicly  to the demand for return,  even while  privately acknowl-
edging  the  impracticality  of  this  demand,  to  strengthen  their  hand  during
negotiations  and to hold on to  what they view  as an eventual  valuable conces-
sion.  In so doing, leaders  on both  sides have created dangerous  aspirations  (on
the Palestinian  side)  and facts  on  the  ground (on  the  Israeli  side),  which  have
now  made, as  we have  seen,  a two-state  solution more difficult  than before to
implement.
4.  The Need for Compensation and Relocation
The resolution  of each  internal conflict  is going  to require  complex com-
pensation  and  relocation  mechanisms  that  will,  no  matter  how  well-planned,
likely give  rise to uncomfortable  questions  about equity and  fairness,  and will
just  as  likely  cause  further  disagreements  that  may  erupt  in  violent  internal
conflict  and civil  strife.  Obviously  they  will also require  a  substantial invest-
ment of resources.  Relocating  8000  Israeli  settlers from Gaza  will cost  Israel
over  one  billion  dollars  and  demand  about  40,000  soldiers  and  policeper-
sons.
224  Compensating  the Palestinian refugees and  their offspring  might cost
tens of billions of dollars.225
But financial resources  alone will not suffice.  Compensation mechanisms
that err too heavily  on the financial  side while ignoring ideological  aspects will
carry with them the taint of "bribery,"  while compensation mechanisms that err
too  lightly  on  the  financial  aspects  and  concentrate  more  on  the  ideological
ones will likely be dismissed as ungenerous  and humiliating.  Compensation in
both  cases  will  have  to  be  allocated  both  on  individual  as  well  as  collective
bases, and  given the huge numbers involved  and the sheer diversity (especially
on the  Palestinian  side) of economic  and  social  conditions,  such mechanisms
are  bound  to  be  controversial  and  unacceptable  to  large  numbers  of  people
affected.
5.  Simplifications, Misconceptions of 'Outsiders'
Both groups tend to be regarded  by outsiders and  "non-members"  as mon-
olithic blocs  comprised of individuals  who  all want  the same  thing, and rarely
224  See, e.g.,  Zvi Zrahiya  &  Meirav  Arlozorov,  Government to Increase Settler Payouts by
NIS  1.5  Billion,  HA'ARE'rZ,  Sept.  19,  2005,  available at  http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/626605.html.
225  See, e.g.,  Michael  R. Fischbach,  The United Nations and Palestinian Refugee Property
Compensation, 31  J.  OF PALESTINE  STUD.  34  (2002).
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are  the differences  within  each  group  acknowledged  and  respected  by  even
their own compatriots.  Moreover, both settlers and refugees tend to be mocked
and  vilified  by some  of those  who  disagree  with their claims.
6.  Diaspora  Support
Both Jewish  settlers and Palestinian  refugees  receive financial  and  politi-
cal  support  from  organizations  in  the  United  States  and elsewhere,  and  this
support  has  helped  each  group  strengthen  and refine  its  position  and  better
organize  its defenses.  For example,  California-based  Al-Awda Coalition  is  a
well  organized  and  well funded  U.S.  based  right of return  group.  Other U.S.
based groups, such  as American  Friends of Elon  Moreh,  are organized  prima-
rily to support the settlement project.  Such organizations have played a crucial
role in strengthening the hands of the settlement and right of return movements.
7.  Differences and Contrasts
Despite these similarities  between the two internal conflicts, there are also
some significant  differences, which stem not only from the nature of each con-
flict but also from  the particular  history  and  context  from  which it  is derived.
The most  conspicuous  differences  are identified  below:
a.  Numbers Involved
There  are  about  250,000  settlers  remaining  in the West Bank, excluding
the  Jewish  inhabitants  of those  portions  of Jerusalem  previously  in the  West
Bank that were annexed  to Israel  in  1968.  This total comprises a small percent-
age of Israel's total population of about five million Jews.  The settlers are thus
a small  but  vocal  and well-represented  minority  within  the  state  of Israel  and
are  treated  as  such by  the  rest of Israel's  Jewish  population.  The Palestinian
refugees,  on the  other hand, number today at  more than four million  and com-
prise  (and have always  done  so) a  majority  of all Palestinians.
b.  Broader Perceptions about Centrality to National Identity
The right of return is central to the core  Palestinian  identity, more  so than
the  "Eretz  Israel"  settlement  project is to Israeli identity.  Because  of the vast
numbers  involved,  and because the  refugee problem predates  the beginning  of
the  Palestinian  national  movement,  the  refugees  and  their  longing  for  return
constitute  the defining  and  oldest identity/narrative  of the  Palestinian  people.
This is evident not only  from the official  and unofficial political  discourse that
emanates  from  Palestinians,  which invariably treats  the issue of return  as cen-
tral to  the Palestinian  cause, but also from Palestinian  literature, poetry, music,
and theatre,  which  frequently  depict the  longing for return.
Moreover,  the catastrophe  or  "Nakba"  of 1948  was the  crucial  event that
crystallized the sense of Palestinian uniqueness-(as distinct from other Arabs)
and  it  therefore  remains  a  core  defining  event  in  the  Palestinians'  sense  of
nationhood.  Because  their sense of shared  nationhood is  so inextricably tied to
the  dispossession  and  refugeehood  suffered  by  most  Palestinians  during  the
Nakba,  almost  all Palestinians  have  great  sympathy  for the  plight of the refu-
gees, and most believe that the Palestinian people were wronged by the creation
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of Israel.  Most  are either  refugees themselves  or closely  related  or otherwise
linked  to refugees  and  are  well-versed  in the  culture  of longing and  loss  that
defines  the Palestinian  refugee  experience.
In Israel,  although national religious settlers claim to form the Zionist van-
guard and to embody the very essence of that founding philosophy  of the state
of Israel,  a majority of Israelis, including those  who are sympathetic, do not see
them  as  representing  the defining  element  of Israeli  national  identity.  Their
project  to extend  the  boundaries  of the  state  of Israel  in  the  West Bank  and
Gaza  through  settlements  began  only  after  1967  and is  not  supported  by the
majority of Israelis.  Many Jews are not sympathetic  with, and sometimes even
reject,  the  messianic  nationalist  vision  of the  national  religious  settlers,  and
many  have  no personal  connection  to  settlers.  Many  also  do not  understand,
and have little interest in understanding,  the motivations  and ideologies of these
settlers.
c.  Role of Religion
Religious  beliefs  lie at the  heart of the  national religious  settlers'  claims,
whereas the  right of return is a secular claim that  arises from  what Palestinian
refugees  consider  to be a past  wrong that  must be  righted.
d.  Perceived Immediacy within Each Community
Concrete  discussions  about possible  and feasible  solutions  to the refugee
question within  the two-state framework have  long been  avoided and deferred
in Palestinian  society,  especially  at the political  level.  Similarly,  material  dis-
cussion  about  the  evacuation  of  Israeli  settlements  in  keeping  the  two-state
framework  has  also  tended  to  be  postponed  and  avoided  by  Israeli  political
leaders  even, as we noted above, when these leaders were conducting  the Oslo
process  between  1993  and  2000.  But this  changed  in December  2003  when
Ariel  Sharon  announced  his  unilateral  plan  to  disengage  from  Gaza.  That
announcement  had the effect of galvanizing people's sentiments  about  the  set-
tlements.  Those  who  were  for  them  became  more  vocal  and  strident  than
before,  as did  those  who  were against  them,  and those  who  sat  on  the  fence
were  forced  to choose  sides.  On  the right of return issue, however,  there  has
been  no  such  concrete  announcement  or  plan  by  Palestinian  politicians,  and
thus discussions  about the  implementation  of the  return,  when  they do occur,
lack the urgency and concreteness of the current and ongoing discussions about
the settlements  and tend to be  more philosophical  and abstract.
e.  Institutions and Fora  for Debate
Israel is a mature multi-party  democracy  with well-developed  institutions
that allow for political  and intellectual debates about the settlements (and other
matters), not just in the Knesset, but also in the newspapers,  universities, cafes,
and in all the other institutions that facilitate a healthy public exchange of ideas.
In  comparison,  the Palestinian  Territories  lack  the  apparatus  of  independent
statehood,  and the  institutions  of the  Palestinian  Authority  are  immature  and
less in comparison.  The Palestinian  Authority  has held  two elections  since its
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creation,...  and in  neither election  was there  been  widespread  discussion  and
debate about the meaning  and the scope of the right of return.  And as we  have
noted  before, among  Palestinian  intellectuals and  academics,  the discussion  of
this  subject  is  more muted and less  freely  conducted.
f  Representation
Another difference  between  the internal  conflicts  relates  to the complexi-
ties  concerning  representation.  With  respect  to  the  Israeli  settlements,  while
there is certainly internal debate over whether there should or needs to be some
sort of referendum  among  Israelis before  land  is  traded for peace  and settlers
are evacuated,  it is plain that the Israeli government  will claim the authority to
make the decision on behalf of the state of Israel.  For Palestinian refugees,  on
the  other hand,  it is  less  clear  that  the  Palestinian  Authority  can  legitimately
make a deal on behalf of those refugees living outside the West Bank and Gaza
whose claims would be affected.  More that two million refugees currently  live
outside  the  geographic  boundaries  of what  will become  the Palestinian  state,
and it is not at all clear who speaks for them; how, if at all, they should partici-
pate in a ratification process; and what is to happen if a majority of Palestinians
presently living within  the West Bank and  Gaza approve  a deal along the Clin-
ton lines.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Our introduction  suggested  the  paradoxical  nature  of the Israeli-Palestin-
ian  conflict  from  the  perspective  of  a  negotiation  analyst:  while  a  majority
within each community  tells pollsters  that it accepts the basic notion of a two-
state  solution,  Israeli  and  Palestinian  leaders  seem unable  to reach  agreement
notwithstanding the fact that the essential terms of a two-state deal are reasona-
bly clear.  The  explanation,  we  suggest,  relates  to  internal  "behind-the-table"
conflicts among Israeli Jews about the settlements project and among Palestini-
ans  about the  scope  and  meaning of the  right of return.
Since the  lecture  on which this paper is based  was delivered  in March of
2005,  a great  deal has  transpired:  Prime  Minister Sharon  successfully  imple-
mented  the  "unilateral"  evacuation  of  Gaza;  Sharon  and  his  former  nemesis
Shimon Peres  launched  Kadima,  a new centrist political party; Sharon became
incapacitated  by a stroke, and Ehud Olmert became acting Prime Minister; and
Hamas won a surprising political victory  in the Palestinian legislative elections.
By the time this article appears there  will be  a new governments  both in Israel
and  for the  Palestinian  Authority.
The quick condemnations of the third track initiatives by some Israelis  and
Palestinians and the recent electoral success  of Hamas serve  as a useful remind-
ers that there  are some within  each community  who explicitly  and vehemently
reject the idea that there should be two states  in the land between the Mediterra-
nean  Sea  and the Jordan  River.  The  charter of Hamas  explicitly  calls for the
destruction  of Israel  and the restoration of all of "Palestine"  to the Palestinian
226  Palestinian  National  Authority,  http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/Elections-in
Palestine.asp  (last  visited Jan.  28,  2006).
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people.  Some Israelis would have Israel annex all  of the West Bank and dream
of  sending  its  Palestinian  population  to  Jordan  or  elsewhere  in  the  Arab
world.227
In  addition  to  those  who  explicitly  reject  a  two-state  solution,  there  are
many  more  within  each  community  who  pay  lip  service  to  the idea  but  take
positions  that,  as  a  practical  matter,  are  profoundly  inconsistent  with  what
would be required  to make  such a solution viable.  On the Palestinian  side, this
group includes those leaders  and individuals who publicly declare their support
for the two-state solution  but who  at the same  time insist on an  individual  and
collective  right of return that  might  permit large  numbers  of Palestinian  refu-
gees to  return  to Israel  and thus  threaten the  continued  existence of Israel as  a
democratic  Jewish  state.  Given  the  PLO's  competition  with  Hamas,  that the
PLO leadership persists in rhetorically claiming a broad right of return becomes
more understandable.  It allows the PLO to support the idea of a two-state  solu-
tion while undercutting one of the most powerful objections to it by those refu-
gees  who  still dream  of going  "home." ' 228
What  is  problematic  about  this  stance,  however,  is  that  it  reinforces
unrealistic  expectations  among  some  refugees.  Moreover,  no  Israeli  leader
would conceivably  accept  a deal granting  a broad  "right of return"  because  of
the demographic  and security risks entailed  and because of the ideological  con-
sequences.  Today  a substantial  minority  of Israeli  citizens  (about twenty  per-
cent)  are  Palestinian  Arabs.  Israeli  Jews  fear  that  broad  recognition  of  a
Palestinian  right of return would  soon create  an  Arab  majority  within  what  is
now Israel.  In the eyes of most Israelis,  this demographic  change would mean
Israel  would  no  longer  remain  the  Jewish  homeland  and  a  Jewish  state. 229
Instead,  what is now  a Jewish  democratic  state  would either become a second
state controlled by Palestinians or an undemocratic  state that limited Palestinian
political participation.
On the Israeli  side, there are also those who pay lip service to the two-state
solution, but persist in taking positions  that would make its durable implemen-
tation  impractical.  This group  includes  those  within  Likud's  leadership  who
declare  their support  for  the two-state  solution  but who  continue  at  the  same
time  to insist  that Israel  must  retain  and even  expand  settlements  that would
make impossible the creation of a Palestinian  state with  a contiguous  region in
the  West Bank.
No Palestinian  leader  could conceivably  accept  a  deal  unless  it  provides
for a contiguous  state encompassing nearly all of the West Bank (along with, of
227  There is, of course, a small third group:  Some Palestinians  and Israelis believe that there
should be a one  secular, "bi-national"  democratic  state.
228  The conflict  between the  PLO and Hamas-at least  in terms of their articulated  differ-
ences-do  not center on the scope and meaning  of the right of return but instead  on the role
of  religion  in  public  life  and  whether  the  legitimacy  of Israel's  right  to  exist  should  be
acknowledged  at  all.  Hamas  is  a grass  roots  fundamentalist Islamic  religious  organization
while the PLO  has always  had a  secular, non-denominational  ideology.
229  See, e.g.,  Orna Ben-Naftali  & Keren  R.  Michaeli,  'We  Must Not Make a Scarecrow of
the Law': A  Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted  Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
233,  245 n.46  (2003).
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course,  East  Jerusalem  and  Gaza). 230  As  a  practical  matter,  this  deal  would
require  that all the settlements  be evacuated.  While  some have  suggested  that
Jewish settlers should be allowed to remain but be subject to the protection and
control  of a new  Palestinian  state, this  seems  unlikely  to  create  a  stable solu-
tion.  There is widespread Palestinian  hostility towards  the Jewish  settlers who
are seen as having  illegally dispossessed  Palestinians  of their land.  If a Jewish
settlement  came Iunder  attack  and  was  not  adequately  protected  by  the  new
Palestinian  state, Israel  would  face irresistible  pressure  to intervene  and come
to its aid.  Within Israel, there is a widely shared notion that the state has a duty
to the extent  possible  to defend  Jews anywhere  in the  world.  Israeli interven-
tion  in a neighboring  state on behalf on former  Israeli citizens,  many of whom
would have relatives  or co-workers in Israel, would seem inevitable.  Knowing
this,  a Palestinian negotiator is likely  to insist on the  evacuation of the Jewish
settlers.
The recent evacuation  of the Jewish settlements  in Gaza offers some hope
but also serves as a sobering reminder of the difficulties  inherent in these inter-
nal  conflicts."'  There  are  grounds  for  both  optimism  and  pessimism.  The
good  news  relates  to  the  basic  fact  that  Israel  was  able  to  evacuate  without
bloodshed  over  8500 Jewish  settlers,  notwithstanding  fierce  internal  political
opposition.  Israel did prove to itself that it had the capacity, through  its politi-
cal  institutions, to relocate  settlers.  After fierce internal debate in Israel regard-
ing  disengagement,  the  conflict  was  resolved  through  the  formal  political
process.  The  plan was approved  by the  cabinet  and the  Parliament, and  stood
the  test of judicial  review  by the Israeli  Supreme  Court.
The sobering news relates to how difficult this relatively  small evacuation
proved  to be,  and  to  the  demands  it imposed  on  Israel's  material  resources,
political  institutions,  and  leadership.  Today  there  are  more  Jewish  settlers
remaining  in  the  Occupied  Territories  than  there  were  when  Sharon  first
announced  his initiative in December 2003.  While the Sharon government was
relocating  settlers  from  Gaza  and  the  northern  West  Bank,  it  was  simultane-
ously  expanding  settlements  in other parts of the West Bank.  A  day after the
last Israeli  soldier left Gaza, both Prime Minister Sharon, and Defense Minister,
Shaul Mofaz, vowed to "strengthen the settlement blocks. 232  In this sense, far
from resolving  the internal  conflict, the Gaza evacuation  can be seen a contin-
230  While some  have suggested  that the West Bank settlers might remain  but be subject to
the  protection  and  control  of a  new  Palestinian  state,  Palestinian  hostility  towards  them
makes  this outcome  unlikely,  particularly  given the widely  shared  notion  within Israel  that
the state  has a duty  to come to  the aid of Jews  outside of Israel if they  came under attack.
See,  e.g.,  Yossi  Melman,  Ha'Mossad Hya  Rotze  Limno'a Pigu'im Be'Rahvey  Ha'Olam,
HA'ARETZ,  Nov.  11,  2003,  available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?
itemNo=361556  (in Hebrew).
231  It  bears  emphasis, of course, that this unilateral  Israeli initiative was  not the  product of
Israeli-Palestinian  negotiations  and  in  no  way  addressed  the  final  status  issues  relating  to
permanent  borders  or refugees  that  must be  resolved  for  a  comprehensive  resolution.  Its
implementation  and  aftermath nonetheless  provide  a number  of important insights  relevant
to the  internal conflicts  that  are the  focus of this  paper.
232  United Nations  Information System on  the Question  of Palestine,  Chronological  Review
of Events  Relating to the Question of Palestine (Sep.  16,  2005), http://domino.un.org/UNIS-
PAL.NSF  (then  follow "search"  hyperlink;  then  search  by title  and  date) (last  visited  Sept.
20, 2005).  In  part, this strategy  is intended to mollify the right in the internal Israeli  debate,
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ued  form of deferral  which  may  make the  internal  questions  more  difficult  to
resolve  in  the  long  run.
The  events  leading  up  to  the  Gaza  withdrawal  as  well  as  its  aftermath
suggest the  monumental leadership  challenges on both sides.  The Israeli with-
drawal  was  not  a  consequence  of  any  across  the  table  negotiations  between
Israel and the  Palestinians, but rather a unilateral act  initiated and implemented
by  Israel  alone.  No  Palestinian  leader  was  required  to  take  any  actions  that
required  diminishing  the  scope  of a  right of return.
On the Israeli side,  it took Sharon,  the former champion  of the settlement
movement  and a leader known to have a will of iron,  to pull off this important
but modest evacuation of settlements.  That Prime Minister  Sharon would sur-
vive the challenge,  either politically or physically, was by no means  clear.  The
Israeli  security  services  took very  seriously  the  threat  that  a  Jewish  assassin
might try  and kill Sharon to prevent the implementation  of the plan.  Nor was
his  political  survival  assured.  If following  the  March  2006  elections,  Ehud
Olmert  becomes  Prime Minister,  it  remains  open to  question  whether  he  will
have  the  political  capital  to bring  about further  settlement  evacuations  in the
West  Bank.He  plainly  lacks  Prime  Minister's  Sharon's  national  security
credentials.
The  Gaza  evacuation  serves  as  a  useful  reminder  that  the evacuation  of
Jewish settlements  in the West Bank and  the resolution  of the Palestinian  refu-
gee issue will require extraordinary  amounts of resources and government insti-
tutional  capacity  to  implement  decisions  involving  the  relocation  of  large
numbers of people. The costs of resettling those Palestinians who now reside in
refugee camps outside of the West Bank and Gaza, let alone  the costs of fairly
compensating  those Palestinians  for their loss of property  when they fled Israel
will  amount to  untold billions  of dollars.  Unwinding  the  settlement  project in
Gaza  were far greater than the costs of creating it in  the first place:  avoidance
and deferral  are expensive.  The Gaza evacuation required  an enormous  invest-
ment  of  resources  to  relocate  less  than  four  percent  of  the  settlers.  Israel
deployed  five Army divisions  to carry  out the operation and evacuate  less than
10,000 settlers and Israel earmarked  over a billion dollars to relocate these  set-
tlers  and to fund  various  other  activities related  to  the  relocation.
The impressive fashion  in  which the Israeli  police and military  combined
empathy  and assertiveness  in evacuating the Gaza settlers  has important  impli-
cations  for  the  broader  internal  conflicts.  In  Gaza,  the  soldiers  and  police
charged  with  physically  removing  the  settlers  were  unarmed  but  deployed  in
overwhelming  numbers.  They  were patient,  sympathetic  and  sometimes even
tearful but also firm and purposeful.  In resolving the broader internal conflicts,
national  leadership  will also  need to combine  both empathy  and  assertiveness.
Israeli  leaders  must show  empathy  for those  West Bank  settlers  who will
need to leave their houses and dismantle their communities.  Palestinian leaders
will  need  to  show  empathy  for  those  refugees  who  will  need to  give  up  the
dream of ever returning  to their ancestral  homes.  Leaders  on both  sides  also
need  to be  assertive.  The  Israelis  should, as  they  did in the  summer of 2005,
as Sharon  could argue  that while the  settlement project  was  rolled back in one place,  it was
in fact  buttressed  in another.
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signal to  the settlers  that if a democratic  government  should decide  to relocate
them,  the  decision  will  be  carried  out.  The  Palestinian  leaders  must  also  be
assertive.  Most of all,  they need  to  say  in public what  they  admit in private:
most refugees,  after sixty  years  of dispossession,  will  never be able  to regain
their lands  in what is now Israel.  For too long, Palestinian  and Israeli  leaders
have fed false hopes:  that the refugees  will be able to choose  to return  and that
Jews would  be able to  settle Eretz  Israel.  It is time to end this pattern.